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Preface
We help companies to grow by helping them to raise capital. Companies
that grow create wealth. This, in turn, allows people to have jobs that
create more wealth and more wealth. It’s a virtuous cycle.
Lloyd Blankfein, chief executive officer of Goldman Sachs, The Sunday Times,
November 8, 2009
At first glance, the economic literature can provide support for this assessment. Bank
activity is credited with positive effects on economic growth (Levine 2005), the pro-
motion of entrepreneurship (Guiso et al. 2004), the alleviation of poverty (Beck et al.
2007) and the mitigation of volatility in investment and growth (Aghion et al. 2014).
This is attributed to the different functions that are performed by banks. Among
others, this includes the reduction of transaction costs, the economizing on screening
and monitoring costs and the management of liquidity risk. Thus, bank activity can
significantly contribute to the efficient allocation of scarce resources.
Within the eurozone, banking supervisory authorities seemed to be confident in the
creation of a virtuous cycle when they observed an increase in the total assets on
resident bank balance sheets of more than 120% between 1998 and 2008.1 Considering
the revenue of the US finance industry, which experienced a proportional growth in
income (Philippon2015), this assessmentwas right. In other regard, it provednot tobe
the case. Rather, the sharp increase of banking activity contributed to amisallocation
of financial capital to specific sectors, e.g. housing (European Systemic Risk Board
2014). When interventions were finally implemented, the costs became visible. By
the end of 2011, rescue operations targeted at the Euro area banking sector resulted
in gross fiscal costs of 3.9% of GDP and an average increase in national public debt of
1See ECB data http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=bbn137
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19.9% (Laeven and Valencia 2012).2
Non surprisingly, thus, regulatory policies towards the banking sector have become
central in the political debate.3 Importantly, past experience suggest that the design of
the future regulatory frameworkwill be strongly influenced by two factors. Regulatory
competition between countries and political considerations within countries. This
thesis explicitly accounts for these factors. Thereby, it aims at deriving results that
arenewto the literature onbanking regulationand thusprovidehelp in the explanation
and assessment of recent developments in the regulatory framework.
First, with bank capital being highly mobile, national regulatory decisions interde-
pend. In theory, here, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision provides a fo-
rum for regulatory cooperation between all financially developed countries. However,
lacking any sanctioning authority, countries have departed from this global frame-
work.4 Surprisingly, deviations have been to both directions, undercutting but also
reinforcing selected global standards that are determined in the current Basel 3 ac-
cord. On the one hand, the United States have already increased the capital standards
for their largest banks from 3 to 6 percent.5 At the same time, a recent assessment
of the Bank for International Settlement on the implementation of Basel 3 within the
European Union concluded that the overall EU capital regulations were ”materially
non-compliant” with the Basel 3 framework.6
Interestingly, so far, the theoretical literature could only predict a deviation below the
cooperative global standard (Sinn 1997, 2003; Dell’Ariccia andMarquez, 2006). How-
ever, as shown in chapter 1, this assessment was due to the narrow focus of the existing
literature on the profit maximization of a homogenous banking sector. In contrast,
once heterogeneous bank quality as well as entrepreneurial and taxpayer concerns are
introduced, the analysis shows that it becomes attractive for countries to deviate above
the cooperatively set global standards. Following on this, chapter 2 analyzes the in-
teraction between capital standards and resolution procedures in a framework where
2Gross fiscal cost consist primarily on bank recapitalizations and asset purchases. While net
fiscal costs, e.g. after asset recoveries were significantly lower in some cases, still a large amount
of public funds was put at risk during the process.
3See Freixas (2010) and Beck (2013) for assessments on the failures of pre-crisis banking
regulations and on the implications for the design of the post-crisis regulatory framework.
4See BIS 2015 for a report on the adoption of the Basel regulatory framework in all countries
that are member of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision.
5See www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20140408a.htm
6See www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d300.pdf
2
Preface
each of these regulatory instruments can be coordinated internationally. Thereby, this
chapter shows that the divergence in capital standards between the US and Europe
can be explained by their different approaches towards the centralization of resolution
mechanisms for resident multinational bank subsidiaries.
Besides international aspects, the distributional effects of regulatory interventions in
the banking sector give room to a systematic role of politics. Calomiris and Haber
(2014) document this in an impressive way. Providing historical patterns, the authors
demonstrate the role of banking regulation in the creation and persistence of rents.
Thereby, they show how differences in the size, competitive structure and stability of
banking systems are determined by the ability of independent institutions to limit the
influence of rent seeking interest groups. Building on these insights, the third chapter
of this thesis studies the regulation of banks’ sovereign bond holdings. The analysis
shows that, by changing a bank’s investment policy, the privilege of government bonds
creates a financing entry barrier to the private sector that generates rents for wealthy
producers and bank owners. It thus creates its own political support by maintaining
those rents.
All results of this thesis are derived within a microeconomic framework. Therefore,
this thesis builds on previous work about the characteristics of the banking sector and
the need for regulatory intervention therein. A specific feature of the banking sec-
tor is the existence of a deposit insurance system, which is present in all financially
developed countries.7 The necessity of this system has been well studied in the theo-
retical literature (Bryant, 1980; Diamond und Dybvig, 1983; Diamond, 1984). Due to
the role of banks as a provider of (long-term) credits and guaranteer of (short-term)
fund availability, the stability of the banking sector crucially depends on the trust of
its customer. Thereby, deposit insurance systems should act as a backstop for nega-
tive expectations becoming self-fulfilling and, then, creating negative welfare effects
through the liquidation of investment projects. Critically, as shown in the analysis of
Acharya and Dreyfuss (1988) and Chan et al. (1992), asymmetric information and
timing problems prevent regulation authorities from charging banks with adequate
insurance premiums. This in turn provides the incentive for bank owners to take on
overly risky projects.8
7See Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt et al 2014 for a global database of deposit insurance arrangements.
8Raising this problem to higher power, many authors have shown the spillover effect from the
malfunction of single banks to the entire banking sector (Allen and Gale, 2000; Diamond and
Rajan, 2005).
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Coping with this problem, various regulatory instruments are discussed in the liter-
ature. These include, deposit interest rate ceilings (Hellmann et al. 2000), market
entry barriers (Cordella and Yeyatti 2002) and supervisory activity (Goodhart and
Schoenmaker 1995). However, the main emphasis has been placed on the regulation
of the bank funding structure. Here, main contributions emphasize two stabilising ef-
fects of capital standards, which determine the amount of equity that the bank has
to invest (Rochet, 1992, Dewatripont und Tirole, 1994, Repullo, 2004, Morrison und
White, 2005). On the one hand, due to the subordinated status of equity in the order
of repayment, higher capital standards increase the capability of banks to take losses
before becoming insolvent. At the same time, an increase in capital standards reduces
the degree to which bank owners can externalize costs to the deposit insurance system
in case of bank default. Consequently, the incentive to choose inefficiently high risk
projects is reduced.
All chapters within this thesis depart from the fact that incentives within the bank-
ing sector are distorted due to the existence of a deposit insurance system and that
regulation authorities can limit the moral hazard behavior by banks through the im-
plementation of capital standards. In the following, I will give a brief overview of the
lines of argument developed in each chapter. All chapters are based on self-contained
paperswhich can be read separately. Chapter 1 and 3 are based on co-authored papers.
Chapter 1 studies regulatory competition in the banking sector in a model with three
distinct features. First, the model allows for banks that are heterogeneous in their
monitoring ability, and hence in their expected profitability. This implies that the
least profitable banks will exit themarket in response to tougher capital requirements.
In turn, this benefits the remaining national banks as loan-taking firms will value the
improve in the pool quality of the national banking sector. Second, the model incor-
porates competitive firms that use bank credit to produce output. This allows the
analysis of changes in the consumer surplus that are associated with tightened capi-
tal standards. Finally, the model also accounts for the concerns about national public
finances by introducing a savings deposit insurance scheme that must be funded by
taxpayers in the event of bank failure. The main result of this chapter is that when
governments care equally about their banking sectors, consumers and taxpayers, the
non-cooperative setting of capital standards will lead to higher levels of capital reg-
ulation than is optimal from a cooperative perspective. This result can be explained
as follows: higher capital standards in one country shift some of the loan volume to
the foreign country, but reduce the aggregate loan volume in the integrated market.
4
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This increases the profits of foreign banks but simultaneously hurts both taxpayers
and consumers in the foreign country. At the same time, the selection effect of capital
regulation increases the profitability of high-quality banks in the country that imposes
the tougher regulation, but it reduces the net increase in profits for the foreign bank-
ing sector. On net, the externalities of capital regulation on the foreign country are
therefore negative. This chapter is based on unpublished work carried out jointly with
Prof. Dr. Andreas Haufler, University of Munich.
Chapter 2 introduces a model where countries compete for the investment of multina-
tional bank subsidiaries. While each country benefits from the investment in normal
times, costs arise in case that the subsidiary is hit by a shock and has to default. There
exist two regulatory instruments to curb these costs. First, each regulator can impose
capital standards for the subsidiary that is resident in its country. However, as this
reduces the subsidy from deposit insurance, a unilateral increase will lead to the real-
location of investment to the subsidiary that is located in the other country. Second,
each regulation authority can intervene into the operation of its resident subsidiary
whenever the probability of default is sufficiently large. Here, national regulators fail
to account for the international spillovers that are caused by the reallocation of capital
within the multinational bank network in case of unilateral shocks. As an important
result, this model shows that moving from a national to a global intervention regime
changes the non-cooperative equilibrium of capital standards. The model then ana-
lyzes the welfare effect of different intervention regimes. Here, it can define a condition
that whenever bank investment is sufficiently profitable and mobile and thus the ex-
ternality that arises due to non-cooperative capital standards is large, moving from a
national resolution regime with too little intervention towards a more centralized in-
tervention regime is welfare decreasing. This result arises due the interdependence
of the externalities at different stages within the regulatory framework so that their
impact can either be mutually amplified or weakened by unilateral actions.
Chapter 3 analyzes the capital regulation of sovereign bonds in a political economy
framework. In this model a monopolist bank can allocate its funds between sovereign
bonds and loans to entrepreneurs. Critically, the bank’s loan supply is affected by the
expectation about its payoff in the case of sovereign default. Capital standards for
sovereign bonds affect this optimization. Given the existence of the deposit insurance
system, zero capital requirements for sovereign bonds do not incentivize banks to
create a buffer that can take losses caused by sovereign default. Then, however, bank
owners anticipate that in case of sovereign bond default, the expected return from
5
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loans will not accrue to them but only reduce the cost of the deposit insurance system.
Given the fixed costs of funding, this will cause banks to increase the marginal return
of each loan and, thus, reduce the total supply of loans. Obviously, this effect is more
pronounced if the sovereign bond is perceived to be more risky. Crucially, a subgroup
of wealthy producers is not affected by the deterioration in bank funding conditions.
For this group, their wealth endowment provides themwith collateral to overcome the
asymmetric information problem so that they can borrow directly from investors. The
model thus shows how the privilege of government bonds in capital regulation causes
less lending and thereby creates a financing entry barrier to the private sector. Further,
the model illustrates the heterogeneous effects within the production sector. While
all producers earn production rents due the financial entry barrier, producers that are
dependent on bank loans suffer from artificially high funding costs. Therefore, as an
important result, this chapter shows how an inefficient status quo in sovereign bond
regulation can affect the composition of the production sector such that the majority
of incumbents supports the maintenance of this distortive regulatory framework as an
entry barrier for new competitors. This chapter is based on unpublished work carried
out jointly with Dr. Florian Buck, University of Munich.
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Regulatory competition in capital
standards with selection effects
among banks
1.1 Introduction
The regulation of banks, and in particular the setting of capital adequacy standards,
is arguably one of the most important policy issues in the aftermath of the financial
crisis. In many countries, large, commercial banks needed to be recapitalized with
public funds in recent years. In several countries, such as Ireland or Iceland, the public
bailout was so massive that it threatened the entire state of public finances. The new
Basel III capital standards, which foresee the ratio of core capital to rise to 7 percent
of the banks’ outstanding loans until 2019, are therefore widely believed to represent a
critical step forward in ensuring more resilient banking sectors around the world.1 At
the same time, the higher capital standards are also expected to lead to a consolidation
of banking sectors, with smaller or weaker banks having to exit the market.
The financial sectors of many countries have grown dramatically in recent decades and
This chapter is based on joint work with Andreas Haufler.
1Thus Mervyn King, then Governor of the Bank of England, noted in October 2010 that
“the broad answer to the problem [of finding adequate regulatory tools] is likely to be remark-
ably simple. Banks should be financed much more heavily by equity rather than short-term
debt” (www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/speeches/2010/speech455.pdf). Simi-
larly, Timothy Geithner, then U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, emphasized in February 2010 that
“first, we are going to make sure that financial firms hold a lot more capital than they did before
the crisis” (www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg808.aspx).
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represent an important source of value added, highly paid jobs, and - in good times - tax
revenue.2 Therefore, an important concern in policy discussions is that the national
setting of higher capital adequacy standards will not distort international competition
between the banking sectors of different countries, and maintain a ‘level playing field’.
Interestingly, however, it is by no means clear whether individual countries, which
may be tempted to pursue ‘beggar-thy-neighbor’ policies, have an incentive to set
their national capital standards above or below that of neighboring jurisdictions. On
the one hand is the conventional concern that maintaining low adequacy rules reduces
the cost of doing business for domestic banks, thus securing an ‘unfair’ advantage in
the international competition for bank customers. As an example, several critical
voices were raised in the United States during 2011 against the new Basel rules, and
the implementation of these rules was eventually delayed. This raised concerns among
several European policymakers that the United States might eventually refrain from
adopting the tighter Basel III standards for its banks.3
On the other hand, several countries, such as Switzerland, have enacted capital stan-
dards that substantially exceed the Basel rules. Similarly, the United Kingdom an-
nounced inMay 2012 that it planned to introduce national capital requirements above
the Basel standards to protect domestic taxpayers. This announcement also met with
resistance from most EU partners, who favored instead a strict harmonization of na-
tional capital requirements along the Basel standards.4 This suggests that there may
also be fears of a competitive advantage for banking sectors that operate under capital
standards above those of their competitors.5
This chapter studies regulatory competition in capital standards for thebanking sector
in a model that incorporates several of the concerns that have featured prominently
2Auerbach et al. (2010, Figure 9.5) document the increasing fiscal importance of the financial
sector in the United States and the United Kingdom. In both countries, corporate tax revenues
from financial corporations made up more than 25% of total corporate tax revenues in 2003, before
the financial crisis.
3See “Delay seen in implementing U.S. bank capital rules”. Reuters, November 9, 2012.
4See “European Leaders to weigh new capital requirements for banks”, The New York Times,
May 1, 2012.
5Nevertheless, the United States and the United Kingdom went ahead to implement a regula-
tion of the leverage ratio that differs from the international standard. While the Basel III schedule
now foresees a leverage ratio of 3% within the Pillar 1 capital framework becoming effective in
2018 (http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs270.pdf), the United States will demand an additional buffer
of 2% from its largest banks (www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20140408a.htm).
In the United Kingdom the leverage ratio of 3% already became effective on July 1, 2014
(http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/pra/Documents/publications/ss/2013/ss313.pdf).
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in these recent policy debates. Our model allows for banks that are heterogeneous in
theirmonitoring ability, andhence in their expectedprofitability. This implies that the
least profitable banks will exit themarket in response to tougher capital requirements.
In this framework, national capital standards cause selection effects, as loan-taking
firms anticipate that higher capital standards will drive the least efficient banks from
the market and thus improve the pool quality of banks in the regulating country. A
second distinguishing feature of our model is that it incorporates the repercussions
that changes in the availability and the price of credit have on the real economy. Thus
our model incorporates competitive firms that use bank credit to produce output.
This allows us to incorporate changes in consumer surplus that are associated with
tightened capital standards. Finally, we also incorporate the concerns about national
public finances by introducing a savings deposit insurance scheme thatmust be funded
by taxpayers in the event of bank failure.
Themain result of our analysis is thatwhengovernments care equally about their bank-
ing sectors, consumers and taxpayers, the non-cooperative setting of capital standards
will lead to higher levels of capital regulation than is optimal from a cooperative per-
spective. In other words, non-cooperative behavior of governments leads to a ‘race to
the top’ in capital regulation.6 This result, which contradicts the findings in the ex-
isting literature (see below), can be explained as follows: higher capital standards in
one country shift some of the loan volume to the foreign country, but reduce the aggre-
gate loan volume in the integrated market. This increases the profits of foreign banks
but simultaneously hurts both taxpayers and consumers in the foreign country. At
the same time, the selection effect of capital regulation increases the profitability of
high-quality banks in the country that imposes the tougher regulation, but it reduces
the net increase in profits for the foreign banking sector. On net, the externalities of
capital regulation on the foreign country are therefore negative.
Our analysis is related to several strands in the existing literature. A first set of pa-
pers analyzes the effects of capital regulation on financial institutions (Rochet, 1992;
Hellman et al., 2000; Repullo, 2004). This literature stresses that capital regulation
increases the risk buffer of banks and curbs risky behaviour. In one of the few contri-
butions that incorporate bank heterogeneity, Morrison and White (2005) show that
capital regulation also serves to address adverse selection problems in the banking
6This is very different from the issue of tax harmonization, for example, where the concern is
almost exclusively about a downward competition of tax rates (see Fuest et al., 2005, for a survey).
Where EU-wide legislation exists, as in the field of value-added taxation, only minimum tax rates
are therefore stipulated.
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sector. Another paper that models bank heterogeneity in a framework with capital
regulation is Kopecky and VanHoose (2006). All these models stress that capital reg-
ulation is costly for banks. An opposing view is taken by Admati et al. (2010), who
argue that higher capital requirements reduce the risk premia incorporated in banks’
equity capital, and therefore need not raise the overall financing costs of banks.
The existing literature on regulatory competition in the banking sector stresses the
result that nationally set capital standards are inefficiently low from a global welfare
perspective. Sinn (1997, 2003) models the competition in regulatory standards as
a direct application of the classical lemons problem (Akerlof, 1970), arguing that
consumers are unable to discriminate between different levels of regulatory quality.
Acharya (2003) models competition between bank regulators that choose both the
level of capital requirements and the bailout policy when banks become insolvent.
Our approach is closest to Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2006), where regulators choose
nationally optimal capital requirements by trading off the aggregate level of banks’
profits against the benefits of financial stability. None of these papers incorporates
heterogeneity of banks, nor abenefit to thebanking sector that arises fromthe selection
effect of higher capital standards.
A reputation effect that benefits banks is also present in the model of Morrison and
White (2009). In their framework, however, the beneficial effect arises from the quality
of the regulator, for which capital requirements act as a substitute. Hence, high
capital requirements act as a negative signal in their paper, contrary to our approach.
Moreover,MorrisonandWhite (2009)donotmodel international competitionbetween
banks and their focus is on the question whether a uniform regulatory standard is
beneficial for countries thatdifferwith respect to thequality of their national regulator.
A different channel for cross-border spillover effects of decentralized bank regulation is
presented in the empirical papers by Houston et al. (2012) and Ongena et al. (2013).
They show that multinational banks that face higher minimum capital requirements
in their home country tend to take on higher risk in foreign markets. Further, Carbo-
Valverde et al. (2012) demonstrate that cross-border banking mergers can be partly
explained by differences in the size and character of safety-net benefits available to
banks in individual EU countries. Thus, in this strand of the literature, the spillover
effect of national bank regulation is due to the reallocation of cross-border activities
by multinational banks. Contrary, in our model, the spillover effect is due to the
change in the structure of the national banking sector that affects competition on the
international market.
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The heterogeneity of banks that we model in this chapter has become an important
topic in the recent international trade literature. Buch et al. (2011) show a close
empirical link between size, productivity and international activity in the banking
sector that is similar to the well-established patterns for the manufacturing sector.
Niepmann (2013) develops a model of banking across borders model that is driven
by both differences in factor endowments and differences in banking sector efficiency.
Finally, the recent public economics literature has stressed the qualitative similarities
between regulation and taxation of the financial sector (Keen, 2011). It has also
provided first empirical results showing that recent bank levies have been effective in
increasing the equity-to-asset ratio of European banks (Devereux et al. 2013).
The remainder of this chapter is set upas follows. Section 1.2 describes thebasicmodel.
Section 1.3 analyzes the nationally optimal regulation policy. Section 1.4 derives the
outcome of regulatory competition between the two countries. Section 1.5 discusses
various extensions of our benchmark model. Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 The model
1.2.1 Banks
We consider a region of two countries i ∈ {1, 2}, which are identical in all respects.
Banks in each country extend loans to firms in an integrated regional market. In each
country, multiple, heterogeneous banks operate under the authority of a national regu-
lator who imposes capital requirements ki for all national banks. The number of active
banks in each country and the volume of loans given by each bank are endogenous.
Banks differ exogenously in their monitoring skills, which determines the quality q
of the individual bank.7 We assume that the variable q is distributed uniformly in
the interval [0,1] and it corresponds to the likelihood that the investment financed
by the individual bank’s loan is successful. Thus, our model effectively assumes that
7See Morrison and White (2005) for a similar assumption. The bank’s monitoring decision
could also be endogenized by assuming that banks differ exogenously in their monitoring costs
and each bank chooses the degree of monitoring optimally, given its cost. See, for example,
Dell’Ariccia and Marquez, 2006, for this modeling approach in a setting with homogeneous banks.
This however, would complicate our analysis without changing its qualitative results.
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the bank’s monitoring quality is the critical determinant in the success of firms.8
Importantly, the exogenous (monitoring) quality q is the individual bank’s private
information and it is not known by the firm taking a loan from this bank.
There are several ways in which the quality of a bank can improve the payoff to bor-
rowers during the production process. First, due to their repeated interaction with
different customers, banks acquire a knowledge that is complementary to that of firms
(see Boot and Thakor, 2000). In this sense, q can be interpreted as the general and
sector-specific expertise of an individual bank, which directly affects the probability
of successful production. Second, during the process of production, firms might face
additional random liquidity shocks that could force them to terminate the project.
Therefore, firms will optimally protect themselves by demanding lines of credit at
their bank (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1998). However, as shown by Boot et al. (1993),
the ability of banks to offer these flexible, discretionary financial contracts will depend
on the quality of the issuing bank. As a consequence, the probability of successful pro-
duction will again be a function of bank quality, when q is interpreted as the ability of
banks to monitor projects and thus manage the liquidity pool of its portfolio.9
Recent financial crises have illustrated the substantial benefits to firms of having long
and stable relationships to banks. Firms with stable bank relationships can draw on
existing lines of credit (Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010) and receive favorable credit
terms for new loans (Bolton et al., 2013). In the case of insolvency of its bank, a
firm loses these relationship-based cost advantages and may face credit constraints
from new banks that sharply reduce lending in order to comply with binding capital
requirements (Peek and Rosengren, 1997; Popov and Udell, 2012).
Each bank can fund itself either through equity capital, or through external funds,
which we take to be saving deposits of individuals. In line with common practice in
virtually all developed countries, we assume that the savings deposits are fully insured
by the government of the country inwhich the bank is located. Hence, and importantly
for our model, the (expected) costs of bank failures are borne by the taxpayers of the
banks’ residence country. Being fully insured against failure, depositors demand a
competitive return on their savings, which we normalize to unity. In contrast, equity
holders may demand a risk premium and the per-unit cost of equity is exogenously
8This extreme form of complementarity merely serves to simplify the analysis. The same
qualitative results would be obtained when the bank’s monitoring quality and the firm’s success
rate were positively, but not perfectly, correlated.
9See Inderst (2013) for a recent analyis where the expected payoff of projects depends on the
ability of banks to roll over loans.
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given by ρ ≥ 1.10
In our benchmark model we assume that individual banks are not able to signal their
quality to firms and the return per unit of loans is the same for all banks in case of
success. Therefore, no bank will choose to hold costly equity capital in excess of the
minimum level ki stipulated by the regulator.
11 The expected profits of a bank in
country i with quality q that chooses to distribute a total number of l loans are then
given by:
pii(q, l) = {q[Ri − (1− ki)]− kiρ}l −
1
2
bl2 . (1.1)
HereRi is the returnperunit of thebank’s loan,whichdependson the capital standards
set by the bank’s home country, but not on the individual quality of the bank. From
this gross loan rate the bank must deduct the costs of savings deposits (1− ki), which
are paid back by the bank only with its success probability q. The return on the
bank loan is zero, if the borrowing firm’s risky investment fails. In this case the bank
will also go bankrupt and savers will be compensated by payments from the national
deposit insurance fund. Equity holders of the bank are residual claimants and receive
all profits, less their opportunity costs ρki. Finally, the quadratic cost term (1/2)bl
2
represents transaction costs that are rising more than proportionally when the bank’s
level of operation rises. Hence this term limits the scale of operations in each bank.12
We assume that all banks are small relative to the overall loan market and hence take
Ri as given when choosing l. The optimal loan volume l for each bank is then given by
l∗i =
qφi − kiρ
b
, (1.2)
where we have defined the short-hand notation
φi ≡ Ri − 1 + ki (1.3)
to indicate the bank’s return per unit of its loans, net of the funding costs for savings
deposits. This term therefore represents the expected increase in the bank’s cash flow
10Admati et al. (2010) argue that the per-unit cost of equity should be endogenized, and it
should fall when the capital requirement is increased. In our model, however, a higher capital
requirement will always increase the bank’s overall costs of funds, because a higher equity share
reduces the value of implicit taxpayer subsidies. Therefore, ignoring the feedback effects of changes
in ki on the per-unit cost of equity capital ρ will not affect our results qualitatively.
11This assumption will be relaxed in Section 5, where we assume that imperfect signalling by
banks is possible.
12See Acharya (2003) for a similar assumption.
13
Regulatory competition in capital standards
when the success probability of a loan increases.
It is clear from (1.2) that the volume of lending for each bank increases in its quality
and the loan rate, while it decreases with the amount of capital the bank has to hold.
Thus, a better bank is also larger in equilibrium.13
Substituting (1.2) in (1.1) determines the optimized profits of a bank of quality q:
pi∗i (q) =
(qφi − kiρ)
2
2b
. (1.4)
The equilibrium number of banks in each country is determined by the condition that
the cutoff bank with quality qˆi receives zero expected profits from its operations:
pi(qˆi) = qˆiφi − kiρ = 0 . (1.5)
Consequently, only banks with qi ≥ qˆi will be active in the market. Equation (1.5)
shows that capital standards in country i directly affect the quality level qˆi of the
marginal bank, by increasing the cost of capital for all banks. As low-quality banks
benefit most from limited liability and cheap deposit funding, they are hit hardest by
an increase in capital standards. Without any capital requirements (ki = 0), all banks
will be active in themarket (qˆi = 0). In contrast, full equity financing of banks (ki = 1)
results in qˆi = ρ/Ri. Hence, a necessary condition for a positive number of banks to
stay in the market even with full equity financing is that the cost of equity ρ is lower
than the equilibrium return on loans Ri. We make this assumption in the following.
It remains to determine the aggregate loan volume of all active banks in country i. We
normalize the exogenously given number of potentially entering banks to unity. To
arrive at the aggregate loan volume, we integrate over the optimal loan volumes (1.2)
of all active banks. This gives
Li =
1∫
qˆi
li(q)dq =
(1− qˆi)(φ− kiρ)
2b
=
(1− qˆ)2φ
2b
. (1.6)
In the first expression, (1− qˆi) is the measure of active banks in country i, whereas the
13This corresponds to the empirical evidence in Buch et al. (2011). For a sample of more
than 2000 German banks, the authors find that bank productivity and bank size are positively
correlated, where productivity is measured either as labor productivity (assets/employees), or as
the bank-level difference between average revenues and marginal costs.
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remaining term on the RHS of (1.6) gives the average loan volume per active bank.14
The second step in (1.6) then uses (1.5) to simplify the resulting expression.
1.2.2 Firms and consumers
One of the features of our model is that we explicitly incorporate firms that use bank
loans to produce consumer goods. In the following sections this will allow us to study
the welfare effects of capital standards on banks, taxpayers and consumers.
We assume that there is a large number of identical, potential producers in a final
goods market, which do not have any private source of funds. The potential producers
compete for credit in an integrated loan market. Each firm that enters the market in
equilibrium demands one unit of credit to produce one unit of output. Total output
in the integrated market depends on the expected number of successful loans from
banks in both countries. Denoting the expected output produced with bank loans
from country i by yi, we get:
y ≡ yi + yj =
1∫
qˆi
qili(qi)dqi +
1∫
qˆj
qjlj(qj)dqj = Li
(
2 + qˆi
3
)
+ Lj
(
2 + qˆj
3
)
. (1.7)
It follows from our assumption of a uniform distribution of bank qualities q, and from
the fact that high-quality banks supply a larger volume of lending [see eq. (1.2)], that
at least two thirds of all loans will lead to successful production, even in the absence
of all capital requirements (qˆ = 0). Obviously this expected success rate increases
further, when capital requirements drive the worst banks from the market and qˆ > 0.
Nextwedetermine the loan rate thatfirmsarewilling topay tobanks in the competitive
equilibrium. All potential entrants in the final goods sector have to incur a uniform
fixed cost c for their projects. Further, as firms can not observe the quality of the
contracting bank, they have to form expectations about the average quality of loans
distributed by all banks located in country i. We denote this expected success rate of
loans originating from banks in country i by qei . If the investment is successful, the firm
sells its product in the integrated market for the homogeneous consumer good. This
output market is characterized by the inverse demand function p = A− y where A is
an indicator of market size. A firm will not repay the loan if its project fails, but the
14A comparison with eq. (1.2) shows that this term is the average of the loan volume chosen
by the best bank with q = 1, and the loan volume of the marginal entering bank with qˆi, which is
zero.
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fixed cost c has been incurred nevertheless. Thus, allowing for free entry of firms into
the output market, the zero profit condition for entering, risk-neutral firms is given by
qei (p−Ri) = c . (1.8)
Equation (1.8) implies that competitive, producing firms make zero profits in the
aggregate. Effectively, all (expected) profits are transferred to banks via the loan rate
Ri.
To derive the equilibrium loan rate in each country,Ri, we rearrange (1.8) and substi-
tute the inverse demand function p = A− y. This gives:
Ri = A−
c
qei
− y = A−
3c
2 + qˆi
− y ∀ i, j, i 6= j. (1.9)
In the second step of eq. (1.9) we have assumed that firms rationally anticipate the
average success rate of loans fromcountry i, which is givenby qei = (2+qˆi)/3 from(1.7).
Thus the loan price is decreasing in total output and in the amount of fixed costs c.
Moreover, (1.9) shows that loan rates are country-specific anddependpositively on the
expected quality of the banking sector in country i. A higher expected quality of the
banking sector reduces each firm’s probability of failure and thus raises its willingness
to pay for the loan. Hence, in our model, national capital requirements ki act as a
selection mechanism by affecting the pool quality of domestic banks, which in turn
affects the price that borrowers are willing to pay for a bank loan from country i.
Consequently the price of bank loans differs systematically between the two countries
whenever their capital requirementsdiffer,withbanks fromthecountrywith thehigher
expected average quality receiving a higher return.
1.2.3 Market equilibrium and welfare
To derive the market equilibrium, we substitute eq. (1.9) into (1.5) and, together
with (1.2), into (1.7). This yields a system of three simultaneous equations:
qˆ1
[
A−
3c
2 + qˆ1
− y − 1 + k1
]
= ρk1 (1.10)
qˆ2
[
A−
3c
2 + qˆ2
− y − 1 + k2
]
= ρk2 (1.11)
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y = y1 + y2 =
1
b
∫ 1
qˆ1
[
q2(A− y − 1 + k1)− qk1ρ− q
2
(
3c
2 + qˆ1
)]
dq
+
1
b
∫ 1
qˆ2
[
q2(A− y − 1 + k2)− qk2ρ− q
2
(
3c
2 + qˆ2
)]
dq (1.12)
Equations (1.10)–(1.12) jointly determine the cutoff qualities of banks, qˆ1 and qˆ2 and
the aggregate output level y, all as functions of the capital requirements imposed by
the two countries 1 and 2. These core variables then determine the total level of loans
from (1.6) and the loan rate from (1.9).
We consider a national regulator in each country i who sets capital requirements so as
to maximize national welfare. The welfare function of country i is given by:
Wi = αΠi + βTi + γ
S
2
, α, β, γ ≥ 0. (1.13)
Welfare in country i comprises the expected profits of all national banks that are active
in the regional market (Πi). In addition, the regulator considers the expected costs
to resident taxpayers when banks fail and depositors must be compensated for their
losses through thedeposit insurance fund (Ti). Finally, by affecting the supply of loans,
capital standards also affect aggregate output and hence consumer surplus. Since the
output market is regionally integrated, and the model is symmetric, we allocate one
half of the total consumer surplus in the integratedmarket to each of the two countries
(S/2).
These components of national welfare can be directly calculated from the equilibrium
in the loan market. Total profits in the banking sector of country i are given by
aggregating (1.2) over all active banks. This yields
Πi =
∫ 1
qˆi
(qφ− kiρ)
2
2b
dq =
(1− qˆi)φiLi
3
=
6by2i
(2 + qˆi)2(1− qˆi)
. (1.14)
Aggregate profits are the product of of the aggregate loan volumeLi and the net profit
per loan, as given by the difference between the gross loan rate Ri and the banks’
refinancing cost 1−ki+ρki. In the second step we have used (1.6) and (1.7) to express
profits solely as a function of aggregate output y = yi + yj, and of the common cutoff
quality of banks qˆ.
The expected losses borne by taxpayers in country i are determined by the share of
deposit financing, the aggregate loan volume, and the average failure probability of
country i’s banks. In line with past experience, we thus assume that the costs of bank
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failures are fully borne by taxpayers.15 We abstract from international contagion
effects and assume that the losses from failed banks arise only in the country in which
the bank is located.16 Aggregating and using (1.6) and (1.7) in the second step gives
Ti =
−(1− ki)
b
∫ 1
qˆi
(1− q)(qφi−kiρ)dq =
−(1− ki)(1− qˆi)Li
3
=
−(1− ki)(1− qˆi)yi
(2 + qˆi)
(1.15)
Finally, by affecting aggregate output, capital standards also affect the consumer
surplus in the integrated market. The total consumer surplus is
S =
1
2
(A− p)y =
y2
2
, (1.16)
which is shared equally between the two symmetric countries.
From(1.14)-(1.16)wecanthusdeterminetheeffectsof capital requirementsonnational
and regional welfare, as well as its components.
1.3 Nationally optimal capital standards
1.3.1 Equilibrium in the loan market
In this section we analyze the effects of capital requirements that are set non-
cooperatively by the two countries. Thus we are looking for a symmetric Nash equilib-
rium in the national policy instruments ki when each country maximizes the welfare
of its citizens, as given in (1.13). Appendix A.1 derives the responses of the endoge-
nous variables qˆi, qˆj, yi and yj in response to a unilateral increase in country i’s capital
requirement ki (where i 6= j). These are given by:
∂qˆi
∂ki
=
(ρ− qˆ)[6b(φ+ c˜qˆ) + 2φ(1− qˆ3)] + ρ(φ+ c˜qˆ)(2 + qˆ)(1− qˆ)2
2(φ+ c˜qˆ)Ω
> 0 (1.17)
15Several countries, such as Germany, are currently building up special funds financed by com-
pulsory bank levies, in order to make the banking sector participate in the costs of bank restruc-
turings. The size of these insurance funds is (still) very small, however. In Germany, for example,
the volume of this ‘restructuring fund’ is only slightly above 1 billion Euro after two years of
collecting bank levies, out of a target volume of 70 billion Euro.
16See Goodhart and Schoenmaker (2009); Niepmann and Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2013), and Beck
and Wagner (2013) for analyses of international regulatory coordination when bank failures in one
country have adverse effects on banks in the other country.
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∂qˆj
∂ki
=
qˆ(1− qˆ)κ
2(φ+ c˜qˆ)Ω
(1.18)
∂yi
∂ki
=
(1− qˆ)[6b(φ+ c˜qˆ) + 2φ(1− qˆ3)]κ
12b(φ+ c˜qˆ)Ω
(1.19)
∂yj
∂ki
=
−2φ(1− qˆ)(1− qˆ3)κ
12b(φ+ c˜qˆ)Ω
,
∂y
∂ki
=
(1− qˆ)κ
2Ω
(1.20)
where we have introduced the short-hand notations
Ω ≡ 3b(φ+ qˆc˜) + 2φ(1− qˆ3) > 0, (1.21)
κ =
−6by
(1− qˆ2)(2 + qˆ)
[3(ρ− 1)(1 + qˆ) + (1 + 2qˆ)(1− qˆ)] + c˜(1− qˆ)(2 + qˆ)ρ. (1.22)
and
c˜ ≡
3c
(2 + qˆ)2
. (1.23)
Equation (1.17) shows that an increase in country i’s capital requirements unambigu-
ously raises the quality of the cutoff bank in this country, qˆi. This is due to both the
higher cost of equity vis-a-vis savings deposits, and the reduced volume of implicit tax-
payer subsidies as a consequence of the higher equity ratio. Hence, by raising the cost
of finance for all banks, capital requirements drive the weakest banks in country i from
the market.17
The remaining effects in (1.18)–(1.20) all depend on the size ofκ, as given in (1.22). It is
thus critical for our analysis to discuss the effects summarized by κ in detail. As shown
in (1.22), the effect of a higher capital requirement on the total level of performing
loans can be decomposed in two parts. The first term is unambiguously negative,
as capital standards raise the costs of refinancing for all banks. This will drive some
banks in country i from the market [eq. (1.17)] and it will also reduce the output of the
remaining banks, other things being equal [see eq. (1.2)]. This isolated cost effect of
higher capital standards will thus reduce loan supply by country i’s banks, and hence
expected output, other things being equal. The second term involving c˜ is, however,
positive. This captures the positive effect of higher capital requirements on the pool
quality of banks in country i. The induced rise in qˆi results in a higher loan rate that
firms are willing to pay for loans from banks based in country i, as they face a lower
17This effect is thus very similar to models where production taxes or subsidies affect the market
entry decision of firms with the highest cost of production (see e.g. Chor 2009). In the same way,
capital regulation in our model affects the ‘production cost’ of banks, and higher costs will drive
the banks with the lowest success probability, and hence the lowest expected revenue, from the
market.
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probability of losing their fixed cost c [see eq. (1.9)]. In the following we will refer to
this effect as the selection effect of capital standards. In sum, we can therefore not sign
κ, in general.
If κ < 0, and the cost effect of higher capital standards in country i dominates the
selection effect, then output generated from loans by country i’s banks falls [eq. (1.19)].
As a result of this fall in output, the output price rises and competitive firms are
willing to pay a higher loan rate to banks from country j. This higher profitability
will draw additional banks in country j into the market, thus lowering qˆj [eq. (1.18)].
Moreover, the aggregate loan volume in country j will also rise, and with it the output
yj generated from these loans [eq.(1.20)]. Hence a unilateral increase in country i’s
capital requirement shifts business from banks in country i to banks in country j.
This is the core reason why existing models of cross-country competition in capital
standards (Sinn, 1997; Dell’Ariccia andMarquez, 2006) predict ‘a race to the bottom’
when capital standards are endogenized.
In our model, it is also possible that the selection effect of a higher capital standard
dominates the cost effect andκ > 0 holds in (1.22). In this case, the effects of a rise in ki
on the loan volumes of countries i and j and on the critical bank quality in country j are
all reversed. In this case, a higher capital standard in country iwill boost the aggregate
loan supply of banks in country i, as the remaining banks receive a higher loan rate
Ri on account of the higher pool quality of banks in country i. If κ > 0, this increase
in the loan volume of higher-quality banks dominates the effect that arises from the
reduced number of active banks in country i. The expansion of loans from country i
will then reduce the profitability of banks in country j, raising qˆj and reducing yj.
The case where introducing a small capital requirement in country i raises this coun-
try’s aggregate loan supply in equilibrium is shown in Figure 1.1 Eq. (1.6), together
with (1.7) yields a (inverse) supply function RSi (yi) that describes the loan rate in
country i as a positive function of yi when the output from loans of country j is held
constant. In contrast, eq. (1.9) gives a derived demand RD(y), where the loan rate is
falling in country i’s output. The demand function for loans RDi (yi) represents a par-
allel downward shift of the demand function in the output market, where the change
in the vertical intercept is determined by the firms’ fixed investment cost c and the
average success probability qˆi [see eq. (1.9)].
In the absence of any capital requirements, the loan supply curve for country i’s banks,
RSi , starts atper-unit refinancing costs of unity. This represents the case ofpuredeposit
finance. A small capital requirement ki shifts the loan supply curve upward to R
S
1 .
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Figure 1.1: The effects of a small capital requirement in country i
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The associated increase in qˆi also shifts the loan demand demand curve R
D
1 upward,
however, by lowering the firms’ expected probability of losing their fixed costs. If c
is sufficiently large, then the upward shift in the demand curve for country i’s loans
dominates the shift in the loan supply curve, leading to a higher volume of (successful)
loans yi.
1.3.2 Welfare effects of capital standards
In a second step, we use the effects on the loan market equilibrium variables, as given
in (1.17)–(1.20), to determine the effects of the capital standard ki on country i’s
welfare.
Totally differentiating (1.13) and (1.14)–(1.16), we get
∂Wi
∂ki
= α
∂Πi
∂ki
+ β
∂Ti
∂ki
+
γ
2
∂S
∂ki
,
where
∂Πi
∂ki
=
18by2i qˆi
(1− qˆi)2(2 + qˆi)3
∂qˆi
∂ki
+
12byi
(1− qˆi)(2 + qˆi)2
∂yi
∂ki
, (1.24)
∂Ti
∂ki
=
(1− qˆi)yi
(2 + qˆi)
+
3(1− ki)yi
(2 + qˆi)2
∂qˆi
∂ki
−
(1− ki)(1− qˆi)
(2 + qˆi)
∂yi
∂ki
, (1.25)
1
2
∂S
∂ki
= yi
∂yi
∂ki
. (1.26)
We first evaluate equations (1.24)–(1.26) at an initial capital standard of ki = 0. In
other words, we ask how welfare in country i is affected by the introduction of a small
capital standard ki. Note that an initial capital standard of ki = 0 implies qˆi = 0
from (1.5). Turning first to the effects on the profits of country i’s banking sector
in (1.24), the first term in this expression vanishes when qˆi = 0 initially. Hence the
effects on bank profits are exclusively determined by the change in the aggregate level
of (successful) loans, as given by the second term. Similarly, the change in the volume
of successful loans is also critical in determining the change in consumer surplus in the
integrated market, as given in (1.26).
The effects on tax revenues in (1.25) are threefold. The first effect gives the direct,
positive effect on tax collections (i.e. a reduction in expected subsidy payments) by
decreasing the bank’s reliance on deposits that are backed by a tax-financed insurance
mechanism. Moreover, increasing the critical bank quality qˆi, and hence raising the
average success rate of loans, additionally reduces the expected burden on taxpayers
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by the second effect. The sign of the third effect is ambiguous, however, as it will
depend on the change in the aggregate volume of loans extended by banks in country i,
and hence on the sign of κ.
In Appendix A.2 we derive the conditions under which (1.24)–(1.26) are all positive
when evaluated at ki = 0 initially and the introduction of a small, capital standard
strictly increases welfare in country i. These conditions are given by:
3(2ρ− 1)c
3ρ− 2
> (A− 1) (1.27)[
15
8
+
1
4b
]
c < (A− 1). (1.28)
The inequality in (1.27) is just the condition for κ to be positive at k = 0. Effectively,
this requires that the firms’ fixed investment costs cmust be sufficiently large, relative
to the market size parameter A, which determines the profit margin of banks. If
condition (1.27) is fulfilled, the selection effect of capital standards dominates the cost
effect when both are evaluated at an initial capital ratio of zero. Inequality (1.28)
states, in contrast, that the firms’ fixed cost, and hence the induced expansion of bank
loans is not so large as to overcompensate the positive first two effects of a small capital
standard in (1.25). We can then summarize our results as follows:18
Proposition 1.1 (i) When firms’ fixed production costs are sufficiently high, rel-
ative to the size of the output market [ (1.27) holds], then a small capital standard
ki > 0 raises the aggregate loan volume and aggregate profits of country i’s banking
sector.
(ii) If, in addition, the firms’ fixed costs c are not overly high, relative to mar-
ket size [ (1.28) holds], then introducing a small capital requirement benefits banks,
consumers and taxpayers in country i simultaneously and country i’s welfare is im-
proved for any combination of α, β, γ ≥ 0.
Our model thus shows that in the presence of selection effects, introducing capital
standards may be unanimously approved by all agents in a country, even if the regula-
tion is imposed unilaterally. In particular, introducing a small capital standard may
be in the overall interest of the country’s banking sector when the latter is heteroge-
neous. By raising the costs of doing business, the capital standard drives the least
18Note that (1.27) and (1.27) are not mutually exclusive. For example, if ρ = 1 and b = 2, both
conditions are simultaneously fulfilled when 3c > A− 1 > 2c.
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productive (most risky) banks from the market. High-quality banks will then bene-
fit from the market exit of low-quality banks via a higher loan rate. When firms value
the increase in the pool quality of banks sufficiently, as measured in our model by their
fixed costs of production c, then the higher profits of infra-marginal banks dominate
the profit losses of marginal, low-quality banks. These redistributive effects among
heterogeneous banks may explain why large and productive banks do not generally
oppose national capital standards, and in some cases even actively advocate them.
We emphasize, however, that Proposition 1.1 is a local result, which holds only for low
levels of capital standards. When the capital requirement ki is continuously increased,
κ will fall. To show this, differentiating κ in (1.22) with respect to ki gives
dκ
dki
= ε
∂qˆi
∂ki
−
6b[3(ρ− 1)(1 + qˆ) + (1 + 2qˆ)(1− qˆ)]
(1− qˆ)2(2 + qˆ)
∂yi
∂ki
, (1.29)
where
ε =
−9ρc
(2 + qˆ2)
−
6by
(1− qˆ)2(2 + qˆ)2
{
3(ρ− 1)[5(1 + qˆ) + 2qˆ2] + (1− qˆ)(5 + 2qˆ + 2qˆ2)
}
< 0.
From the positive effect of ki on qˆi in (1.17) we see that the first term in (1.29) is
unambiguously negative. Moreover, the second term in (1.29) is also negative when
κ > 0 initially and hence dyi/dki > 0 [see eq. (1.19)]. But this is exactly the case of
firms’ fixed costs being sufficiently large, on which we have focused in Proposition 1.1
(i). Therefore, as long as the value of κ is positive, κ must be unambiguously falling
in k .
We can now look at the properties of our model when capital standards are optimally
and non-cooperatively chosen in each of the two symmetric countries. Appendix A.3
simplifies (1.24)–(1.26) and gives the first order-condition for the capital standard in
each country i ∈ {1, 2}:
dWi
dki
=α
(1− qˆ)2φ
6b
[
−3ρ+ (2 + qˆ)
dφi
dki
]
+ β
{
(1− qˆ)3φ
6b
+
(1− k)(1− qˆ)2
6b
[
3ρ− (1 + 2qˆ)
dφi
dki
]}
+ γ
(1− qˆ)3(2 + qˆ)φ
2(6b)2
[
−3(1 + qˆ)ρ+ 2(1 + qˆ + qˆ2)
(
dφi
dki
+
dφj
dki
)]
= 0 ,
(1.30)
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where
dφi
dki
=
3(1 + qˆ)ρ
2(1 + qˆ + qˆ2)
+
6b(φ+ c˜qˆ) + 2φ(1− qˆ3)κ
(1 + qˆ + qˆ2) [12b(φ+ c˜qˆ) + 8φ(1− qˆ3)] (φ+ c˜qˆ)
(1.31)
dφj
dki
=
−2φ(1− qˆ3)κ
(1 + qˆ + qˆ2) [12b(φ+ c˜qˆ) + 8φ(1− qˆ3)] (φ+ c˜qˆ)
. (1.32)
Not surprisingly, (1.31) and (1.32) show that φ, the bank’s return per unit of its loans,
net of funding costs for saving deposits, is a function of the relative importance of the
selection effect and the cost effect. For κ > 0, the selection effect dominates the cost
effect and thus increases φi and decreases φj.
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We can now interpret the first order-condition for the capital standard in each country.
Obviously, dpii/dki, the first term in (1.30) is a positive function of dφi/dki. An increase
in the bank’s return per unit of its loans, net of funding costs for saving deposits,
mechanically translates into an increase in bank’s profit. However, and clearly, this
effect can be overcompensated by the increase in funding costs, making the overall
effect of an increase in capital standards on bank profits ambiguous.
The effect of an increase in capital standards on the tax revenue in country i is captured
in the second term of (1.30). Here dφi/dki runs counter to the positive effects of ki that
are due to the lower amount of insured deposits per unit of investment and due to the
increase in the quality of the banking pool in country i. The negative effect of dφi/dki
on Ti can be attributed to the rise in investment that follows from an increase in φi [see
eq. (1.2)], which results in an increase of taxpayer liability in the case of bank default.
The third term in (1.30) measures the effect of an increase in capital standards on
consumer surplus in country i. Comparing (1.31) and (1.32), it becomes clear that the
effect of κ on dφi/dki is always larger than on dφj/dki. Moreover, substituting (1.31)
and (1.32) in (1.30) results in the findings of (1.20), which states that dy/dki > 0 and
thus consumer surplus increases whenever κ > 0.
To characterize the properties of capital standards that are set at an interior optimum,
we can now analyze the value of dφi/dki in a symmetric Nash equilibrium. Therefore,
we derive dφi/dki at κ = 0 by setting the square bracket in the third term of (1.30),
which measures dSi/dki, equal to zero. Then, substituting this value into dpii/dki
19Note that (1.31) and (1.32) further differ due to the fact that φ denotes the bank’s return per
unit of its loans, net of funding costs for saving deposits. Therefore, additionally to κ an increase
in ki decreases the amount and thus the cost for saving deposits per unit of investment in country
i, while the amount of saving deposits per unit of investment does not change for banks in country
j.
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and dTi/dki, we get that both terms are positive at κ = 0. Combining this result
with dκ/dki < 0, we can conclude that when non-cooperative capital standards are
optimally set in an interior optimum, it must be true that κ < 0 holds and hence
dyi/dki < 0.
20 While this result unambiguously signs dTi/dki and dSi/dki, we are left
to determine dpii/dki in the Nash equilibrium. Substituting (1.31) in dpii/dki shows
that even for κ < 0 it can be true that dpii/dki > 0. However, analysing dTi/dki
and dSi/dki at dpii/dki = 0, it becomes clear that the negative effect on consumer
surplus must receive a relatively high weighting to overcompensate the positive effect
on taxpayer losses. More precisely, in Appendix A.3 we show that
γ < β(16b/ρ) (1.33)
is a sufficient condition for dpii/dki < 0 in the non-cooperative policy optimum. We
can now summarize our results at that stage in:
Proposition 1.2 In a symmetric Nash equilibrium where capital standards are at
an interior optimum, 0 < k∗i < 1 ∀ i ∈ {1, 2}, a marginal increase in the capital
standard of country i reduces the loan supply of this country as well as aggregate
output, but it increases the loan supply of country j. Further, if the welfare weight
on consumer surplus is not overly high [ (1.33) holds], then a marginal increase in
the capital standard of country i reduces expected profits for the banking sector in
country i.
Proposition 1.2 implies that, in the non-cooperative policy optimum, the cost effect of
capital standards must dominate the selection effect. This in turn shows that, evalu-
ated at the non-cooperative equilibrium, an increase in capital standards reduces con-
sumer surplus in both countries, but it increases tax revenues (i.e. reduces subsidies)
for taxpayers for country i. Moreover, it reduces bank profits in country i whenever γ
is not overly high.
20Theoretically, β could be such that even for κ > 0 the negative effect of dφi/dki on dTi/dki
would balance the positive effect on dpii/dki and dSi/dki . However, in this case, we would arrive
at the corner solution of k = 1.
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1.4 Are decentralized capital standards set too
low?
We now turn to analyzing the efficiency of decentralized regulation policies. Since
countries are symmetric in our benchmarkmodel, we can simplydefine regionalwelfare
as the sum of national welfare levels
WW = Wi +Wj ∀ i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j, (1.34)
whereWi is given in eq. (1.13). Choosing ki so as to maximize aggregate welfare (1.34)
would imply ∂WW/∂ki = 0. The nationally optimal capital standards derived in
the previous section are instead chosen so that ∂Wi/∂ki = 0. Hence, any divergence
between nationally and globally optimal capital requirements is shown by the effect
of country i’s policy variable ki on the welfare of country j. If ∂Wj/∂ki > 0, then the
capital requirements chosen at the national level are too lax from a regional welfare
perspective, as an increase in ki would generate a positive externality on the welfare
of country i. The reverse holds if ∂Wj/∂ki < 0. In this case the externality on the
foreign country is negative and nationally chosen capital requirements are too strict
from a regional welfare perspective.
DifferentiatingWj with respect to ki gives (see Appendix A.4):
∂Wj
∂ki
=
−κyj
2Ω(qˆc˜+ φ)(2 + qˆ)
{
6byj(α− γ)
(1− qˆ)
−
β(1− kj)[2(1− qˆ
3) + 3qˆ(1− qˆ)]
(2 + qˆ)
−
3γ(1− qˆ)qˆc
(2 + qˆ)
}
. (1.35)
There are three terms in the squared bracket of (1.35). Note that the common multi-
plier for all these terms is positive because the effects must be evaluated at a negative
value of κ in the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium (Proposition 1.2).
The first term in the squared bracket nets out the effect of a higher capital standard
in country i on the profits of country j’s banks in the absence of a selection effect (i.e.,
for c = 0), and the effect on consumer surplus in the output market for the residents
of country j. It is seen that if bank profits and consumer surplus are weighed equally
in the welfare function of country j (i.e., if α = γ), then the sum of these effects is
exactly zero. To explain why these two externalities just offset each other, note first
from the zero profit condition of firms (1.8) that, for given levels of qˆj and c, the change
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in the consumer price p induced by the higher ki just equals the induced change in the
loan rate earned by country j’s banks. Moreover, we see from (1.19)–(1.20) that an
increase in ki causes a smaller expansion of (successful) loans in country j, but a larger
overall fall in aggregate output y, if banks face relatively high costs of expanding their
operations [b is high; see eq. (1.2)]. In this case, however, the profit margin earned by
country j’s banks is also high, and a given loan expansion therefore increases profits
by more [see eq. (1.14)].
Clearly, the fact that these terms are exactly offsetting for α = γ is due to the precise
specifications of our model. The more general point behind our results is, however,
that if themarket for bank loans is integrated, the effects of a tougher capital standard
in country i on banks vis-a-vis consumers in country j will not only be qualitatively
offsetting, but their quantitative importance is also likely to depend on the same
underlying market characteristics.
In the casewhereα = γ, and the first effect in the squared bracket of (1.35) is thus zero,
the net effect of higher capital standards depends on the two effects in the second line
of (1.35). Both of these effects are unambiguously negative. The first of these effects
gives the change in expected tax subsidies that taxpayers in country j have to pay for
their failing banks. Clearly these tax subsidies must increase, because the aggregate
size of bank loans rises in country j and the average failure probability also rises, due
to the lower cutoff quality of the banking sector in country j [see eq. (1.18)].
Finally, the last effect in (1.35) is also negative. This effect arises from the selection
effect of capital standards in our model. The higher average quality of loans induced
in country i reduces total output, on net, and this has a negative effect on consumer
surplus in country j. At the same time, the higher cutoff quality of banks in country i
raises the loan rate in country i, but not in country j. Therefore, banks in country j do
not benefit from the part of the aggregate output reduction that is induced by a higher
level of qˆi. On net, therefore, only the negative effect on consumer surplus remains for
country j. We summarize our results in:
Proposition 1.3 When governments weigh the welfare of banks and consumers
equally (α = γ), then non-cooperatively set capital standards exceed those that max-
imize aggregate welfare in the union. This ‘race to the top’ is more pronounced, if
(i) the valuation of taxpayers’ losses in the government objective function is large
(β is high) and (ii) if the ‘selection effect’ of capital standards is strong (c is large).
Proposition 1.3 is in direct contrast to the results in the existing literature, which have
28
Regulatory competition in capital standards
found that the non-cooperative setting of capital standards leads to a ‘race to the
bottom’, or to a ‘competition of laxity’ (see Sinn, 2003; Acharya, 2003; Dell’ Ariccia
and Marquez, 2006). Effectively, these contributions have focused on the effect that
capital requirements have on the profits of national banking sectors. Our model adds
two main effects to these existing analyses. First, we incorporate firms that use bank
loans to produce final output andwe explicitly calculate the costs of bank failures. This
allows us to consider more general objective functions where governments set capital
standards also with a view on taxpayers and consumers. As we have shown, this leads
to additional externalities of capital standards that are negative for the neighboring
country: higher capital standards can be used to shift risks from domestic to foreign
taxpayers and they also negatively affect consumer surplus in the foreign country
when loans markets are integrated. In sum, these effects will often overcompensate
the positive externality on the foreign banks’ profits on which the existing literature
has focused.
The second additional aspect in our model arises from the selection effect of capital
standards in amodel where banks are heterogeneous and individual bank quality is not
observable for firms that require funds. In such a setting, capital standards can partly
solve the information problemand redistribute profits from low-quality to high-quality
banks within the domestic banking sector. At the same time, the cost disadvantage
that higher capital requirements imply for the domestic banking sector is reduced,
on average, in comparison to a model where such selection effects do not arise. As a
consequence, models with homogeneous banks will typically overestimate the positive
externalities that higher capital requirements in one country have on the profits of the
banking sector in the neighboring jurisdiction.
1.5 Discussion
1.5.1 Foreign ownership of banks
Wecan easily extendour analysis to allow for the realistic scenario that bankownership
is not limited to national borders. In this case, thewelfare function of country j slightly
changes to
Wj = α [σpij + (1− σ)pii] + βTj +
γ
2
S , (1.36)
where country j owns a share σ of its own resident banks and a share (1 − σ) of the
banks that are resident in i.
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Consequently, compared to section 1.4, two changes occur in the analysis of dWj/dki.
First, the positive effect of ki on the profit of banks that are located in country j
becomes less important for the welfare in country j. Second, the consideration of
dpii/dki, which is negative at the non-cooperative policy optimum for γ < β(16b/ρ),
reinforces the negative effect of ki on welfare in country j which is due to dTj/dki < 0
and dSj/dki < 0. Therefore, we can conclude that:
Proposition 1.4 Foreign ownership of banks increases the negative effect of a uni-
lateral increase in capital standards in country i on welfare in country j.
Proposition 1.4 tells us that the degree of foreign bank ownership has an unambiguous
welfare implication when capital standards are non-cooperatively chosen. This is due
to the fact that the positive externality of ki onpij enters thewelfare function of country
j with lower weight, while dpii/dki < 0 adds to the negative externality of ki on Tj and
Sj, which dominates the overall effect as shown in Proposition 1.3. This result might
be especially important for countries with a large presence of foreign bank subsidiaries,
e.g. Eastern European countries, where according toAllen et al. (2011) foreign-owned
banks provide 90% of the credit to non-bank residents compared to only 30% in other
European countries.
1.5.2 Quality signalling of banks
We now depart from our basic model and assume that entrepreneurs are able to in-
terpret the funding structure of banks. More precisely, entrepreneurs anticipate that
high quality banks are interested in credibly conveying the information about their
quality and that they are thus willing to invest in the costly signal of holding equity
above the minimum standard. Thereby, the entrepreneurs take into account that, for
a bank with quality q, the marginal cost of changing the funding structure towards
more equity is equal to
∂pi∗i (q)
∂k
=
qφ− kρ
b
(q − ρ) < 0 , (1.37)
which follows directly from the first derivative of the banks optimized profit function
in eq. (1.4) with respect to k. The cost arises due to the reduction in the share of bank
funds that are covered by deposit insurance. Critically, as we can see from (1.37), the
marginal cost of raising equity above the minimum standard is a negative function of
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bank quality. As the default is most likely for low quality banks, these banks benefit
most from the existence of the deposit insurance system.
However, given the complexity of bank balance sheets and the potential costs of screen-
ing, it seems hard to imagine that even the smallest differences in the capital holding of
banks can be observed and understood by each entrepreneur. Therefore, and to keep
themodel tractable, we allow for one specific level of equity that is denoted khi ≡ ki+k˜i.
All banks that choose to hold khi will then be identified as high quality bank (p = h),
whereas all banks that remain at ki will be classified as belonging to the low quality
pool (p = l). This is due to the entrepreneurs’ interpretation of the banks’ signalling
choice according to the following considerations:
q˜i
(
φhi − φ
l
i
)
= k˜iρ , (1.38)
where
φpi =A−
c
q
ep
i
− y − 1 + kpi (1.39)
qep =
[2q¯p + qp]l(q¯p) + [2qp + q¯p]l(qp)
3[l(q¯p) + l(qp)]
. (1.40)
Entrepreneurs know that the cost of acquiring additional equity is a function of each
bank’s quality [eq. (1.37)]. Consequently, the entrepreneurs are able to identify the
critical quality level q˜i at which the bank is just indifferent about investing into the
costly signal and issuing additional equity of k˜i [eq. (1.38)]. Importantly, the value
associated with this signal is determined through q˜i. This is due to the fact that the
loan returnwill depend on the entrepreneurs assessment of the expected quality of each
banking pool [eq. (1.39)]. Therefore, given the benchmark of q˜i, entrepreneurs infer
that all banks with quality q < q˜i will prefer to hold only the minimum amount of ki
and be identified as low quality bank, while all banks with q > q˜i will choose to signal
that they belong to the high quality pool of banks and set khi . The expected quality of
each pool [eq. (1.40)] is then calculated as the weighted average of the number of loans
issued by the lowest quality bank within the pool (ql = qˆ , qh = q˜) and issued by the
highest quality bank within the pool (q¯l = q˜ , q¯h = 1).21
Given this extended setup, we can now again derive the responses of the endogenous
21To arrive at eq. (1.40), we first substitute eq. (1.2) in qep = Y
p
LP
=
∫
q¯p
qp
ql(q)dq
∫
q¯p
qp
l(q)dq
, then solve the
integrals, and finally simplify terms.
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variables qˆi, qˆj and y in response to a unilateral increase in the capital requirement of
country i, where we assume dkhi = 0. These are equal to
∂qˆi
∂ki
=
Υi
Ωs
> 0 (1.41)
∂qˆj
∂ki
=
Υj
Ωs
κs (1.42)
∂y
∂ki
=
1
Ωs
κs . (1.43)
In Appendix A.5 we show that Υi > 0 ,Υj > 0 ,Ω
s > 0 and that, again, the sign of κs
is ambiguous and determined through
κs = (q˜ − qˆ) {− [(2q˜ + qˆ)(1− q˜) + (2qˆ + q˜)(1− qˆ)]
+
1
3
c
(qel)2
1
φl
[2qˆ(q˜ + qˆ)(ρ− 1) + 2ρq˜2 − q˜qˆ − qˆ2]
}
+
2
3
c
(qel)2
q˜3 − qˆ3
Λ
[
−2(ρ− q˜) +
1
3
c
(qel)2
q˜
φl
2qˆ(q˜ + qˆ)(ρ− 1) + 2ρq˜2 − q˜qˆ − qˆ2
q˜2 + q˜qˆ + qˆ2
]
+Γ
c
(qeh)2
1− q˜3
Λ
[
−2(ρ− q˜) +
c
(qel)2
2
3
ρ(q˜ − qˆ)
φl
]
(1.44)
where we have introduced the short-hand notations
Λ = (φh − φl)− q˜
[
2
3
c
(qel)2
− Γ
c
(qeh)2
]
!
> 0 (1.45)
Γ =
2lq˜(2l1 + lq˜)b
3(l1 + lq˜)2b+
c
(qeh )2
(1− q˜)2khρ
> 0 . (1.46)
Equations (1.41) - (1.44) confirmthat themain response functions remainqualitatively
unaffected when we extend our basic model and allow for quality signalling by banks.
Theweakest banks in country i are, again, driven out of themarket due to the reduction
of implicit taxpayer subsidies [eq. (1.41)]. Further, as in the basic model, the effect of
ki on the number of banks in country j and the total amount of produced output is
ambiguous and captured by the term κp [eq. (1.42)and (1.43)]. While the first row in
eq. (1.44) is similar to κ, which we derived in the basic model [see eq. (1.22)], the terms
in the second and third row of eq. (1.44) enter due to the reallocation effects between
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the different quality pools within each country.22 We will now analyze each term in
more detail.
Initially, a unilateral increase of capital standards in country i only affects all banks
with q < q˜i. As in the basicmodel, the loan supply of these bankswill change according
to the relative strength of the cost effect vis-a-vis the selection effect. This trade off is
captured in the first row of eq. (1.44).
Additionally, however, the expected quality of both bank pools in country i is altered
through the change in thewillingness of banks to signal their quality. Lookingat (1.38),
one can see the opposing effects of a marginal increase in ki on q˜i. First, the exit of
the weakest banks ceteris paribus increases the attractiveness of this pool and thus
decreases the incentives of banks to signal their superior quality. Second, and contrary,
given the (plausible) assumption of khi remaining constant, an increase in ki decreases
the relativecostof signalling. Interestingly, now, the relative strengthof theseopposing
effects is, again, critically affected by the level of c. Whenever c is relatively large, the
positive effect of the increase in qˆi on q
el will sharply increase the expected loan return
for banks of the low quality pool [see eq. (1.39)]. Thus, in this case, the low quality
pool will become relativelymore attractive for banks in country i and, consequently, q˜i
will increase. In contrast, for small values of c, the increase in the expected quality of
the low quality pool will be less pronounced compared to the reduction in the relative
cost of signalling. Marginally increasing ki will then decrease q˜i.
This reallocation process within the banking sector of country i has repercussions on
the total output and on the number of banks in country j, which are captured in the
second and third row of eq. (1.44). As explained above, whenever c is relatively large,
marginally increasing kiwill also raise q˜i. This in turn increases the expected quality of
both bank pools in country i by removing theweakest banks from the high quality pool
and increasing the quality of the best bank in the low quality pool. All country i banks
that remain in the high quality pool will then increase their loan supply, as follows
directly from substituting (1.39) in (1.2). Further, all banks that no longer signal their
quality will also increase their supply of loans. This follows from a revealed preference
argument. Banks will change their quality pool only if they expect higher profits.
These profits, however, can only be generated through an increase in the supply of
22Condition (1.45) has to hold, as otherwise we would arrive at q˜ = 1. Equation (1.46) measures
the effect of a marginal increase in q˜ on the high quality pool. As an increase in q˜ increases φh,
which in turn affects the output and thus the marginal weights of each bank within the pool, this
term is more complicated then the effect of q˜ on the low quality pool (2/3), where the output of
the lowest quality bank is always zero.
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loans [see eqs. (1.2) and eq. (1.4)]. We can summarize these results in
Proposition 1.5 The responses of qˆi, qˆj and y to a unilateral increase in ki remain
qualitatively unaffected when we introduce imperfect signalling by banks.
In section 1.3 we have argued that, given a setup of heterogenous banks that are
unable to signal their quality, national banks can benefit from a selection effect when
the domestic regulator unilaterally increases its capital standard. Our analysis in this
section confirms this effect even when banks group themselves into multiple pools to
signal theirquality. Obviously, allbanks in the lowqualitypoolare still directlyaffected
by the increase in the minimum capital standards. However, all banks in the high
quality pool will also be affected, indirectly, through the change in the critical quality
threshold at which banks opt to signal their superior quality and fund themselves with
a higher amount of equity. Aswe have shown, higher values of cwill favor a reallocation
of banks such that the expected quality of both quality pools increases. Thus, in this
case, banks in both quality pools will benefit from the positive selection effect of a
marginal increase in theminimum capital standards and increase their loan supply. In
contrast, for lower values of c, entrepreneurs will value the exit of worse quality banks
less. Therefore, following a unilateral increase in capital standards, the decrease in the
relative signalling cost will attract banks around the signalling threshold to enter the
high quality pool. Thus, in this case, the marginal increase in capital standard causes
a negative selection effect for all banks in the high quality pool. This reduces the
supply of loans. As in the basic model, this effect will spillover to the banking sector
in country j that competes on the integrated loan market. Therefore, the number of
banks in country j will decrease whenever the aggregate loan supply from banks in
country i increases.
1.6 Conclusion
In a setting with international competition between heterogeneous banks and a tax-
payer bailout for failing financial institutions, we have shown that non-cooperative
setting of capital adequacy standards leads to a ‘race to the top’ in capital regulation,
in direct contrast to the ‘race to the bottom’, on which the existing literature has fo-
cused. Our model can thus explain why countries such as Switzerland and the United
Kingdom, which are characterized by large banking sectors and accordingly a high risk
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exposure of national taxpayers, resort to capital adequacy rules that exceed the Basel
III standards. At the same time, it also offers a motivation for why many European
countries insist on setting upper limits on capital standards, along with lower ones.
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Chapter 2
Capital standards and resolution
procedures for multinational banks
2.1 Introduction
During the recent financial crisis, government responses towards ailing banks were
largely driven by the attempt to limit the damage for national taxpayers. However,
as the liquidation procedure of Lehman Brothers Holding Inc. (LBHI), the parent
company of Lehman Brothers, illustrated, this approach caused serious international
contagion effects. While theUS authorities refused to support LBHI, they did support
the US broker-dealer subsidiary that could be later merged successfully with Barclays
Capital. In contrast, the resolution of the remaining subsidiaries that were present
in 49 countries was more costly. This was especially due to the high degree of cen-
tralization and complexity of the LBHI, that would have made it necessary for the
national authorities to cooperate (Claessens et al., 2010). Similar patterns could be
observed during the crises of the Icelandic banking system, where banks had estab-
lished a Europe-wide system of savings accounts that broke down at the onset of the
financial crisis (see Benediktsdottir et al., 2011). Further, the large amount of govern-
mental support towards Fortis, a multinational bank with large presence in Belgium,
the Netherlands and Luxembourg, was mainly attributed to the lack of cooperation
between the national supervisory authorities.1
1See Claessens et al. (2010) for a study on Fortis and for further cases of cross-border resolution
procedures during the recent financial crises.
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As a consequence, improvements in the process and the decision about the resolution
of multinational banks are high on the political agenda. Proposals include demands
for multinational banks to map their line of business into the corporate entities and
clarify key interconnections across affiliates (centralized information). Further mea-
sures foresee a better collaboration and more rights to intervene for international su-
pervisory colleges (centralized resolution).2 These measures are expected to lead to a
reduction in expected bankruptcy costs of multinational banks.
Interestingly, however, it is by no means clear that this will also decrease the total
expected cost for national taxpayers. While coordinated supervision and liquidation
can be a reasonable tool to limit the costs of failure for multinational bank once they
have occurred, one should also look at the incentives of national regulators to limit the
potential social losses of bank failure ex-ante.
This chapter introduces a model where countries compete for the investment of multi-
national bank subsidiaries. While each country benefits from the investment in normal
times, costs arise in case that the subsidiary is hit by a shock and has to default. There
exist two regulatory instruments to curb these costs. First, each regulation authority
can impose capital standards for the subsidiary that is resident in its country. How-
ever, as this reduces the subsidy from deposit insurance, a unilateral increase will lead
to the reallocation of investment to the subsidiary that is located in the other coun-
try. Second, each regulation authority can intervene into the operation of its resident
subsidiary whenever the probability of default is sufficiently large. Here, national reg-
ulation authorities fail to account for the international spillovers that are caused by
the reallocation of capital within the multinational bank network in case of unilateral
shocks.
First, we show that moving from a national to a global intervention regime changes
the non-cooperative equilibrium of capital standards. Accounting for the externality
at the intervention stage, moving towards a global intervention regime raises the value
of one unit of bank investment and thus increases the welfare loss when capital stan-
dards are unilaterally increased. Further, when national intervention would be too
lax from a global welfare perspective, the increase in safety caused by a more global
regime makes it less attractive for each regulation to impose strict capital standards.
This result might help to explain why countries like Switzerland, the United Kingdom
and the United States, which all host large multinational banks but are not integrated
2See Hagan and Vinals (2010), Claessens et al. (2010) and Allen et al. (2011) for discussions
on various structures of resolution regimes for multinational banks.
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in a multinational intervention regime, have substantially tightened bank capital re-
quirements, while countries within the eurozone have so far not departed from the
minimum standard in the Basel 3 framework.
We then analyse the welfare effect of different intervention regimes. Thereby we study
the interaction between the anticipation of supervisory decisions, the determination
of capital standards and the externalities that are induced without full coordination
in both regulatory instruments. We can then define a condition that whenever bank
investment is sufficiently profitable and mobile and thus the externality that arises
due to non-cooperative capital standards is large, moving towards a more centralized
intervention regime is welfare decreasing.
This chapter wants to add to the current policy debate about the strategies in the in-
tervention and resolution of multinational banks. Our analysis is especially important
for Europe, where multilateral resolution procedures are aimed at in the new banking
union. Most authors support the idea of a more centralized approach (Claessens et
al., 2010; Beck and Wagner, 2013). However, until now, the determination of precise
intervention criteria and the (partial) transfer of budgetary sovereignty in case of de-
fault have impeded the full implementation.3 This is similar to the harmonization in
bank capital standards, where European countries still differ in the application of rules
that have to be put in place at the Member state level (Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision, 2014). Importantly, as this chapter argues, both initiatives should only
be negotiated and agreed upon in a closely coordinated approach. Otherwise, unilat-
eral approaches towards more centralization in the resolution of multinational banks
might even prove to be economically harmful.
The analysis in this chapter builds on several strands of the literature. Various au-
thors examined the effects of capital regulation on financial institutions (Rochet, 1992;
Hellman et al., 2000; Repullo, 2004). This literature stresses that capital regulation in-
creases the risk buffer of banks and curbs risky behaviour. However, introducing bank
mobility, the existing literature shows that capital standards in the non-cooperative
equilibrium will be set inefficiently low from a global welfare perspective (Sinn 1997,
2003; Dell’Ariccia and Marquez, 2006). The interaction of capital standards and
bailout policies in a framework of international spillovers due to regional bank mar-
kets is analyzed in Acharya (2003). The author shows that the convergence of bank
capital requirements can amplify the frequency and the amount of bank bailouts when
3See ”Banking on a new union - The promises and pitfalls of the euro zone’s next big idea”,
The Economist, December 14, 2013.
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they are carried out by national authorities.
Different aspects regarding the role of supervision within the regulatory framework
have been discussed in the literature. Aghion et al. (1999) and Mitchell (2000) anal-
yse incentive schemes to overcome the information problem between the management
of the bank and the supervisory authority. The distribution of supervisory tasks be-
tween different institutions, e.g. central bank and deposit insurance fund, is analyzed
in the work of Repullo (2000) and Kahn and Santos (2005). The adequacy of different
measures of intervention, e.g. liquidation or restructuring, is analyzed in Dewatripont
and Freixas (2011). Taking into account the international mobility of banks, several
papers discuss the inefficiencies that derive from a decentralized supervision regime.
Beck et al. (2013) and Beck and Wagner (2013) analyze the distortions in the inter-
vention decision of host country regulators that are caused by foreign ownership of
bank assets, bank equity and bank deposits. Calzolari and Loranth (2011) focus on
the effect of the multinational bank’s organizational structure on the distortions that
arise from national supervision authorities. Goodhart and Schoenmaker (2009) an-
alyze ex-ante burden sharing agreements between hosting nations of multinational
banks that can be implemented to overcome the inefficient ex-post negotiations on the
recapitalization of failing banks.
The decision for banks to operate multinational is analyzed in Niepmann (2013).
Dell’Ariccia andMarquez (2010) analyze the decision of multinational banks between
branch-based and subsidiary-based corporate structures. The existence of an internal
capital market at multinational banks that allocates capital between capital-scarce
and capital-abundant affiliates has been well documented in the empirical literature
(see e.g. Cetorelli andGoldberg 2012). More specific, a vast amount of (mostly empir-
ical) literature has analyzed the role of multinational banks during times of financial
distress. The findings can be summarized as follows. On the one hand, the internal
capital market of multinational banks can play a supportive role for subsidiaries that
face idiosyncratic shocks (see e.g. Navaretti et al., 2010). At the same time, the real-
location of funds between affiliates of a multinational bank network might also lead to
the propagation of local shocks (see e.g Peek and Rosengren, 1997; De Haas and Van
Horen, 2012). In our model, we account for both of these possible outcomes.
The remainder of this chapter is set up as follows. Section 2.2 describes the setup of
the model. The basic model is solved by backward induction in section 2.3, while the
welfare analysis is carried out in section 2.4. Section 2.5 concludes.
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2.2 The model
2.2.1 Bank investment
We consider one representative multinational bank that owns two subsidiaries and
has a unique technology of monitoring entrepreneurs. One subsidiary is located in
country A while the other subsidiary is resident in country B. Each subsidiary has
access to an unlimited amount of domestically raised (insured) deposits at cost of
one. In contrast, the supply of bank equity is assumed to be fixed at the level of the
multinational bank.4 The amount of equity at the subsidiary in country A is denoted
α. The allocation decision will be analyzed below. Further, we assume that firms
do not have any funds of their own so that one unit of loan distributed in country i
translates into one unit of investment Ii.
The investment of banks is prone to country specific shocks. Consequently, the return
toeachunitofbank investment isperfectlycorrelatedwithineachcountryandperfectly
uncorrelated between both countries. If the shock does not hit country i, each unit
of investment leads to the production of one unit of a homogenous consumer good in
this country. We assume that both countries are symmetric with respect to the size
of the market A and that each national output market is characterized by the inverse
demand function pi = A − ayi. Allowing for free entry of firms that can produce at
zero cost, the return of each unit of bank investment in country i in case of successful
production is therefore equal to the price on the national output market and given by
Ri = A− aIi . (2.1)
Obviously, as all profits accrue to the bank subsidiary, Ri is a positive function of the
exogenous parameterA and a negative function of total investment in country i. When
the investment is successful, the bank subsidiary will be able to repay its depositors
and pay out the surplus to the equity holders. Including the surplus to consumers and
given that the subsidiary in country i is not hit by a shock, each unit of bank investment
4This simplification is often made in the literature, e.g. Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2006). It
represents the notion that bank capital is difficult to raise on short notice. All results would remain
qualitatively unaffected if we would instead assume that the bank can raise additional equity but
faces higher expected cost than for deposits.
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generates
vi = Ri + CSi = A−
a
2
Ii . (2.2)
If, in contrast, country i is hit by a shock, the return of the investment will be zero.
Abstracting, for now, from the internal capital market of the multinational bank that
reallocates capital between its subsidiaries, the bank subsidiary that is located in coun-
try i will not be able to repay its depositors. In this case, the repayment obligations
will be shifted to the deposit insurance system. The existence of a deposit insurance
system, which equals common practice in virtually all developed countries, can be ex-
plained by the prevention of expectation-driven bank runs. These runs would occur
due to the possibility for depositors to withdraw their funds at any time. The wel-
fare costs of these bank-runs have been well documented (see e.g. Bryant 1980 and
Diamond and Dybvig 1983). Critically, as shown in the analysis of Acharya and Drey-
fuss (1988) and Chan et al. (1992) among others, due to asymmetric information and
timing problems, it might not be possible to charge banks with fair insurance rates.
Experienced difficulties to (fully) recoup the vast amount of financial support from
taxpayers during and after the financial crisis confirm this feature of deposit insurance
as a subsidy to bank owners. We model this by assuming that the default of the bank
subsidiary that is located in country i causes social costs for each unit of investment
equal to
cd = c(1− ki) . (2.3)
The exogenous parameter c captures the cost of raising one unit of funds to reimburse
depositors. These costs are primarily due to distortions caused by the collection of
public funds. Further, as we only allow for two different types of funds, deposits and
equity, the amount of insured deposits for each unit of investment is equal to the total
investment net of the amount of equity ki that the subsidiary in country i is required
to hold by the national regulation authority.
2.2.2 Bank regulation
In thismodel, the role for regulation follows from two facts. First, as shown inEq. (2.3),
the default of the bank subsidiary in country i has social costs. Second, due to the
limited liability of bank owners and the presence of the deposit insurance system, bank
owners have no incentive to curb these costs.
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We allow for two regulatory instruments. First, the national regulator in country i
can impose capital requirements ki. This standard determines the amount of equity
that the subsidiary in country i has to invest for each unit of loan. Equation (2.3)
illustrates the buffer function of capital standards. As an increase in ki decreases the
amount of fixed claims (deposits) for each unit of investment, the expected cost of
default decreases in turn. At the same time, however, due to the fixed amount of
equity, which we normalize to one, capital standards also limit the total investment of
each subsidiary which is given by
Ii =
ei
ki
, (2.4)
where eA = α is the amount of equity that the multinational bank allocates to the
subsidiary in countryA, while eB = 1− α is the amount of equity at the subsidiary in
country B. Below, we will analyze the allocation of equity between both subsidiaries.
Second, we assume that a supervisory authority can intervene into the activity of
each bank subsidiary. The modelling approach for this part follows Beck andWagner
(2013). After the investment of each subsidiary but before the realisation of the shock,
the supervisory authority will receive a signal indicating the probability λi that the
investment of the subsidiary in country i will be successful. To simplify, we assume λi
to be uniformly distributed between [0, 1].5 Then, for a given intervention threshold
λ˜i, which we will derive below, we can differentiate between three scenarios. First,
for λi < λ˜i and thus with probability λ˜i, the supervisory authority will intervene.
We assume that in this scenario the regulator is able to recover the initial investment
Ii.
6 Second, given that the supervisory authority will not intervene, the probability
that country i will not be hit by a shock is equal to 1+λ˜i
2
. Consequently, the ex-
ante probability of successful investment is equal to (1 − λ˜i)
1+λ˜i
2
=
1−λ˜2i
2
. Third, the
subsidiary is allowed to continue but then hit by a shock. The ex-ante probability of
this scenario is equal to (1−λ˜i)
2
2
.
In this model, we are mainly interested in the interaction of capital standards and
intervention thresholds in the case that countries do not fully coordinate in the deter-
mination of both regulatory instruments. Even in the presence of the Basel 3 Accord,
a global regulatory framework, this setting should be a realistic reflection of the cur-
rent situation. First, the Basel 3 Accord constitutes only a voluntary framework that
5While this distribution corresponds to the ex-ante shock probability being equal to 1/2, our
results would not be affected qualitatively by different values.
6The intervention can take different forms, e.g. assumption of operation involving another
bank, and might also incur specific costs. However, as long as these costs are sufficiently small
relative to the costs arising after the shock, the same qualitative results would be obtained.
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further leaves scope for national evaluations, e.g. with respect to the discretionary
surcharge of a ’counter-cyclical buffer‘ of up to 2.5%. Second, it seems to be widely
believed that the capital standards that are specified in the Basel 3 framework are in-
sufficient for large multinational banks.7 The United States have already introduced
a minimum leverage ratio of 5− 6% for eight systemically important financial institu-
tions.8 This level is well above the leverage ratio of 3% that is foreseen under the Basel
3 framework. Similarly, the United Kingdom and Switzerland have also tightened
the capital standards for their largest banks above the minimum standards of Basel
3.9 Therefore, we assume that the capital standards in the first stage of our model
are determined non-cooperatively. Starting from this assumption, we are then inter-
ested in the evaluation of supervisory regimes that differ with respect to the degree of
centralisation.
2.2.3 Internal capital market of the multinational bank
Each affiliate of the multinational bank is organized as a subsidiary. Therefore, it is
a locally incorporated stand-alone entity endowed with own capital and protected by
limited liability at the affiliate level. Consequently, in the case of financial difficulties
at the level of one subsidiary, there would be no legal obligation for the multinational
bank to relocate capital between subsidiaries to solve this problem. However, and
crucially, there might be other reasons.
The primary reason for the multinational bank to prevent the insolvency of its sub-
sidiaries is reputational. The particular importance of this argument is connected to
the characteristic of banking. Due to the illiquidity of its asset side (e.g. loans), the
large amount of short-term liabilities and the opaqueness of the financialmarket, it is of
critical importance for each bank to be viewed as trustworthy by all stakeholders (bor-
rowers, investors and regulation authorities). Therefore, the failure of one subsidiary
might cause an interruption to the provision of liquidity for all subsidiaries within the
bank network and thus amplify the cost for the multinational bank. Further, regula-
tion authoritiesmight also demand the replacement of the bankmanagement following
7See www.financialstabilityboard.org/wp-content/uploads/TLAC-Condoc-6-Nov-2014-
FINAL.pdf for a consultative document of the Financial Stability Board in response to the G20
St. Petersburg Summit in 2013 that discusses Pillar 1 total loss absorbing capital requirements
for systemically important banks and proposes capital standards in the range of 16− 20%.
8see www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20140408a.htm
9see www.bankofengland.co.uk/pra/Documents/publications/ss/2013/ss313.pdf
and www.admin.ch/opc/de/classified-compilation/20121146/201501010000/952.03.pdf
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the default of subsidiaries that are part of the multinational bank network.
As already discussed, the empirical literature shows that due to the reallocation of
capital within the multinational bank network, subsidiaries, in contrast to purely
domestic banks, can either be more stable or more prone to external shocks. We
try to account for both of these possible outcomes by modelling multinational bank
behaviour in the following way. In case that either no or both subsidiaries are hit by a
shock, no capital reallocation between both subsidiaries will take place. In contrast,
whenever only one subsidiary is hit by a shock, the multinational bank can react and
reallocate capital to the affected subsidiary. However, as we assume that the shock
will take place before the end of the period and thus before the investment in both
countries pays off, the subsidiary in the non-affected country has to incur liquidation
losses to meet the immediate capital demand. In expected terms, we assume these
cost to be smaller than the reputational costs that would arise from a partial default
of the subsidiary that is hit by the shock. Consequently, given a unilateral shock, the
multinational bank will always decide to liquidate the subsidiary’s investment in the
non-affected country. To allow for a rich set of possible outcomes, we assume that l,
the liquidation loss per unit of investment, is distributed according to the function h(l)
that generates positive probabilities for the following three scenarios:
∫ lr
0
h(l)dl︸ ︷︷ ︸
pr
+
∫ lc
lr
h(l)dl︸ ︷︷ ︸
pm
+
∫ R
lc
h(l)dl︸ ︷︷ ︸
pc
= 1 (2.5)
where
lr = Ri − (1− ki)− (1− kj) , (2.6)
lc = Ri − (1− ki) . (2.7)
To illustrate the effect of capital reallocationwithin themultinational bank,weanalyze
the different outcomes of the scenario in which the subsidiary in country j is hit by a
shock and, thus, the subsidiary in country i liquidates its assets to reallocate capital
to the affected subsidiary. First, if the liquidation loss of the subsidiary in country i is
sufficiently small (l ≤ lr), the multinational bank will be able to reallocate capital to
the subsidiary in country j to allow for the repayment of depositors in both countries.
Therefore, in this case, the subsidiary in country j that is hit by a shock will be rescued
through the internal capital market by funds of the subsidiary in country i. The
expected liquidation loss given that l ≤ lr is labeled µr(l). Second, for liquidation
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losses within the range of lr < l < lc, the subsidiary in country i will be able to repay
its local depositors but the remaining funds will be too small to further repay the
depositors in country j. Consequently, the subsidiary that is located in country j will
default, while the subsidiary in country i will remain open. The expected liquidation
loss given that lr < l < lc is labeled µm(l). Third, if the liquidation loss is sufficiently
severe (l > lc), even the subsidiary in country iwill not be able to repay its depositors.
Thus, in this scenario the shock in country j is contagious in the sense that it triggers
the default of the subsidiary in country i that was not hit by a shock. The expected
liquidation loss given that l > lc is labeled µc(l).
Equations (2.5)-(2.7) illustrate the positive welfare effect of an increase in capital
standards on the outcome of the internal capital reallocation by the multinational
bank. Due to the fact that capital standards define the buffer that can take losses,
following an increase in k, each affiliate canwithstand greater liquidation losses, which
leads to an increase of pr and a decrease of pc.
10
Besides the liquidation costs that areprivate to thebankowners, additional social costs
occur.11 These costs arisewhen entrepreneurs depend on the continuous funding of the
bank subsidiary and are thus not able to finish their projects, leading to a reduction
in consumer surplus. Further costs might be due to the loss of private information
between the entrepreneur and the bank following the termination of the relationship.
These expected additional liquidation costs are labeled µe(l). Therefore, the total
expected social liquidation cost for each unit of investment are given by
cl = prµr(l) + pmµm(l) + pc
[
µc(l) + cd
]
+ µe(l) . (2.8)
While the expected cost in the first two terms of (2.8) are private to the bank owners,
the expected cost in the third term are only private to the degree that the bank owners
stock of equity is depleted. The remaining losses measured in the third term, as well as
the losses captured in the fourth term of (2.8) are not internalized by the bank owner.
However due to the prevention of the subsidiaries’ default whenever l ≤ lr, the overall
welfare effect of the internal capital reallocation of the multinational bank remains
ambiguous.
10See Anginer et al., 2014 for a empirical study that analyses the default risk of foreign bank
subsidiaries. The authors find a positive effect of equity holding at the subsidiary level on the
contagion risk within the multinational bank network.
11See Dell’Ariccia et al (2008) and Chor and Manova (2012) for empirical studies that support
this assessment.
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Figure 2.1: The timeline of events
2.2.4 Time structure
The sequence of events in this model is illustrated in figure 2.1. In the first period,
regulation authorities in both countries non-cooperatively set capital standards for
the subsidiary that is resident in the respective country. In the second period the
multinational bank allocates its equity between the subsidiaries in country A and
country B. In the third period the supervision authority receives a signal about the
success probability of the investment in both countries. It will intervene into the
operation of the subsidiary in country i whenever the success probability λ is below
the threshold λ˜i. At this stage we analyze the differences between the outcome of a
national and a global regime. Between the third and the fourth period each subsidiary,
when allowed to continue, can be affected by a shock in its resident country. In case
that one of the two subsidiaries is hit by a shock, the subsidiary that is not hit by the
shock will liquidate its assets, thereby incurring liquidation losses of l that follow the
distribution h(l). Finally, in the fourth period, the payoffs realize. We will solve the
model by backward induction.
2.3 Nationally optimal capital standards with dif-
ferent intervention regimes
2.3.1 t=4: Payoffs
For each country, the expected payoff from the activity of the resident subsidiary of
the multinational bank depends on the regulatory framework (k and λ˜) and on the
allocation of capital by the multinational bank (α). The resulting welfare function of
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country A is then given by
E[WFA] ={
λ˜A +
1− λ˜2A
2
[
vA −
(1− λ˜B)
2
2
clA
]
−
(1− λ˜A)
2
2
cdA
[
1−
1− λ˜2B
2
prA
]
− 1
}
α
kA
.
(2.9)
The first term in (2.9) measures the expected return from the intervention of the
supervisory authority into the investment of the subsidiary in countryA. It is equal to
λ˜A due to the fact that the regulator will intervene whenever λ < λ˜A and recover the
initial investment of one in this case. The second term in (2.9) captures the expected
payoff in case that the subsidiary is allowed to continue and not hit by a shock. Then,
whenever the investment is not liquidated early, each unit of investment will yield the
social return of vA [see eq. (2.2)]. In contrast, when the subsidiary in country B is
hit by a shock, the welfare in country A will be reduced by the expected liquidation
cost clA [see eq. (2.8)]. The expected cost in case that the supervision authority does
not intervene and the subsidiary is hit by a shock is given in the third term of (2.9).
Here, the return of the bank investment will be zero and the additional default costs
cdA, which are given in (2.3), will arise, unless the subsidiary will be rescued. This will
happen whenever the subsidiary in countryB is not hit by a shock and the liquidation
losses are sufficiently small. Finally, the last term in (2.9) is equal to the opportunity
cost of each unit of investment.
2.3.2 t=3: Supervisory intervention: national vs. global
regime
At this stage, the supervisory authority receives a signal about the probability λi that
the bank investment in country i will be successful. Due to the reallocation of capital
by themultinational bank in case that one subsidiary is hit by a shock, the intervention
decision in country i affects the expected welfare in country j [see eq. (2.9)]. We want
to compare two regimes that differ in the degree that this externality is taken into
account. We start with the decision of a national supervisory regime. Therefore, we
derive the first order condition of (2.9) with respect to the intervention threshold λ˜A
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and get:
∂WFA
∂λ˜A
=
{
1− λ˜A
[
vA −
(1− λ˜B)
2
2
clA
]
+ (1− λ˜A)c
d
A
[
1−
1− λ˜2B
2
prA
]}
α
kA
= 0
(2.10)
Equation (2.10) shows that a marginal increase in the intervention threshold λ˜A in-
creases the expected return from intervention (first term) and decreases the expected
cost from failure (third term). However, clearly, it also reduces the expected return
from successful investment (second term). Therefore, the intervention threshold is
chosen relatively low whenever the expected return from successful investment is rel-
atively large, while for large expected costs from failure, the intervention threshold is
relatively high.
The ambiguous sign of the interaction term between the intervention threshold in each
country is due to the ambiguouswelfare effect that follows from the reallocation of cap-
ital by the multinational bank. As explained in the previous section, the continuation
of the subsidiary in countryB will be welfare increasing for countryA from an ex-post
perspective, whenever the shock unilaterally hits the resident subsidiary. However, it
can also be welfare decreasing, whenever only country B is hit by a shock. Whenever
the expected cost from liquidation is large, the positive effect of a marginal increase
in λ˜B on the expected return from continuation outweighs the negative effect on the
expected cost from continuation that is due to the lower probability of rescue. There-
fore in this case it holds that ∂λ˜A
∂λ˜B
< 0, while for low expected cost from liquidation and
thus high probability of rescue we get ∂λ˜A
∂λ˜B
> 0.
Taking into account the effect of kA, Equation (2.10) shows that a marginal increase
in kA decreases the optimal intervention threshold for three reasons. First, marginally
increasing kA reduces the expected cost from liquidation due to the lower probability
of contagion [see eqs. (2.5) and (2.7)]. This in turn increases the expected return
from successful investment and thus decreases the optimal intervention threshold.
Second, an increase inkA reduces the expected cost fromdefault by limiting theamount
of public funds [see eq. (2.3)], while third it increases the probability of rescue [see
eqs. (2.5) and (2.6)]. Both effects decrease the expected cost of continuation and thus
also lead to a decrease in the optimal intervention threshold.
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Wenowturn to the intervention threshold that is chosenbyaglobal supervisory regime:
∂WF
∂λ˜A
=
∂WFA
∂λ˜A
+ (1− λ˜A)
1− λ˜2B
2
clB − λ˜A
(1− λ˜B)
2
2
prBc
d
B = 0 . (2.11)
Equation (2.11) shows two externalities that are taken into account by the global
supervisory regime. Thefirst externality, which is captured in the second termof (2.11)
is positive. The marginal increase in the intervention threshold for the subsidiary
located in countryA benefits countryB due to the fact that it reduces the probability
of failure for the subsidiary in country A and thus decreases the expected cost from
liquidation for the subsidiary in country B. In contrast, the second externality that
is equal to the third term of (2.11) is negative. This is caused by the negative effect
of a marginal increase in λ˜A on the ex-ante success probability of the investment by
the subsidiary in country A. In turn, this reduces the probability that the subsidiary
in country B will be rescued through the internal capital market of the multinational
bank.
We can now use (2.11) to compare the intervention threshold of the national and the
global supervisory regime. As ∂
2WFA
∂λ˜2
A
< 0 follows directly from (2.10), it is clear that
the intervention threshold chosen by the global supervisory regime can be either more
strict or more lenient than the intervention threshold by the national supervisory
regime. It will be more strict whenever the positive welfare effect of an increase in
λ˜i on the expected cost from liquidation in country j outweighs the negative welfare
effect that is due to the decrease in the rescue probability. However, and clearly, if we
stopped at this stage, the global supervisory regime would be welfare superior to the
national regime independent of the direction of the deviation between both regimes.
2.3.3 t=2: Investment decision by the multinational bank
We now want to analyse the allocation of equity between the subsidiaries in country
A and country B. The expected profit of the multinational bank is equal to
E[pi] =
{
1− λ˜2A
2
[
RA − 1−
(1− λ˜B)
2
2
cpA
]
−
(1− λ˜A)
2
2
kA
}
α
kA
+
{
1− λ˜2B
2
[
RB − 1−
(1− λ˜A)
2
2
cpB
]
−
(1− λ˜B)
2
2
kB
}
1− α
kB
, (2.12)
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where
cpA = p
r[µr(l) + (1− kB)] + p
mµm(l) + pc(RA − 1 + kA) (2.13)
cpB = p
r[µr(l) + (1− kA)] + p
mµm(l) + pc(RB − 1 + kB) . (2.14)
The first row in (2.12) captures the expected profit of the subsidiary located in country
A, while the expected profit of the subsidiary located in country B is displayed in the
second row. Abstracting from the success of the subsidiary in the other country, in case
of no supervisory intervention and no shock, the net return of the subsidiary’s invest-
ment in each country will be equal to Ri − 1. However, in case that the subsidiary in
the other country is hit by a shock additional liquidation costs occur. Equations (2.13)
and (2.14) show that these costs depend on the severity of the liquidation shock. In
case that the liquidation shock is sufficiently weak, the subsidiary will not only incur
these losses (µr(l)) but also repay the depositors in the other country. For medium liq-
uidation shocks, the subsidiary will still be able to repay its own depositors but lose
µm(l) in expectation. However for severe liquidation shocks, the subsidiary will lose
the entire return of the project but will benefit from limited liability as the depositors
(1−ki) are reimbursed through the deposit insurance system. Finally, if the subsidiary
is allowed to continue but hit by a shock, the bank owner will lose the amount of equity
that is invested in the project. In this case, the depositors will either be repayed by the
subsidiary in the other country (with probability pr) or by the deposit insurance.
12
We now want to analyse the allocation of equity at the level of the multinational bank
that can choose between the subsidiaries in country A and country B. In Appendix
B.1 we show that the amount of equity that the multinational bank allocates to the
subsidiary that is located in country A is given by
α =
1
2
+
(1− λ˜2A)kAk
2
BφA − (1− λ˜
2
B)k
2
AkBφB + k
2
Ak
2
B[(1− λ˜B)
2 − (1− λ˜A)
2]
2a[(1− λ˜A)2k2B + (1− λ˜B)
2k2A]
,
(2.15)
12Due to our assumption of the supervisory regime liquidating with zero costs, the profit of the
bank remains unaffected with probability λ˜.
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where
φA = A−
a
kA
− 1−
(1− λ˜B)
2
2
cpA (2.16)
φB = A−
a
kB
− 1−
(1− λ˜A)
2
2
cpB . (2.17)
Equation (2.15) shows that the multinational bank will equally allocate its equity
between its subsidiaries whenever both countries are symmetric. In this case, the
second term of (2.15) becomes zero. Further, deriving the partial derivatives of αwith
respect to the regulatory instruments ki and λ˜i yields the expected result that
13
∂α
∂kA
= −
∂α
∂kB
= −
A− 2a
k
− 1− (1−λ˜)
2
2
cp
4a
< 0 , (2.18)
∂α
∂λ˜A
= −
∂α
∂λ˜B
=
−2λ˜k
[
A− a
k
− 1− (1−λ˜)
2
2
cp
]
− (1− λ˜)k
[
cp(1− λ˜2)− 2k
]
4a(1− λ˜2)
< 0 .
(2.19)
Equations (2.18) and (2.19) make clear that a unilateral increase in one of the regula-
tory instruments will lead to an outflow of bank capital from this country. Intuitively,
when ki is increased, the subsidiary that is located in country i can use a lower amount
of subsidized deposits for each unit of investment. This in turn decreases the attrac-
tiveness for the multinational bank to allocate (scarce) equity to the subsidiary that is
located in country i. Similarly, an increase in the expected threshold of intervention
λ˜i decreases the expected value of the investment in this country from the perspective
of the multinational bank. Obviously, the results hinge on the (realistic) assumption
that both regulatory instruments are binding. This will be the case whenever the cost
from failure and liquidation that are not internalized by the bank are sufficiently high
relative to the benefit of continuation from the perspective of the consumer.14
2.3.4 t=1: Capital standards
Wecan now turn to the analysis of the capital standards that are set non-cooperatively
in the first stage of our model. Given the symmetric setup, maximizing (2.9) with
13This is shown in Appendix B.2.
14See Appendix B.2 for the precise condition.
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respect to kA gives us the following first-order condition:
∂E[WFA]
∂kA
=
(
−
α
k2
+
∂α
∂kA
1
k
)
ψ +
α
k
σ + η = 0 (2.20)
where
ψ =λ˜+
1− λ˜2
2
[
A− a
α
k
−
(1− λ˜)2
2
cl
]
−
(1− λ˜)2
2
cd
[
1−
1− λ˜2
2
pr
]
− 1 (2.21)
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η =
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2
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 ,
(2.23)
and
D =
{
0 if global supervisory regime
1 if national supervisory regime
(2.24)
Looking at (2.20), we can decompose the welfare effect of a marginal increase in kA
into three parts. The first term in (2.20) measures the welfare effect that is due to the
change in the subsidiary’s investment in country A, while the second term in (2.20)
includes thewelfare effect of kA on the expected cost of liquidation and failure. Finally,
the third term in (2.20) captures the indirect effect of kA on the intervention threshold
in both countries. We will now analyze each effect in turn to emphasize the effect of
different supervisory regimes on the level of capital standards at this stage.
According to the first term in (2.20), bank investment in country A decreases for two
reasons when capital standards in country A are unilaterally increased. First, ob-
viously, as the capital standard is binding and the amount of equity is fixed, higher
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equity requirements mechanically translate into a reduction of total investment. Sec-
ond, however, due to themobility of bank investment [see eq. (2.18)] themultinational
bank will allocate more equity to the subsidiary in country B whenever country A
unilaterally increases its capital standard. The welfare loss that follows from this re-
duction in bank investment is shown in (2.21). Now, critically, due to the different
intervention thresholds that are set by the national and the global supervisory regime
[see eqs. (2.10) and (2.11)], the marginal social return to bank investment in country
A will be higher under the global supervisory regime. Therefore, the negative welfare
effect of a marginal increase in kA that follows from the reduction in bank investment
will be larger under the global supervisory regime.
The positive welfare effect of a marginal increase in kA on the expected cost from bank
investment is captured in (2.22). The first term in (2.22) measures the decrease in the
social cost from bank failure. This will be relevant either when country A is hit by a
shock [first term in square bracket of (2.22)] or when the liquidation loss of the sub-
sidiary located in countryA is sufficientlyhigh [secondterm in squarebracketof (2.22)].
As the probability of bank failure is decreasing in λ˜, it is clear that the positive welfare
effect of kA on the social cost of bank failure is reduced when the intervention thresh-
old is higher. Further, as shown in the second line of (2.22), the marginal increase
of kA changes the probability of the different outcomes that can arise from the real-
location of capital. Both terms are positive as one can directly see from (2.5)-(2.7).
Intuitively, by increasing the buffer that can take losses without causing insolvency,
higher capital standards in country A increase the range of liquidation losses for the
subsidiary in country B where it can still rescue the subsidiary in country A. Like-
wise the range of liquidation losses for which the subsidiary in country A can default
is reduced. Again, these positive effects are decreasing in the intervention threshold.
Consequently, (2.22) will be larger under the national supervisory regime whenever
the global supervisory regime is more strict (λ˜g > λ˜n).
The third term in (2.20) captures the indirect welfare effects that are due to the change
in the intervention threshold in both countries when kA is increased. Under the na-
tional supervisory regime, we can ignore ∂WFA
∂λ˜A
as one can directly see from the op-
timization problem in (2.10). Thus (2.23) measures ∂WFA
∂λ˜B
∂λ˜B
∂kA
. Here, kA only affects
the intervention decision by the national supervisory regime in B to the degree that
it changes the probability of rescue for the subsidiary in B. As an increase in kA en-
hances the probability of rescue for the subsidiary in B [see eqs. (2.5) and (2.6)], this
will decrease the intervention threshold in B. The induced welfare effect for A de-
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pends on the relative importance of the rescue to the contagion effect [see eq. (2.23)].
Consequently, whenever the indirect welfare effect of kA through λ is relatively strong,
then this effect will be positive as A will be positively affected by the decrease in the
intervention threshold in B due to the higher probability of rescue. This in turn re-
inforces the effects in (2.22) under the national supervisory regime. Turning to the
global supervisory regime, we can use the maximization problem in (2.11) to rewrite
∂E[WFA]
∂λ˜A
= −∂E[WFA]
∂λ˜B
so that (2.23) captures ∂E[WFA]
∂λ˜B
(
∂λ˜B
∂kA
− ∂λ˜A
∂kA
)
. Under the global
supervisory regime there exist two indirect effects of kA through λ˜. First, the decrease
in the contagion risk in A leads to a decrease of the intervention threshold in both
countries. Here, given that the lower intervention threshold partially reverses the de-
crease in the contagion risk, this indirect effect has negative welfare implications for
countryAwhenever this effect is relatively strong.15 Compared to the national super-
visory regime, this again reduces the positive welfare effects of a marginal increase in
kA under the global supervisory regime. Second, the increase in kA reduces the cost of
default, which in turn reduces the intervention threshold in country A and country B
under the global supervisory regime. While the effects of lower intervention thresholds
in A and B partly balance each other, the overall welfare effect again depends on the
relative importance of the rescue and contagion externality. We can now summarize
our findings at this stage in:
Proposition 2.1 When the intervention of national supervisory authorities into
the local operation of multinational bank subsidiaries is less strict than globally opti-
mal, then changing to a regime of global supervision will reduce the capital standards
that are set non-cooperatively. The reduction in capital standards is less pronounced
and can even be reversed when the intervention threshold of the national supervisory
authorities is inefficiently high.
Proposition 2.1 tells us that the incentives of national regulation authorities to impose
capital standards on the resident subsidiaries ofmultinational banks are affectedby the
expectation about the procedure and the externalities that arise from the intervention
regime. As the analysis of (2.20) has shown, this is mainly for two reasons. First,
increasing the efficiency of intervention by changing to a global supervisory regime
raises the value of one unit of bank investment from the perspective of the national
regulator. This in turn increases the competition between the regulation authorities
15This effect is not present in the case of a national supervisory regime as the contagion risk of
the other country is then not included in the maximization problem.
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in both countries to attract mobile bank investment and thus decreases the amount
of capital standards that are set non-cooperatively. Second, each regulator imposes
capital standards to increase the safety of its banking system. Obviously, the incentive
to impose strict capital standards depends on the probability of bank failure, which
in our model is a negative function of the intervention threshold λ˜. Therefore, when
national intervention regimes are too lax from a global welfare perspective, moving to
a global supervisory will result in higher λ˜. This reinforces the incentive for national
regulation authorities to decrease its capital standards. In contrast, whenever the
positive externalities of bank continuation dominate, introducing a global supervisory
regime will lower λ˜ and therefore, ceteris paribus, increase k. Thus, in this case we
can not unambiguously sign the effect of a more centralized intervention regime on the
level of capital standards that are set non-cooperatively.
2.4 The welfare effect of moving towards a global
supervisory regime
We now want to use the results from the analysis in section 2.3 to discuss the welfare
implications of a more centralized supervisory regime. Therefore, we assume that
the supervisory regime takes account of the net externality that arises at the stage of
intervention [see eq. (2.11)] with a factor 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1. We start at γ = 0 and analyse
the welfare effect of a marginal increase in γ. In Appendix B.3 we show that, given
the symmetry of countries and thus δλ˜A/δγ = δλ˜B/δγ = δλ˜/δγ, the welfare effect of
a marginal increase in the centralization of the supervisory regimes is given by
∂E[WFA]
∂γ
=
∂λ˜
∂γ
[
∂E[WFA]
∂λ˜B
(
1 +
∂λ˜B
∂λ˜A
)
+
∂E[WFA]
∂kB
(
∂kB
∂λ˜B
+
∂kB
∂λ˜A
)]
, (2.25)
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where
∂λ˜
∂γ
=
(1− λ˜)1−λ˜
2
2
cl − λ˜ (1−λ˜)
2
2
prcd
v − (1−λ˜)
2
2
(cl + pccd) + cd
(
1− 1−λ˜
2
2
pr
)
+ γ
[
1−λ˜2
2
(cl + pccd) + (1−λ˜)
2
2
(prcd)
] ,
(2.26)
∂E[WFA]
∂λ˜B
= (1− λ˜)
1− λ˜2
2
(cl + pccd)− λ˜
(1− λ˜)2
2
prcd , (2.27)
∂E[WFA]
∂kB
=
∂α
∂kB
1
k
ψ + h(lr)
1
2k
(1− λ˜)2
2
1− λ˜2
2
cd > 0 , (2.28)
∂kB
∂λ˜B
+
∂kB
∂λ˜A
=
1
2
(
∂σB
∂λ˜A
+ ∂σB
∂λ˜B
)
− ∂ψB
∂λ˜A
(
∂α
∂kB
+ 1
2k
)
∂ψB
∂kB
(
∂α
∂kB
+ 1
2k
)
− 1
2k
∂σB
∂kB
. (2.29)
Equation (2.25) shows that moving towards a global supervisory regime affects the
welfare of each country through two channels. The first effect, which is always positive,
is due to the fact that the externality at the intervention stage is taken into account.
This is the effect on which the theoretical literature(see Beck and Wagner 2013) as
well as policy reports (see Claessens et al. 2010) have focused. The second effect is
due to the interaction of the regulatory instruments. As we have already analyzed
in the previous section, this relation critically depends on the sign of the externality.
Therefore, we discuss both scenarios one after the other.
2.4.1 Case 1: national supervision that is too lax
We start with the scenario that λ˜g > λ˜n. Obviously, in this case a marginal increase
in the centralization of the supervisory regime increases the intervention threshold in
both countries [see eq. (2.26)] and thus increases thewelfare in each country [eq. (2.27)].
This effect is mitigated by the interaction between the intervention threshold in both
countries (δλ˜B/δλ˜A < 0). The increase of the intervention threshold in country A
lowers the probability of contagion in countryB and thus leads to a decrease in the in-
tervention threshold of countryB as the expected return of continuation is increased.16
Now interestingly, the indirect welfare effect of a more centralized supervisory regime
that is due to the interaction of λ˜ and k is negative. This follows from the unambigu-
ously negative effect of λ˜ on the capital standard that is set non-cooperatively [see
16Formally, this can be seen by using the implicit function theorem on (2.10).
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eq. (2.29)], which in turn decreases the welfare in country A [see eq. (2.28)]. The neg-
ative sign in (2.29) is due to two effects. On the one hand, the marginal increase of λ˜
decreases the positive effect of capital standards on the expected cost of bank failure
[first term in the numerator of (2.29)], while at the same time it increases the marginal
social return of bank investment in countryA [second term in the numerator of (2.29)].
Both effects lead to a decrease in the capital standards that are set non-cooperatively
as summarized in Proposition 2.1. This in turn reduces the welfare in country A for
two reasons. First, it reinforces the externality in the first stage of the model that is
due to the competition for mobile bank investment [first term in (2.28)]. Second, the
probability that the bank subsidiary in countryA can draw on liquidation funds of the
bank subsidiary that is located in country B is reduced [second term in (2.28)].
In Appendix B.4 we derive the overall welfare effect. This shows that a sufficient
condition for the overall welfare effect of a marginal increase in the centralization of
the supervisory regime to be negative is given by:(
A−
2a
k
− 1− cl
)[
ψ
k
(
A−
2a
k
− 1− cl
)
− 2 + 4k2c
]
> 16k4c [h(lr) + h(lc)] .
(2.30)
We can analyse condition (2.30) in the following way. If the externalities that are
caused by the capital reallocation of the multinational bank react very sensitive to
a marginal increase of capital standards, the right hand side of (2.30) will be very
high. Thus, in this case the overall welfare effect of an increase in the centralization
of supervision will very likely be positive. Intuitively, this is due to the fact that each
national regulation authoritywill then only slightly decrease its capital standardwhen
amore centralized intervention regime is introduced. Thus, the negative welfare effect
that is illustrated in (2.28) is limited. Incontrast, the lefthandside is apositive function
of the profitability of bank investment. Intuitively, with bank investment generating
a large surplus, the positive externality of k is very high [see eq. (2.18)]. Therefore,
the decrease in the non-cooperative equilibrium of capital standards that follows from
a more centralized resolution regime imposes higher welfare losses. While k enters
both sides of (2.30), we can directly see that it is weighted by different parameters.
Whenever a is relatively low and thus bank investment is relatively mobile, the left
hand side of (2.30) will be reduced to a lower degree. Similarly, whenever c is relatively
low, the (positive) effect of k on the right hand side of (2.30) will be small. Therefore,
we can summarize our findings at this stage in:
Proposition 2.2 Whenever the capital standard is set non-cooperatively and the
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resulting externality due to the mobility of bank investment is sufficiently severe
[ (2.30) holds], moving from a national intervention regime with too little interven-
tion to a more globally oriented resolution regime will be welfare decreasing.
Our model thus shows that in the presence of further regulatory instruments, the
desirability of a more centralized intervention regime that was brought forward in
the recent literature is no longer unambiguous. The reasoning follows the theory of
the second best.17 This is due to the fact that in our model, there exist externalities
at multiple stages. First, when national regulation authorities choose the optimal
amount of capital standards they only consider the negative effect of an increase in ki
on mobile bank investment (δα/ki < 0) in their country. From a global perspective
this is a zero-sum game [see eq. (2.18)]. Second, when national supervision authorities
choose the level of intervention they fail to account for the international spillovers
that are caused by the reallocation of capital within the multinational bank network
in case of unilateral shocks. Now, importantly, when both regulatory instruments are
determined non-cooperatively, they partly balance each other. National authorities
will impose stricter capital standardswhentheyexpecthigher costs fromthesubsidiary
that is resident in its country, which in turn partly compensates for the externality
at the first stage. Therefore, once full cooperation is not achieved in both regulatory
tools, the gains from a more centralized intervention regime might disappear in the
presence of lower capital standards that arise due to less protection and more intense
competition at the level of national regulation authorities.
2.4.2 Case 2: national supervision that is too strict
We now move to the case where the intervention threshold that is set by a national
supervisory regime is too high from a global welfare perspective. While in this case a
marginal increase in γ leads to a decrease in λ˜ [see eq. (2.26)] it obviously also increases
the welfare in both countries [see eq. (2.27)]. Different to case 1, this positive welfare
effect is reinforced through the interaction of the intervention thresholds in both coun-
tries. This is due to the fact that the decrease in the intervention threshold in country
A increases the probability of rescue for the subsidiary that is located in country B.
For country B, this in turn increases the expected social return from continuation of
its locally resident subsidiary and thus equally decreases the intervention threshold in
country B.
17See Lipsey and Lancaster (1956) for the seminal paper in this literature.
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The indirectwelfare effect of an increase in δ that is due to the interaction of λ˜ and k has
two parts. First, as in case 1, moving to a more globally oriented intervention regime
increases the value of each unit of bank investment. Ceteris paribus, this leads to a
decrease in the capital standard that is set non-cooperatively [see eq. (2.20)]. Second,
however, the decrease in λ˜ also leads to an increase in the expected probability of bank
default. Taking the derivative of the failure probability pf =
(1−λ˜)2
2
(
1− 1−λ˜
2
2
pr
)
with
respect to the intervention threshold we get that
∂pf
∂λ˜
= −(1− λ˜)
(
1− pr
1+λ˜−λ˜2
2
)
< 0.
Intuitively, the increase in the probability of rescue does not compensate the increase
in the probability of bank failure. This in turn, ceteris paribus, increases the capital
standard of each country [see eq. (2.20)]. We can summarize this result in:
Proposition 2.3 Moving towards a more globally oriented intervention regime is
more likely to be welfare increasing when the externality at this stage is negative,
e.g. national supervisory regimes would intervene too often.
Therefore, comparing case 1 and 2, we can conclude that the conventional result of a
more centralized intervention regime being associated with positive welfare effects is
more likely to hold when national supervisory authorities would intervene too often
from a global welfare perspective. However, this is in contrast to the experience from
the recent crisis, where national regulation authorities were accused of intervening
only at the last stages (Claessens et al., 2010; Beck and Wagner, 2013). Intuitively,
decreasing the intervention threshold (as in case 2) ceteris paribus increases the capital
standards and thus reduces the positive externality at the first stage. In contrast,
increasing the intervention threshold (as in case 1) ceteris paribus decreases the capital
standard and therefore reinforces the positive externality at the first stage.
2.5 Conclusion
In this model, we have analyzed the interaction between capital standards and resolu-
tion procedures when bank investment is mobile. In our setting, national regulation
authorities non-cooperatively choose capital standards at the first stage. The multi-
national bank then allocates capital between its subsidiaries in the second stage. The
outcome of both stages depends on the anticipation of the intervention regime at the
third stage. Here we differentiate between a national and global intervention regime.
The results of this chapter stress the importance of a coordinated approach towards
59
Capital standards and resolution procedures for multinational banks
the determination of capital standards and the decision to intervene into the opera-
tion of multinational bank subsidiaries. Interestingly, in this regard, Europe and the
United States seem to follow different directions.
So far, the United States have abstained from closer international integration in the
supervision and intervention of multinational banks. At the same time, however, the
leverage ratio for eight systemically important banks has been substantially raised
above the level that is foreseen under the Basel 3 framework. This reaction is in line
with the results of this chapter. As the regulatory authorities in the United States can
expect the intervention into multinational banks to be potentially very difficult, they
have a strong incentive to impose strict capital standards as the main instrument to
limit the potential costs.
In contrast, the introduction of the (not yet fully completed) Single Resolution Mech-
anism shows the determination of many European countries to move towards a cen-
tralized intervention regime for multinational banks. Clearly, this would be welfare
optimal if all countries within the eurozone would also fully coordinate with respect
to the determination of capital standards. To this regard, all countries within the eu-
rozone have adapted the Basel 3 regulatory framework and are supervised under the
Single SupervisoryMechanism. But, due to the lack of common capital definitions and
further scope for national authorities, Danie`le Nouy, chair of the supervisory board of
the ECB, recently pointed out that the process of harmonisation is still far from com-
pleted.18 Applying the results of this chapter, we should expect all countries within
the Euro Zone to insist on most favorable terms for all banks that are located within
their jurisdiction. However, comparing the approaches of the US and the eurozone,
this chapter suggests that the consistent enforcement of harmonized capital require-
ments, in all details, will be the critical determinant for the centralised intervention
approach of the eurozone to be successful.
18See www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/press/speeches/date/2015/html/se150331.en.html
for introductory remarks at the presentation of the first ECB annual report on supervisory
activities on 31 March 2015
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Chapter 3
Inactivity by design
3.1 Introduction
Severe financial crises produce the demand for a reform. Today, there is broad con-
sensus among economists that the financial system is characterized by a regulatory
framework that subsidizes lending to the state and thus distorts the smooth alloca-
tion of scarce resources: the current regulation represses economic growth and can
sow the seeds for a dangerous bank-sovereign nexus, a ‘deadly embrace’ or ‘doom loop’
through which both banks and their sovereign can end up in crisis simultaneously (see
Acharya et al., 2014a; Farhi and Tirole, 2014 for recent contributions). However, six
years after the outbreak of the crisis, none of the remedies that economists advocate
could pass the test of political viability. With zero capital requirements and unlimited
exposures, post-crisis regulation still systematically privileges the bank’s investment
in sovereign bonds.
The consequences are far-reaching. Starting in 2008, domestic banks in the ‘periph-
ery countries’ of the eurozone (Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy) sharply
increased their holding of sovereign debt (see figure 3.1). Acharya and Steffen (2015)
analyze how regulatory arbitrage to extract regulatory rents turned out to be an im-
portant motive in the portfolio decision of bank owners. However, the effects were
not limited to the sovereign bond market. Using European stress test data, Crosig-
nani (2015) shows that profit-maximizing banks in the periphery of the eurozone tilted
their portfolio towards domestic sovereign securities and crowded-out private lending
as the home sovereign became riskier. Further, Acharya et al. (2014b) extensively
This chapter is based on joint work with Florian Buck.
61
Inactivity by design
document that in the cases of Ireland, Spain, and Portugal the overall lending volume
of newly issued loans fell by 82 percent, 66 percent, and 45 percent over the period
2008-2013, respectively. This contraction in the lending volume had real effects for
the borrowing firms, e.g. in the form of lower levels of investment, lower sales growth
and lower employment growth. Popov and Van Horen (2013) and De Marco (2014),
also using syndicated loan market data, empirically support the significant transmis-
sion of the banking crisis to the private sector originating from the sovereign via the
bank lending channel.
The contraction of credit has generated different effects among producers. The fun-
damental importance of bank lending for small and medium enterprises is well docu-
mented in the theoretical (Holmstro¨m and Tirole, 1997; Lloyd-Ellis and Bernhardt,
2000) and empirical literature (Gertler and Gilchrist, 1994; Aghion et al., 2007; Beck
et al., 2008). In the aftermath of the financial crisis, frictions in the bank lending
channel contributed to a contraction of output and employment of small and medium
firms (Ivashina and Scharfstein 2010; Chodorow-Reich 2014). In contrast, large, es-
tablished firms with access to capital markets have been relatively unaffected by the
changes in bank-funding conditions (Ferrando andMulier, 2013; Beck et al. 2014). As
a consequence, lending rate spreads between loans for small and large firms have sig-
nificantly increased in the crisis (OECD 2014; Kaya 2014) such that large firms were
able to exploit a dominant position in the respective market.
This chapter identifies these stylized facts as a driving force for the status quo bias in
sovereignbondregulation. Wedevelopa simplemodel that reveals the channel through
which the investment of banks in risky sovereign bonds can translate into less lending
to the private sector. The erection of financing entry barriers to entrepreneurship, in
turn, generates rents for the industrial incumbents since its underminesnewcomers and
preserves the social status quo of incumbent firms. Thus, lax regulation in sovereign
bonds creates its own political support by maintaining rents for a fraction of the
population.
The startingpoint forouranalysis is the linkagebetweencapital standards for sovereign
bonds and expected bank payoffs in the case of sovereign default. Given the existence
of a deposit insurance system, zero capital requirements incentivize banks to invest
in risky sovereign bonds (figure 3.1) without creating a buffer to cover losses from
sovereign default. Then, however, bank owners realize that in case of sovereign bond
default, the expected return from loans will not accrue to them but only reduce the
cost of the deposit insurance system. This causes banks to readjust their portfolio and
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Figure 3.1: Domestic sovereign debt holdings
Graph taken from Battistini et al. 2014
gives birth to redistributional effects within the private sector.
Thebasicpolitical conflict is simplydescribed. Regulation significantlydetermines the
allocation of credit between the private sector and the state. Established interests are
willing to support a policy that subsidizes investments in sovereign bonds. Intuitively,
incumbent producers benefit from less lending to entrepreneurs since this is a way to
insure them from competition and to create scarcity rents. Provided that the median
incumbent firm is a net beneficiary of the current regulatory framework, they will
build a coalition with bank owners to block any reform of the status quo. In contrast,
less wealthy entrepreneurs and consumers tend to fight for a reform. Fiscal illusion
of consumers and a self-interested government that has the motive to hold down the
cost of financing public debt through the clever design of banking rules are additional
factors that strengthen the identified status quo bias in sovereign bond regulation.
Our key point is that the regulatory induced allocation of credit has redistributive
implications in the status quo and creates its own constituency such that the economy
may be locked into an undesirable situation.
This chapter is related to two strands of the literature. According to the public interest
theorytheregulator should improvewelfareandameliorate failures infinancialmarkets
through the clever design of a regulatory framework. With imperfect information in
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finance, capital requirements are necessary since they limit the risk-shifting behavior
by banks (Dewatripont and Tirole 1994). The reasoning is that if bank owners have
more capital at risk, the upside gains that they would enjoy from risk-taking would
be counterbalanced by the potential loss of their equity if their bank suffers major
losses (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Sinn 1980; Stiglitz and Weiss 1981). Accordingly,
undercapitalizedbanks can trigger afinancial crisis by inducingmoral-hazardbehavior
when banks enjoy the privilege of limited liability. Minimum capital requirements
should vary depending on the risks of the underlying bank investments. Furthermore,
higher capital requirements increase the risk buffer of banks and therefore decrease
both fiscal cost of a crisis to taxpayers as well as the risk of contagion among banks
(Allen and Carletti 2013; Admati and Hellwig 2013).
The private interest theory, however, views regulation as a product and therefore ana-
lyzes supply and demand forces (Stigler 1971). Banking policies are primarily shaped
by the private interests of the regulator (”grabbing hand” approach by Shleifer and
Vishny 1998) or regulatees (”political support” approach by Becker 1983 and Hillman
1989).1 Thereby the objective function of the regulator includes preferential treat-
ment of an organized interest group as well as the cost of subsidies given by the welfare
costs to society. Policy-makers then balance the private benefits with the social costs
of distorted interventions. Turning to the arena of banking regulation, most propo-
nents of the private interest theory argue that on the supply side, especially in crisis
times, the politician has a self-interest to reduce his debt service and to use sovereign
bond regulation as an instrument to adjust public finances. Given the economic, polit-
ical and constitutional limits of an austerity policy of increasing taxation or spending
cuts, a regulatory framework for banks that privileges access to finance to the state,
so-called ‘repressed financial systems’, appears politically attractive (Reinhart and
Sbrancia 2015). Concerning demand forces, the cross-country dataset on bank regu-
lation and supervision in over 150 countries by Barth et al. (2006) strongly supports
the view that bank regulators often end up serving the banking industry and private
interests. Interestingly, throughout the history controlling finance proved out to be
a powerful barrier to competition in the private sector and thus a channel for rent-
creation (Calomiris and Haber 2014). The reason is that politically connected lending
and access to finance could pose a threat to established industrial firms, since profits
1Policy for sale models introduced by Grossman and Helpman (1994) provide a microfoundated
mutisectoral model of organized lobbies that make contributions to get polices in their favour
against the unorganized population.
64
Inactivity by design
for incumbent firms will be impaired by broadening the access for potential entrants.2
Competitive effects make the control of capital flows an important tool in the struggle
for real market shares and thus shapes the demand for lax sovereign bond regulation
relative to credits for firms.
This chapter follows the private interest theory of banking regulation and focuses
on the demand forces for regulation by analyzing when regulation is supported by a
majority of the electorate. We provide a microeconomic model that links the banking
sector and its regulation to the market entry of firms, thus allowing us to specify the
rents that are created for banks and agents in the private sector. This is new in the
literature since most studies in this field either focus on the self-interest of politicians
or on conflicts within the financial sector between small and large banks.3
The structure of this chapter is as follows: In section 3.2 we set up and solve the basic
model where a change in portfolio policy affects the rents of private agents. Section 3.3
solves the political question when a welfare-improving reform is feasible. Section 3.4
extends the basic model to account for the case of ‘financial repression’ and presents
empirical evidence. Section 3.5 discusses policy lessons and concludes.
3.2 The model
3.2.1 Setup
We study a closed economy with a continuum of risk-neutral citizens. Each citizen is
born with some initial wealth wi, which is uniformly distributed in the interval [0, 1].
Within the population, the share m of all citizens owns a monopolistic bank, while
the share e of all citizens has the human capital to become an entrepreneur and open
a firm. The remaining share of citizens 1 − m − e can only use its initial wealth for
consumption and savings. Further, we include a government that can issue sovereign
bonds to provide a public good.
2The idea that financial barriers deny fungible resources and hinder entrepreneurs to overcome
obstacles to entry is based on the pioneering work of Rajan and Zingales (1998; 2003). Lloyd-Ellis
and Bernhardt (2000) and Evans and Jovanovic (1989) show in a general equilibrium model that
credit constraints induce lower entry of potentially good entrepreneurs. Moreover, Clementi and
Hopenhayn (2006) and Cabral and Mata (2003) demonstrate that credit constraints arise from
asymmetric information between firms and banks or limited enforcement and have strong impact
on entry.
3See Haber and Perotti (2008) and Buck (2015) for surveys on the political economy perspective
on banking regulation.
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The entrepreneurial sector is composed of a market for one homogenous goodX. The
demand of each citizen is characterized by the following function:4
p = A−X , (3.1)
where p equals the equilibrium output price, while A captures the (exogenous) size
of the market. Further, to simplify, we assume that each entrepreneur is only able to
produce one unit.
Each potential entrepreneur has to invest the fixed amount of I = 1 to start produc-
tion. She thus needs external finance of 1− wi to open a firm. Critically, the lending
relationship is characterized by asymmetric information problems. Instead of pro-
ducing, the entrepreneur can also use the borrowed funds to enjoy private benefits.
However, following Diamond (1984), the bank as the delegated monitor is character-
ized by its ability to reduce the asymmetric information problembetween the borrower
and the entrepreneur.
Besides loans, the bank can also invest in sovereign bonds G. In our basic model, we
abstract from the politician’s choice regarding the share of public expenditure that is
financed with the issuance of sovereign bonds.5 Rather, suppose that the government
issues the fixed amount of sovereign bondsG to provide the amount of the public good
that fulfills the Samuelson condition (Samuelson 1954).
Critically, we assume that the sovereign bond does not represent a safe asset. We think
that this adequately describes the present situation in many countries. While before
the financial crisis sovereign bonds were perceived to be a virtually safe asset class, this
assessment changed. Figure 3.2 illustrates the sharp increase in the interest rate on
sovereign bonds in several countries. Obviously, this reflected the sentiment of many
market participants that countries could default on the repayment of their sovereign
bonds. In contrast to the investment in loans, we make the (realistic) assumption
that the bank has no specific technology of monitoring or enforcement with respect to
sovereign bonds that would result in a higher probability of repayment. Therefore, in
4For simplicity, we assume that even citizens endowed with wi < p are able to consume the
homogenous good, e.g. due to welfare benefits that are funded through lump-sum taxation.
5Starting with Barro’s (1979) tax-smoothing model of deficits, many papers have come up
with explanations why governments accumulate debt. Focusing on the political economy litera-
ture, Aghion and Bolton (1990) show that governments can use the issuance of sovereign bonds
strategically to increase their probability of reelection. Alesina and Tabellini (1990) emphasize
the fact that accumulated debt can bind the hands of future governments with different political
preferences.
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Figure 3.2: 5-year sovereign bond yields
Graph taken from Battistini et al. 2014
our model, the probability of repayment 0 < θG ≤ 1 is exogenous and there exist no
ex-ante reason why the bank should play a disciplining role as a holder of sovereign
bonds.6
Themonopolistic bank is financed through savings by citizens that can take the formof
deposits or equity. To keep the basic model as simple as possible, we abstract from any
additional cost for the bank of raising external equity and assume that each citizen
is indifferent between the provision of deposits and equity as long as the expected
return equals the (exogenous) interest rate r. The banking sector is characterized by a
deposit insurance system. This resembles common practice in virtually all financially
developed countries.7 However, due to the possibility for the bank to externalize costs
in case of its default, it becomes more attractive for bank owners to fund themselves
withdeposits. Critically, aswewill analyzebelow, this canaffect thebank’s investment
decision. To prevent this, the regulatory agency can stipulate capital standards that
determine the amount of equity that the bank has to use for each unit of investment.
6We thus abstract from arguments provided in the literature, suggesting that during normal
times banks hold sovereign bonds to store liquidity (Holmstro¨m and Tirole 1993).
7Its desirability has been shown in the seminal paper by Diamond and Dybvig (1983). Further
paper in this literature have stressed the difficulties of charging banks with an adequate insurance
premium (see e.g. Acharya and Dreyfuss, 1988). Therefore in our paper we abstract from any
insurance premium for the bank.
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Here, the regulatory agency can discriminate between the capital standards for loans
(kL) and sovereign bonds (kG).
3.2.2 Bank investment
Westart by analyzing the portfolio allocation of themonopolistic bank that can choose
between the provision of loans to entrepreneurs and the purchase of sovereign bonds.
Clearly, this decision depends on the risk of both asset classes as well as the implied
correlation between the repayment of loans and sovereign bonds. Critically, the bank
differs in its ability to monitor both asset classes. It can control the default risk of each
loan through monitoring and the demand for collateral. In contrast, it has to take the
default risk of the sovereign bond 1 − θG as given. We thus assume that in a given
state of the world, the bank would be in default only due to the losses of its sovereign
bond investment. This feature is critical for our model. On the other hand, we could
also allow for bank insolvency to be caused by failed loans to entrepreneurs. However,
this would not alter our main results as long as in some scenario bank default would
only be caused by sovereign default. Therefore, to simplify, we consider the following
objective function of the bank:
E[pi] =θG {rGG+ rLL− r [(1− kG)G− (1− kL)L]}
+ (1− θG)max {rLL− r [(1− kG)G− (1− kL)L] ; 0} − r (kGG+ kLL) ,
(3.2)
Whenever the sovereign bond does not default, the bank owners can use the (endoge-
nous) return from loans (rLL) and sovereign bonds (rGG) to repay their depositors.
Due to the existence of the deposit insurance system, the bank will choose to fund
each unit of investment with the maximum amount of deposits that is allowed by the
regulation authority (1− ki). In contrast, whenever the sovereign bond defaults, the
bank can only repay its depositors when the net return from the distribution of loans is
sufficiently large relative to the amount of outstanding deposits. Reduced by the op-
portunity cost of investment [r (kGG+ kLL)], all excess profits accrue equally to the
sharem within the population that own the monopolistic bank.
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3.2.2.1 Lending to the sovereign
Wefirst consider the amount of sovereign bonds that the bank is willing to hold. Given
the risk-adequate interest rate of rG = r/θG, which would be claimed by citizens,
maximizing (3.2) with respect to G yields
∂E[pi]
∂G
= θG [rG − r (1− kG)]− rkG −D(1− θG)r(1− kG) ≥ 0 , (3.3)
where
D =
{
0 if rLL− r [(1− kG)G− (1− kL)L] < 0
1 if rLL− r [(1− kG)G− (1− kL)L] ≥ 0.
(3.4)
Equations (3.3) and (3.4) show that the bank‘s portfolio investment decision into
sovereign bonds is affected by the expectation about the repayment obligation in
case of the default of the sovereign bond. Here we have to differentiate between two
scenarios. In the first scenario, D = 1, the bank owners expect that they will always
be able to repay the depositors. In this case, the expected profit of holding sovereign
bonds is equal to
E[piG]
D=1 = 0 . (3.5)
Obviously, as the bank does not own a specific monitoring technology for sovereign
bonds, the bank cannot earn an additional rent by just forwarding funds to sovereign
bonds. Citizens could equally invest in sovereign bonds and earn the same expected
return. Thus, here the bankwould be indifferent about holding sovereign bonds or not.
We now turn to the second scenario, where D = 0. We call this scenario ‘doom loop’
scenario, a term introduced by Tirole and Farhi (2014) to describe the feedback effect
of sovereign fragility on bank balance sheets. In this scenario, the bank can only repay
its depositors in cases where the sovereign bond does not default (D = 0) so that the
expected profit of holding sovereign bonds is equal to
E[piG]
D=0 = G {θGrG − r [kG + θG (1− kG)]} . (3.6)
In the basicmodelwe abstract from strategic behavior of the sovereign so that the bank
receives the interest rate rG = r/θG. In section 3.4 we discuss the implication of lower
sovereign bond interest rates as the result of a oligopolistic banking sector or strategic
sovereign behaviour. We can then see from (3.6) that, due to the externalization of
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repayment costs in case of sovereignbonddefault, the bankwillmakepositive expected
profit whenever sovereign bonds are risky (θG < 1) and the bank is (partly) funded by
insured deposits (kG < 1). Intuitively, an increase in kG raises the liability at the level
of the bank, while high values of θG decrease the risk premium and thus the return that
the bank owners can earn in the case that the sovereign bond repays. In the scenario
ofD = 0, the bank would thus purchase all sovereign bonds.
3.2.2.2 Lending to the entrepreneur
We now turn to the analysis of the loan market equilibrium. Each entrepreneur will
be willing to borrow from the bank as long as
p− (1− wi)rL − rwi ≥ 0 . (3.7)
The net profit of producing is measured by the first two terms, whereas the third term
captures the opportunity cost. Rearranging terms, one can see directly that the loan
rate at which the entrepreneur will be just indifferent about producing is a positive
function of its initial wealth as this reduces the necessary amount of external funding.
Using (3.7), the demand for loans is given by
LD =
∫ wM
wL(rL)
(1− wi)dwi , (3.8)
where
wL = 1−
A− r
e+ rL − r
. (3.9)
We will derive the upper limit of wealth wM at which entrepreneurs are dependent on
bank funding in the next section. This threshold is independent of the loan interest
rate. In contrast, the critical level of wealth wL at which the entrepreneur will still
demand bank funding is defined through condition (3.7). For the entrepreneur that
is identified with wL this condition will be binding. Then, substituting (3.1) and
rearranging terms, we arrive at (3.9).
We now turn to themonopolistic bank. Here we assume that the bank cannot discrim-
inate between different entrepreneurs and thus strategically selects the combination
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of rL and L that maximizes its profit. Then, maximizing (3.2) with respect to L yields
∂E[pi]
∂L
= [θG +D(1− θG)]
[
rL +
∂rL
∂L
L− r (1− kL)
]
− rkL = 0 . (3.10)
Themarginal loanreturnnetofdeposit costs ismeasured in the secondsquaredbracket.
Taking into account (3.8) and (3.9), the bank owners choose the optimal combination
of rL and L. Crucially, thereby, they account for the effect of the sovereign default on
the bank solvency [first squared bracket in (3.10)]. Thus, in equilibrium, the bank will
choose the supply of loans such that the expected return net of deposit costs equals
the opportunity cost of each unit of loan (rkL).
We can now compare the different loan market equilibriums. Critically, in the case of
D = 0, bank owners anticipate that the loan return net of deposit costswill only accrue
to them whenever the sovereign bond will not default. Given the fixed opportunity
cost of each unit of loan (rkL), the bank owners will therefore also adjust their loan
portfolio compared to the scenario of D = 1. More precisely, as shown in Appendix
C.1 whenever kL > 0 and thus the opportunity cost of bank investment into loans is
positive, the bank owners will charge higher loan interest rates when they expect to
become insolvent in the case of sovereign default (D = 0). Thus, in this scenario, the
bank owners (partly) compensate for the higher portfolio risk by distributing less, but
more profitable loans.
3.2.2.3 Sovereign bond regulation and portfolio choice
We are now left to analyze the circumstances under which we will end up in the doom
loop scenario of D = 0. Looking at (3.2) and rearranging terms, we can see that this
will be the case whenever it holds that
kG ≤ kˆG = 1−
L
G
[rL
r
− (1− kL)
]
. (3.11)
The ‘doom loop’ scenario in our model arises whenever bank owners anticipate that
the bank solvency is directly linked to the repayment of the sovereign bond. In this
context, the level of kG determines the buffer of the bank that can absorb losses once
the sovereign would default. Therefore, whenever condition (3.11) holds, bank owners
anticipate that the amount of deposits that they are allowed to use for the purchase
of risky sovereign bonds exceeds the level that they will be able to repay in case of a
sovereign default. Further, losses from sovereign bond holdings could also be absorbed
71
Inactivity by design
by the revenue generated through loans. Therefore, as shown in condition (3.11), the
critical threshold below which banks enter the doom loop scenario is also critically
affected by the portfolio allocation between sovereign bonds and loans as well as the
profitability of loans.
We can now summarize our findings at this stage in
Proposition 3.1 (Refinancing spillover): Whenever capital standards for
sovereign bonds are inadequate [ (3.11) holds], then loan supply for entrepreneurs
decreases, and total output is reduced.
Ouranalysis rationalizes howtheabsence of capital standards for risky sovereignbonds
contributed to the observed decline in bank lending to the entrepreneurial sector.
Further, it can explain that this effect was particularly pronounced in countries where
sovereign bonds were perceived to be most risky. The spillover effect in our model is
driven by the expectation of bank owners regarding the payoffs that accrue to them
in the different states of the world. More precisely, given the fixed opportunity costs
of lending towards the entrepreneurial sector (rkL), bank owners should adjust the
loan interest rate depending on the probability of accruing these returns. Capital
standards for sovereign bonds affect this optimization. Given the existence of the
deposit insurance system, the regulatory framework of zero capital requirements does
not incentivize banks to create a buffer that can take losses caused by sovereign default.
Then, however, bank owners know that the expected return from loans will not accrue
to them but only reduce the cost of the deposit insurance system in case of sovereign
bond default. Banks thus increase the marginal return of each loan, thereby reducing
the total supplyof loans. Obviously, this effect ismorepronounced if the sovereignbond
is perceived to be more risky. The effect of capital standards for loans is ambiguous.
On the one hand, relatively high capital standards for loans increase the buffer that can
take losses. However, once condition (3.11) holds and thus the ‘doom loop’ scenario
is present, high capital standards for loans will reinforce the spillover effect as they
constitute higher opportunity costs for bank owners [eq. (3.10)].
3.2.3 Rent creation in the private sector
We now turn to the distributional effects within the private sector that follow from
the distortion in the bank’s investment policy as described in the previous section.
Critically, so far we referred to the bank as the only source of entrepreneurial funding.
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This was due to the ability of the bank to monitor its borrowers and thus to overcome
the asymmetric information problem. However, as we show in the following section, a
subgroup of wealthy producers will be able to receive funding without having to rely
on bank loans. We will refer to these producers as market-funded. To illustrate the
mechanism, we use the setup of Holmstro¨m and Tirole (1997).
In this setup, investment generates a verifiable return only with a specific success
probability that depends on an unobservable action taken by the entrepreneur. The
action represents the entrepreneur’s choice of technology usage. The intended purpose
is to produce with an efficient technology, which gives a success probability of one.
However, the entrepreneur also has the option to produce with a gambling technology,
which gives a lower probability of success θL < 1, but provides the entrepreneur with
a private benefit B. We assume that only production with the efficient technology is
economically viable so that A− e− r > 0 > θL (A− e− r) + B.
Critically, now, to receive external funding without having to rely on bank loans, the
entrepreneurwill need to credibly assure the lender to use the efficient technology. The
investor, in turn, will only expect the entrepreneur to repay the loan 1−wi when this
is incentive compatible so that 8
p− rM · (1− wi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
prudent
≥ B + θL[p− rM(1− wi)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
moral hazard
(IC) , (3.12)
where rM denotes the interest rate of market funded entrepreneurs. The left-hand
side (LHS) captures the entrepreneurial rent ΠE in case of prudent entrepreneurial
behaviour. The right-hand side (RHS) measures the return from taking external
funds to receive private benefits B by selecting the gambling technology with the low
probability of success θL < 1 (moral hazard).
Importantly now, we can rearrange terms in condition (3.12) and solve for the mini-
mum endowment of wealth wM that is still incentive compatible to chose the efficient
technology:
wM = 1−
p− B
1−θ
rM
. (3.13)
This threshold arises due to the fact that only personal financial contributions of
8Due to the condition of economic viability, entrepreneurs will not borrow if they are expected
to use the inefficient technology and would have to pay an risk adequate interest rate of r/θL.
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Figure 3.3: The funding structure for entrepreneurs with wealth wi
wi ≥ wM limit the expected revenue from the exploitation of limited liability and
preventmoral hazard behavior of the entrepreneur. Therefore, the threshold decreases
in the profitability of producing the entrepreneurial good and increases in the private
benefit B.
All entrepreneurs that are endowed with wi ≥ wM will be incentivized to choose the
efficient technology without further external control. Thus, all citizens will be equally
willing to invest. Consequently, the interest rate for these entrepreneurs will be equal
to rM = r.
Therefore, in our model, citizens that are endowed with the human capital to become
an entrepreneur can be classified into three distinct groups. We illustrate this in
figure 3.3. All citizens with wi > wM can receive funding for the interest rate of r.
Citizens with wL < wi < wM will be able to receive bank funding but will be charged
an interest rate rL > r. Potential entrepreneurs that are endowed with wi < wL will
not be able to produce.
We can now analyze the degree to which these groups are affected by the refinancing
spillover identified in Proposition 3.1. First, and obviously, it leaves all entrepreneurs
with wi ≥ wM better of, as these entrepreneurs benefit from the reduction in total
output. Second, for all entrepreneurs with w0L ≤ wi < wM this effect counteracts the
increase in the loan interest rate. However, as the negative effect is decreasing in the
entrepreneurial wealth, we can identify the critical level of wealth (see Appendix C.2)
wˆ = 1−
e(A− r)
(e+ r0L − r)(e+ r
1
L − r)
, (3.14)
where both effects exactly balance each other out. Consequently, all entrepreneurs
with w0L < wˆ are worse off as they need external funding to a larger extent. All
entrepreneurs withw1L ≤ wi < w
0
L lose access to credit funding and can thus no longer
produce. Finally, entrepreneurs with wi < w
1
L and consumers are worse off due to the
higher prices resulting from lower supply. We summarize these findings in
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Proposition 3.2 (Rent Creation): The refinancing spillover introduces redis-
tributive effects within the private sector. Rents emerge for all entrepreneurs that
are endowed with wi ≥ wˆ at the cost of consumers and entrepreneurs with wi < wˆ.
Proposition 3.2 emphasizes that the deterioration in the provision of loans does not
evenly burden all entrepreneurs within the private sector. Even reverse, it creates
rents for a subgroup of producers that can fund themselves independent of banks and
thus exclusively benefit from the decrease in competition.
3.2.4 Welfare
Now we combine the previous findings to analyze the welfare effects of inadequate
capital standards for sovereign bonds (kG < kˆG). Due to our simplified structure,
there only exist two levels of credit provision [see (3.10)] that, in turn, determine the
size of the production sector. Depending on the scenario D = 0, 1, the equilibrium
number of producers is thus equal to
nD = e(1− wDL ) =
e(A− r)
e+ rDL − r
, (3.15)
whereby the second step in (3.15) follows directly from substituting (3.9) and rearrang-
ing terms. As analyzed in Proposition 3.1, there are less producers in the ‘doom-loop’
scenario (n0 < n1). We can now study the welfare effect of capital standards for
sovereign bonds below kˆG compared to the scenario of kG > kˆG:
Ω =
(
n1 − n0
) [
n0 −
(
A− n1 − r
)
−
n0 + n1
2
]
+ (1− θG) rG
(
m
1
m
− 1
)
=−
(
n1 − n0
)(
A−
n0 + n1
2
− r
)
< 0 . (3.16)
Non surprisingly, equation (3.16) tells us that the overall welfare effect of inadequate
capital standards for sovereign bonds is negative. Further, as we abstract from any
additional bank default cost, the reimbursement of depositors due to inadequate cap-
ital standards for sovereign bonds in itself only constitutes a non-distorting subsidy
to the bank owners. The first term in the first row of (3.16) measures the decrease in
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production, which follows from the reduction of loans. While all entrepreneurs that
are endowed with sufficient funds will benefit from the increase in prices (first term
in squared bracket), entrepreneurs without access to funds will lose the net return of
producing the entrepreneurial good (second term in squared bracket). Further, con-
sumer surplus will be reduced due to the lower total production (third term in squared
bracket). Clearly, as shown in the second row of (3.16), the net effect is negative.
Finally, while the direct net effect of the deposit insurance system is zero, it has redis-
tributional effects. The benefit, which arises due to lower funding cost for the bank,
is concentrated on the group of bank owners of size m. In contrast, the expected re-
imbursement costs of depositors in case of bank default is evenly distributed over all
citizens.
As we have shown in this section, inadequate sovereign bond regulation not only
induces a portfolio shift from the private sector to the state, but also creates rent-
shifting among entrepreneurs.
3.3 Political feasibility of reforms
This section focuses on the analysis of the reform of sovereign bonds regulation. By
reform we mean capital regulation of a bank’s investment in sovereign bonds beyond
the non-regulated scenario that is present today. Our model has shown that there is
no economic reason for a preferential regulatory treatment of sovereign exposures if
we introduce positive sovereign risk. Such a kind of intervention distorts the smooth
allocation of scarce credit and is responsible for less lending to other asset classes,
most notable the private sector. Consequently, there is consensus among economists
to recommend a positive risk weight for bank lending to the state (e.g. Tirole, 2012;
Gros, 2013; Weidmann, 2014). But, in practice, few of the remedies that economists
advocate pass the test of political viability. In fact, we observe a zero risk weight for
sovereign lending in most industrial countries despite the fact that the Basel Accords
do not demand such a regulatory privilege.
The central question this section addresses is, what is the economic environment most
favorable to reform and when there is a strong political support for the status quo?
Thereby the key message is that repressing private credits is a powerful source for a
status quo bias against policy changes in general. By status quo bias we refer to the
fact described in Proposition 3.2 that lax regulation of investments in sovereign bonds
creates its own political support, bymaintaining rents for a fraction of the population.
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This is a mass of people who are likely to oppose reforms because of two factors.
First, those entrepreneurs who succeeded to open up a firm due to sufficient wealth
benefit from the artificial scarcity of the entrepreneurial good (price-effect). Second,
bank owners gain from artificial high net returns on investments in sovereign bonds
due to low deposit interest rates. Consequently, a more rigid regulatory treatment
of sovereign bonds has reallocative effects and implies losing that rent such that this
mass of citizens forms a coalition in favour of the status quo. They are likely to be
more opposed to the reform, the greater their joint rent.
Indeed, many policy interventions create rents directly to some groups of the society;
for example, tariffs or subsidies for special industries. Here it is obvious that the
profiteers will support such a regulation. In the context of banking regulation we have
a more subtle mechanism. Minimum capital requirements for sovereign bonds do not
in itself create rents in favour of some groups; it does so indirectly because it changes
the portfolio composition and output level of the economy and, thus, redistributes
wealth.
In what follows we consider an economy that does not regulate sovereign bonds in the
status quo, k0G = 0, but votes over becoming more strict concerning regulation of a
bank’s investment in sovereign bonds with k1G ≥ kˆG.
3.3.1 The case of a perfect political environment
The feasibility of reform depends on the political power of its supporters and the
available information. In order to make clear that the rents identified in the last
section do not necessarily generate a status quo bias, we first assume that all citizens
are perfectly informedabout the consequences of a reform, i.e. k1G ≥ kˆG. Moreover, the
political power of the reformers and supporters of the regulatory status quo is simply
proportional to their number. This is not a very realistic description of the political
arena, but it is helpful to illustrate under what conditions a status quo bias arises.
In the above framework, we can split the society into three groups. The first group
represents the consumers of the economy who are positively affected by an increase
in sovereign bond regulation. Formally, the net gain from a reform for a consumer is
strictly positive and equal to
RC = (n1 − n0)
(
A−
n0 + n1
2
)
+ rG(1− θG) > 0. (3.17)
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The first termmeasures the increase in consumer surplus due tomore productionwhen
n1− n0 new entrepreneurs successfully enter the market for the entrepreneurial good.
The second termmeasures the avoided costs for the deposit insurance system since the
bank will always be able to pay out depositors and stays solvent. It is straight forward
that this group will always support a reform.
Moreover, a subgroup of entrepreneurs will also benefit from a reform. To see this,
remember that entrepreneurs with sufficient low wealth (wi < w
0
L) have no access to
external funding in the status quo and cannot produce. Either they keep the same
consumer status when the economy moves from the status quo to stricter sovereign
regulation, or they find funding after the reform and thus earn the producer surplus of
p − rL(1 − wi) ≥ 0 if their wealth exceeds the new critical entry barrier w
1
L. In both
cases they are positively affected by the reform and will join the group of ”reformers”.
The second group in the society represents the producers of the entrepreneurial good
in the status quo. Since entrepreneurs are heterogenous with respect to their initial
wealth, the net effect of the reform on the individual rent depends on the individual
funding structure of the entrepreneur i. Intuitively, stricter regulation of sovereign
bonds enhances competition and reduces the price, p1 < p0, however, for a fraction of
sufficient less wealthy entrepreneurs there is also an opposing effect on the refinancing
situation because their interest rate decreases, r1L < r
0
L. The net gain of a reform for a
producer with wealth wi thus reads
RE(wi) =
{
(p1 − p0)− (r1L − r
0
L)(1− wi) + rG(1− θG) if w
0
L < wi < wM
(p1 − p0) + rG(1− θG) if wi ≥ wM .
.
(3.18)
The first row indicates the net gain for a bank-funded entrepreneur, the second row for
an entrepreneur who has access to market finance because of wi > wM . The reform
affects bank-funded entrepreneurs in three ways. First, there is the negative price-
effect (first term); second, entrepreneurs benefit from a positive refinancing-effect
(second term); and third, there are avoided cost for the deposit insurance provision
(third term). We hence can compute a threshold wealth level, w˜ = wˆ+ rG(1−θG)
r0
L
−r1
L
, from
where the positive refinancing-effect and deposit insurance-effect of the reform will
be dominated by the negative price-effect. Hence, we can say that all entrepreneurs
with wi < w˜ strictly benefit from a reform and also join the consumers to the group
of reformers. The other entrepreneurs oppose the reform since they lose from such a
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policy. Thus, among e entrepreneurs, we have (1− w˜) who defend the status quo.
To complete the political environment, remember that the net gain from a reform for
bank owner is always negative because of the loss of the deposit insurance subsidy:
RB =
1
m
[
r1L(L
1 − L0)− (r0L − r
1
L)L
0 − (1−m)rG(1− θG)
]
< 0. (3.19)
Consequently, themass of bank ownerswill block any reform and prefer the status quo.
To determine the political equilibriumwe have to add votes. Summing up all ”reform-
ers”, we see that reform will pass majority voting if and only if
1− e(1− w˜)−m >
1
2
. (3.20)
The left-hand sideof (3.20) lists the total numberof agentswhobenefit fromthe reform.
Except for wealthy entrepreneurs (second term) and bank owners (third term), all
citizens fall into this group. Thus, the political viability condition from (3.20) should
be satisfied in most societies. In this case, we would end up in the optimal regulatory
framework in the sense that the welfare loss identified in (3.16) is averted. In reality,
however, theremightbedistortions in thepolitical process thatwill change thepolitical
outcome as we will show in the next section.
3.3.2 The case of a manipulable political environment
Organized interest groups may modify the policy-making process and manipulate the
political support for a reform. It is plausible to assume that campaign contributions
by a lobby can increase the average popularity of the status quo relative to a reform.
Specifically, in the following we assume that producers and bank owners have a larger
political clout than consumers. They earn profits in the status quo and have a strong
incentive to get organized in order to protect their rents. In fact, founded in 1983,
the largest and most influential global association of financial institutions (IIF) also
includes multinational firms.9 On the other side, it is much harder to form and to
finance interest groups among less wealthy agents, especially for entrepreneurs who
are excluded from external finance and cannot produce in the status quo. Hence,
9In this context, Lall (2012) shows that the implementation of the model-based approach in
the Basel capital requirement framework, itself a lifting of equity constraints on large banks, was
the regulatory outcome of lobbying the the IIF.
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Figure 3.4: The critical threshold of lobby contributions
we assume that only the rent-making group of ”supporters” of the status quo are
organized politically and their encompassing lobby is the only one to collect campaign
contributions.
Suppose that a fraction λ < 1 of ‘reformers’ can be manipulated through campaign
contributions C financed by the lobby group, where C measures the total advertising
expenditures or media exposure by the opponents. These contributions increase the
overall popularity of the status quo by convincing part of the ‘reformers’ to block any
regulatory change. The fraction of manipulable or bribable ‘reformers’ is endogenous
and strictly increases with the sum of contributions; i.e. the lobby group uses a tech-
nologyλ(C), λC > 0, λCC < 0, that converts the contributedmoney into votes against
the reform. Then the condition for a majority of voters to support the reform becomes
(1− λ(C)) · (1− e(1− w˜)−m) >
1
2
. (3.21)
Figure 3.4 illustrates this condition. For the inadequate status quo sovereign bond
regulation to persist, the total contributions that are expended by the banking and
entrepreneurial sector must be sufficiently large to attract the critical amount of Cˆ so
that condition (3.21) is no longer satisfied.
Using the results from the previous section, we can now analyze the maximum level
of contributions that will be provided by the supporter of the status quo. While the
lobby group will never provide an amount larger than Cˆ, the supporters will be willing
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to contribute as long as they would still be net beneficiaries of the status quo. Thus,
the lobby group will contribute Cˆ whenever Cˆ ≤ C = CB + CE, where
CE =
{ ∫ 1
w0
L
|RE(wi)|dwi if
1+w0L
2
≥ w˜
0 if
1+w0L
2
< w˜
(3.22)
CB = m ·RB , (3.23)
In contrast, the lobby group will not provide any contributions when Cˆ > C =
CB + CE. Obviously, the maximum contributions of bank owners that are captured
in (3.23) will always equal the additional rent that is generated by the inadequate capi-
tal regulation of sovereign bonds in the status quo. These contributions are decreasing
in the share of bank ownersm as this limits the expected cost from deposit insurance
that is externalized to other citizens.
Producers, however, will only get organized and protect the status quo sovereign bond
regulation when this is supported by the median within the group of entrepreneurs
1+w0L
2
≥ w˜. The formation of the lobby therefore critically depends on the composition
of the entrepreneurial sector. More precisely, the larger the share of entrepreneurs µ0
that are not dependent on bank funding in the status quo (µ0 = 1−wM
1−w0
L
), the higher is
the probability that the entrepreneurs will lobby in favor of the status quo sovereign
bond regulation as these entrepreneurs are only exposed to the positive price effect.
Further, as can be directly seen from (3.22), a larger share µ0 also increases total lobby
contributions. This is due to the fact that it limits the positive refinancing effect that
would follow from the reform in the capital standards of sovereign bonds. We can now
summarize our finding at this stage in
Proposition 3.3 (Feasibility of reforms): The higher the share of market
funded producers µ0 and the smaller the share of bank owners within the popula-
tion m, the more likely it is that a lobby group of bank owners and producers will
block welfare-improving reforms in sovereign bond regulation.
Regulatory standstill arises, because a subgroup of beneficiaries of the status quo
forms a coalition to oppose a reform. The clout of the interest group of bank owners
and producers is strongly affected by the funding structure of active entrepreneurs in
the status quo. Market-funded entrepreneurs are insulated from bank funding effects
that result from distortive bank regulation. They always promote the status quo.
The stronger their share in the group of active entrepreneurs, the less important are
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banking conditions for the interest group of incumbent producers. This link between
the funding structure of producers, banking regulation and interest group formation
that stabilizes the status quo is the first important result in the analysis of political
reforms.
3.3.3 The status quo bias
One important aspect of the above model is its potential to generate persistence in
banking regulation. The regulation creates its own political support for the status quo
by providing rents for a fraction of the population. Critically, in the above analysis
the welfare-improving reform will be blocked if the lobby-power of bank owners and
producers is sufficiently large to manipulate a critical fraction of the electorate. To
show that the status quo crucially matters for the policy outcome and that a status
quo-rent in itself is a source of persistence in sovereign regulation, this section now
discusses the alternative option of a reform: a shift from prudent capital requirements
to lax sovereign regulation. Wewill show that such a shift is not the reverse experiment
of a shift to prudent regulation when the society is in the lax status quo. Due to an
asymmetry of regulatory rents in the status quo, rent preservation might ensure that
no reform occurs. The argument is as follows.
Consider the same economy like in the previous section, but a different status quo.
Suppose now that the bank is initially constrained by prudent sovereign regulation
k1G > kˆG and the societydecideswhether to go to (imprudent) zero sovereign regulation
k0G ornot. Inourbaselinemodel, this implies that theentrybarrier for entrepreneurship
w1L in the status quo is relatively low and the number of active firms jumps compared to
the previous case. A change in regulation (the imprudent version of a ‘reform’) would
drop some of them out of the market and makes bank-funding expensive. At the same
time, this increases the scarcity rent for the remaining firms. The conflict of interest
is thus as straight forward. Non-manipulated consumers would block any welfare-
decreasing reform. In contrast, the lobby group of bank owners and producers may
demanda regulatory change. Again, the support for a reformdepends on the likelihood
of coalition building and on the sum of contributions to ‘persuade’ consumers.
However, and critically, while bank owners will always support the reform for lax
regulation, the condition for the group of producers to participate in the lobby-game
and to form a coalition becomes more stringent. In fact, there are more entrepreneurs
that become part of the group of producers and influence the internal decision-making
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process (µ1 < µ0). As the median entrepreneur in the group of producers is less
wealthy, she cares more about the negative refinancing-cost of the reform. As a result,
it is less likely that
1+w1L
2
> w˜, holds. In other words, because of the internalization
of a subset of entrepreneurs, i.e. less-wealthy ones, the barrier for producers to form
a lobby group to promote a welfare-declining reform is higher when there is prudent
regulation in the status quo.
Second, provided that there is a lobby group of producers, the joint contributions will
shrink. The reason is that a fraction of producers, wi < w
0
L will get no funding after
the reform and have to leave the market: they lose the complete entrepreneurial rent
and hence reduce the aggregate contributions of the group of producers in the status
quo. Formally, the resulting lobby contributions of ‘reformers’ is equal to
CE =


∫ 1
w0
L
|RE(wi)|dwi −
[
(n1 − n0)p1 −
∫ w0L
w1
L
(1− wi)dwi
]
if
1+w1L
2
≥ w˜
0 if
1+w1L
2
< w˜
(3.24)
CB = m ·RB . (3.25)
Thus, the sum of producers in the status quo gains less from lax regulation than in
the previous case. The group of ‘insiders’ is larger and extended by a number of
bank-funded entrepreneurs which constitutes an asymmetry compared to the previ-
ous section where there have been less (bank-dependent) entrepreneurs in the status
quo. Again lobby contributions are affected by the price-, the refinancing- and the
deposit insurance-effect [first term of (3.24) and (3.25)]. But in addition the reform
punishes the less wealthy entrepreneurs by excluding them from the market [second
term of (3.24)]. This reduces the ability to lobby and is bad news for a reform. Both
the probability of lobby creation and the aggregate contributions decrease compared
to the benchmark case in the reverse scenario. Since contributions enter the political
viability condition (which now has to be interpreted as a condition for a reform), it is
clear that the status quo bias is stronger the lower the contributions.
Proposition 3.4 (Relevance of the Status Quo): The distribution of rents in
the status quo affects the composition and the power of the lobby group. Hence, it
creates its own source of persistence.
Proposition 3.4 argues that the initial conditions in the economy, i.e. the allocation of
producersbetweenbank-fundedandmarket-fundedentrepreneurs, haveahuge impact
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on the policy outcome. If the initial conditions ensure the existence of a large fraction
of bank-funded entrepreneurs in the status quo, the interest group of producers values
the availability of cheap credits more. Thus, it has a stronger preference for the status
quo compared to the reverse experiment where there is lax regulation and low output.
Due to this asymmetry of ‘insiders’ in the lobby group, rent preservation ensures no
reformmaycommandbroadsupport. Thekeymechanism is that the regulationcreates
its own constituency such that the economy may be locked into a desirable (or in the
case of section 3.3.2: undesirable) situation.
This result is interesting since most of the theoretical literature ignores the existence
of persisting differences in banking regulation. According to the regulatory competi-
tion view (Sinn, 1997; Dell’Arricia andMarquez, 2006) there is a competition of laxity
among national regulators with respect to the provision of minimum capital require-
ments for banks. The underlying argument is that banks will move to jurisdictions
that offer less onerous regulations (Dell’Ariccia and Marquez, 2006; Weinberg, 2002),
or that national regulators will fail to take fully into account international spillovers
(Sinn 1997, 2003). Therefore, the equilibrium outcome is a ‘race to the bottom’.
In contrast, our model rationalizes why we observe heterogeneity in the design of
sovereign regulation. The status quo matters. The model presented thus suggests
that a society may not always seek ever-weaker sovereign regulation, even if a reform
acts in the interests of the resident bank owners. Since access to finance is an important
source for rent-creation for the private sector, the viability of a reform strongly depends
on the market outcome of a reform compared to the status quo and hence the political
support of the private sector. If the status quo had created its own constituency and
sufficient entrepreneurs are dependent on bank-finance, they are ready to oppose a
‘race to the bottom’. A policy-maker thus needs to weigh the indirect costs of soft
sovereign regulation in the form of repressing private credits and losing the support of
producers.
3.4 Extensions and discussion
Although the model economy analyzed is highly abstract, it can shed some light on
further interesting questions.
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3.4.1 What is the impact of sovereign risk?
First, one can analyze the influence of sovereign risk for the support of a welfare-
improving reform. To see the impact of sovereign risk, consider the first derivative of
the total rent of producers [eq. (3.18)] and bank owners [eq. (3.19)] with respect to θG
that is equal to
∂C
∂θG
=−rG
[
1−m− e
(
1− w0L
)
+
∂n0
∂θG
(1− θG)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(−)
+
∂r0L
∂θG
e
(
wM − w
0
L
)(
1−
wM + w
0
L
2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
+
∂n0
∂θG
(
p0 − p1 − n0
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(−)
+
(
r0L − r
1
L
) [(
1− w0L
) ∂w0
∂θG
− (1− wM)
∂wM
∂θG
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(−)
.
(3.26)
Equation (3.26) shows that a change in the default risk of the sovereign bond changes
the willingness to lobby through four different channels. First, an increase in the
default risk directly increases bank profits and thus lobby contributions for the status
quo [first term of (3.26)]. The smaller the lobby group of entrepreneurs, the smaller the
offsetting effect through the reduction in the rent of entrepreneurs. Second, an increase
in in the sovereign bond default risk increases the loan interest rate.10 This reduces the
profits of all entrepreneurs that depend on bank funding and thus reduces the overall
lobby contributions for the status quo [second term of (3.26)]. Third, the number of
entrepreneurs that receive funding is reduced when the sovereign bond default risk
increases. While this lowers the number of citizens that receive an entrepreneurial
rent, it increases the rent for all remaining entrepreneurs. For all relevant levels of
productions, the total gross return for entrepreneurs is thus increasing in the default
risk of the sovereign bond [third term of (3.26)]. Finally, as shown in the fourth
term of (3.26), an increase in the default risk of sovereign bonds changes the share of
entrepreneurs that are not dependent on bank funding. Due to the negative effect of θG
onw0L and the positive effect onwM , the fraction of market-funded entrepreneurs µ
0 =
1−wM
1−w0
L
increases when sovereign bonds become more risky. and thus the willingness to
lobby for the status quo.
Summing up over all effects, it is clear that for all bank owners lobby contributions to
10This follows directly from using the implicit function theorem in (3.10) to derive ∂rL
∂θG
.
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preserve the status quo of capital standards will be a positive function of the sovereign
risk. For all entrepreneurs that are endowedwithwi > wM , contributions will increase
with sovereign risk up to the point where the positive price effect is no longer sufficient
to compensate for the increase in the expected cost of deposit insurance. Finally,
for all entrepreneurs that depend on bank funding the increase in the sovereign bond
default risk causes an additional negative effect due to the increase in the loan interest
rate. While the effect of θG on the total rent of entrepreneurs and bank owners is thus
ambiguous, we can bemore specific about the effect of θG on the formation of the lobby
within the group of producers. On the one hand, the increase in the sovereign bond
risk increases the critical threshold of wealth to receive funding w0L. At the same time
it decreases the threshold wM due to lower competition within the private sector [see
eq. (3.13)]. Thus, an increase in the sovereign risk causes a shift within the production
sector towards a higher share of market-funded entrepreneurs µ, which, in turn, can
increase the support for distortive sovereign bond regulation.
3.4.2 What is the role of the visability of the spillover?
Throughout the above analysis we have considered a politically transparent process.
All consumers anticipate the welfare loss that is caused by the status quo of inefficient
sovereign bond regulation due to the spillover that arises from bank regulation on
the private sector. However, recent seminal publications cast serious doubt on this
assumption. Empirical studies on tax salience indicate that agents ignore utility losses
fromtaxes, eventhoughthese taxeshavefirstorder effectsonsocialwelfare (Finkelstein
2009; Chetty et al. 2009). As the expected cost of status quo sovereign bond regulation
for consumers seems to be rather more subtle, these perceptional limitations should
be of particular importance for the political game. Citizens have to be convinced that
strict regulation of sovereign bonds benefit them.
Critically, the welfare loss for consumers results from two channels [see eq. (3.16)]
and both can be subject to fiscal illusion. First, consumers may not realize the price
channel. The entry barrier to production is not created by direct taxation, subsidies or
licensing. Rather, the entry barrier is caused by a shift in the bank‘s loan investment
policy. Thus, it is not obvious that the consumers will link the status quo in sovereign
bond regulation to the inefficient low level of production. Second, the increase in bank
profits through lax sovereign bond capital regulation is realized instantaneously. In
contrast, the associated increase in the contingent liability for the deposit insurance
system is less visible for consumers both regarding the probability and the amount of
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future payment obligations. In our model, both effects would induce an inward shift
of the λ(C) curve in figure 3.4. Consequently, the critical amount of contributions to
preserve the status quo (Cˆ) shrinks. This increases the probability for persistent zero
capital standards of sovereign bonds.
To sum up, if consumers do not fully understand the spillover effect of sovereign bond
regulation onproduction and on the deposit insurance system, less lobby contributions
are necessary to block a welfare-improving reform.
3.4.3 Openness of the private sector
So far we have modeled a closed economy where incumbent producers are hostile to a
reform. Specifically, there is (1) no competition for incumbent producers from abroad
and (2) no possibility to get funding abroad. What will happen in our model if we
relax both assumptions?
If we allow for foreign competition in the private sector, our model would predict
that incumbents’ opposition against reforms of the status quo will be weaker. The
reason is that the price of the entrepreneurial good becomesmore andmore unaffected
by domestic regulation since the home market has a relatively low impact on total
output. Intuitively, the price effect as the regulatory rent for producers in the status
quo will shrink and thus the willingness to lobby for its maintenance. In the extreme
case of perfect competition in the market for the entrepreneurial good, the market
price is exogenous and hence there is no reason for producers to protect the status
quo anymore. In reality, there is a continuum of industries with varying degree of
competition in international markets so that the identified spillover shapes themarket
outcome of the respective industries differently.
If, on the other hand, we allow cross-border capital flows and entrepreneurial funding
from foreign banks (that are unaffected by domestic regulation), the results are less
obvious. According to the literature (Beck et al. 2014), the supply of external credit
criticallydependsontheopaquenessofdomesticborrowers, or in termsofourmodel the
technology of the foreign bank to reduce the problem of entrepreneurial moral hazard
captured by the private benefit B. Small and young firms are mostly not publicly
listed and hard information about their financial situation and business strategy is
not easily available to foreign lenders. Accordingly, the fraction of foreign funded
entrepreneurs crucially depends on the screening and monitoring technique of foreign
banks. The less costly this technology, the more informed foreign lenders and the less
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collateral, i.e. wealth, domestic borrowers have to pledge to compensate risk. Thereby,
evidence suggests that foreign banks tend to lendmore to large firms, neglecting small
and medium ones (Berger et al., 2001; Berger et al., 2005; see Sengupta 2007 for the
theoretical underpinning). Consequently, empirical findingspoint to thedirection that
the impact of cross-border capital flows on the identified channel for rent creation in
the private sector is determined by the problem of asymmetric information for foreign
banks. They can give birth to more competition in the private sector through credit
substitution, thereby reducing the price effect, the more informed they are.
3.4.4 Market structure of the banking sector
Until now, we have considered a monopolist bank that can buy sovereign bonds for
the risk adequate rate of r
θG
. Consequently, the rent of inadequate sovereign bond
regulation accrued entirely to the owners of this bank. We now want to depart from
this assumption and allow for an oligopolistic banking sector.
Obviously, in this case competition for sovereign bonds drives down the sovereign
interest rates. It is straight forward that the anticipation to derive positive expected
profits from sovereign bond holding will reduce the rent that can be extracted by
the banking sector. Hence, this allows the government to issue sovereign debt at an
artificially low interest rate that no longer reflects risk-adequacy (rG <
r
θG
).11
However, due to the installment of the deposit insurance scheme, bank still have a
comparative advantage vis-a-vis citizens in the holding of sovereign bonds. Thus,
sovereign bonds will remain on the banks’ balance sheet. As a consequence, our qual-
itative results in section 3.2 are unaffected by the market structure of the banking
sector. As long as bank owners anticipate that they will lose any loan return in case of
sovereign-induced insolvency, the spillover effect of inadequate sovereign bond regula-
tion on private lending remains. Total output in the economy declines and again rents
are generated for a subgroup of privileged producers and bank owners. The political
viability condition of welfare improving reforms does not change qualitatively.
To describe the favorable lending conditions for the government that arise in this
11An oligopolistic setting may introduce additional factors for banks to invest in sovereign
bonds. As shown by Acharya and Yorulmazer (2007), Farhi and Tirole (2012) and Gennaioli et
al. (2014) herding behaviour with respect to sovereign bonds can occur. These authors argue
that the government’s inability to commit not to bailout banks during a systemic crisis generates
an incentive for banks to excessively and collectively invest in assets that decline during systemic
crises such as sovereign bonds.
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scenario, the term ‘financial repression’ has evolved in the finance literature and brings
us to the next interesting implication of our model.12
3.4.5 Financial repression
In our model, the scenario of ‘financial repression’ can be the outcome of the political
process even without the explicit intention of the politician to alter the conditions of
public debt management. It is not motivated by the self-interest of politicians, but
by the lobby power of a coalition of beneficiaries of the regulatory status quo. The
persistence of inefficient sovereign bond regulation is caused by its rent creating effect
within the private sector and the willingness of the privileged group of producers and
bank owners to protect their rents. This argument is new in the literature.
Note in this context that the favorable conditions for the government to issue sovereign
debt can only exist on a superficial basis in our setting. Obviously, it is irrelevant
whether the expected cost of public debt will be reflected explicitly in the sovereign
bond interest rate or, more subtle, in an increase of contingent liabilities within the
deposit insurance system. Therefore, given a setup of full information of all agents,
the politician will not benefit from artificially low sovereign bond interest rates as long
as the electorate anticipates that repayment obligations are only reallocated.
However, incentives will change if we observe perceptional limitations regarding the
liabilities within the deposit insurance system (fiscal illusion) in the electorate. This
can be a source for opportunistic behavior by politicians to exploit these perceptional
limitations in order to get reelected which can exacerbate the inefficiencies deriving
from inadequate sovereign bond regulation. In the presence of large amounts of public
debt, traditional fiscal policy instruments such as increased taxation and spending
cuts seem to encounter their inherent economic, political and constitutional limit.
Consequently, policy-makers can be enticed to use sovereign regulation as a politically
preferred alternative to induce banks to lend to the state and crowd out private lending
as a side-effect. Perceptional limitations by the electorate allows a ‘grabbing hand’
12The term goes back to Shaw (1973) and McKinnon (1973) who argue that governments in
emerging markets employ measures to channel funds to themselves. While in the last centuries
financial repression was achieved with direct restrictions on the transfer of assets abroad through
the imposition of capital controls, one can nowadays observe more sophisticated techniques of
financial repression like the creation of a captive domestic market for government debt with reserve
requirements or with direct or indirect controls over interest rates (e.g. Regulation Q). In the light
of the ongoing financial crisis, most recently Reinhart and Sbrancia (2015) provide evidence how
governments use regulatory tools to issue debt at lower interest rates.
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behavior of the state (Shleifer and Vishny 1998) via lax sovereign bond regulation.
This incentive is reinforced if the politician has a self-interest in the spirit of Niskanen’s
theory of bureaucracy (Niskanen 1971). He might derive utility from the pure size of
the public budget and thus benefit from artificially low sovereign bond interest rates
through less public resistance. Accordingly, our model can be easily extended by some
supply forces for the lax regulation of sovereign bonds due to financial repression.
3.4.6 Empirical discussion
Our model establishes a negative relationship between distortive lax sovereign bond
regulation and the sectoral output in the economy (Proposition 3.1). The central
argument of inefficient allocation of scarce credits is in line with empirical findings
in the periphery countries that are evidently affected by financial frictions during
the crisis. For example, Brutti and Saure (2013) document that post-crisis balance
sheets of banks in periphery countries of the eurozone consist of oversized amounts of
government debt. It turns out that banks that were more affected by the crisis have
changed their portfolio structure and reduced their supply of credit for entrepreneurs
(Popov and Van Horen 2013; De Marco 2014). The bank lending channel, i.e. the
spillover effect identified in Proposition 3.1, originates from subsidized sovereign bond
regulation (Acharya and Steffen 2015) and constitutes financial frictions for the real
economy.
This credit crunch has generated huge differences in the rents across producers. New
credit to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in the eurozone declined by 35
percent between 2008 and 2013, but lending rate spreads between loans for small and
large firms have significantly increased (OECD 2014; Kaya 2014).13 Recent stud-
ies demonstrate that this contraction in the lending volume that occurred during the
sovereign debt crisis, has real effects for the borrowing firms, e.g. in the form of lower
levels of investment, lower sales growth and lower employment growth (Acharya et
al. 2014). Ferrando and Mulier (2015), using SAFE-data, provide complementary
evidence that less productive, more leveraged and younger SMEs in the eurozone
have been more likey to experience financing obstacles. There is a consensus that less
wealthy entrepreneurswere the hardest hit by the adverse bank credit conditions. This
finding is consistent with ourmechanism of rent creation elaborated in Proposition 3.2
13Kaya (2014) furthermore argues that liquidity measures to support the liability side of bank’s
balance sheets only had limited impact on SMEs borrowing costs.
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which sets the ground for the political support motive of incumbent wealthy produc-
ers. This can also explain why several European industry organizations, such as the
BDI, have waged a campaign during the consultation process on the European Com-
mission’s proposal for a regulation on banks, arguing that lower risk weightings for
government bonds leads to a competitive disadvantage for firms with the consequence
that corporate finance becomes more expensive.
The model implies that there is a hysteresis in sovereign regulation in the sense that,
in order to get political support those countries that already privilege a bank’s in-
vestment in sovereign bonds tend to continue such a policy. The European Union
(EU) proves to be an illustrative example. Despite the Basel Accords force towards
banks to assign positive risk weights for sovereign bonds, which depend on the formal
rating or the classification of a rating agency, the EU stretched the Basel rules sub-
stantially in 2006, allowing banks to use their own risk models with a zero weight for
sovereign bonds.14 In the course of the crisis the European countries have adopted
many more techniques to direct lenders toward their government securities (see Rein-
hart and Sbrancia 2015; van Riet 2013). For example, besides the discussed unlimited
exposure for sovereign bonds, several euro area countries plan to introduce a com-
mon financial transaction tax under the so-called ”enhanced cooperation procedure”
following a proposal by the European Commission. However, transactions of govern-
ment securities are excluded from the scope of the tax which creates a cost advantage
for secondary market purchases of sovereign debt compared with alternative financial
instruments. Moreover, credit rating agencies have been criticized for downgrading
governments. Further legislation will make credit rating agencies subject to civil lia-
bility for damages caused intentionally or due to gross negligence set a fixed calendar
for issuing sovereign ratings and rating outlook.
The basic model is static. However, empirical evidence suggests that the intersecto-
rial misallocation of funds created by banking regulation has long-run effects for an
economy. Given the key role of finance for growth, the regulatory privilege for state
financing then may create underdevelopment traps (King and Levine 1993; Roubini
and Sala-i Martin 1992). The main channels of the negative influence on economic
growth are a fall in capital productivity, the decrease in the investment level and lower
entry rates in the private sector. Consistent with our basic framework, most recently,
14In fact, the Capital Requirement Directive of the European Union softened this rule by saying
”Exposures to Member States, central governments and central banks denominated and funded in
the domestic currency of that central government and central bank shall be assigned a risk weight
of zero” (Directive 2006/48/EC), Annex VI, Part 1(4)).
91
Inactivity by design
Midrigan and Xu (2014) show in a macro framework the substantial drop in the level
of TFP, output and consumption resulting from financial frictions. They point out
that the most sizeable productivity losses arise from inefficient low levels of entry and
technology adoption decisions.
Economichistory suggests that thisphenomenon isnot limited todevelopingcountries.
The constrained banking era in the 1960’s and 1970’s of the UK shows that there is
a negative effect on the economic development and the growth opportunities of a
country. Because of the tightly regulated clearing banks, the average ratio of private
credits by depositing banks during the decade 1960-69 was only 19 percent of GDP
(Calomiris and Haber 2014). This was one third of the level of countries like the US,
Germany or Italy. The result was the emergence of shadow banks since savers spurned
the regulated clearing banks and created a parallel financial system that was outside
the regulatory structure of the government (see Calomiris and Haber 2014 and Collins
2012).
3.5 Conclusion
This chapter has highlighted the role private interests play when a politician creates
rules governing thebanking sector. Wesetupa simplemodel to rationalize the factwhy
a societymight be locked in regulatory frameworks that subsidizes a bank’s investment
in sovereign debt. Due to portfolio adjustments, spillover effects arise that create
obstacles to entry in the product market constituting a regulatory rent that can be
extracted to influence the policy outcome. Thereby we model how the political choice
emerges as a trade-off between the rents from distorting financial investments and the
associated welfare loss from suppressed production. Making private credits dearer is
an effective way to change the distribution of income through the back door and create
electoral support for the status quo in sovereign bond regulation.
Our results indicate that the support for the persistence of inadequate sovereign bond
capital standards is likely to be strongest in those countries that have been most
affected by the financial crisis. First, as shown by Acharya and Steffen (2015), bank
owners have benefited from the increase in the risk premium of sovereign bonds. This
is due to the fact that the increase in the risk premium fully accrues to the bank owners
while the downside risk is limited through the deposit insurance scheme and shifted to
the (international) taxpayers. Second, additional negative effects might result from
the sharp contraction in bank lending that are documented in Becker and Ivashina
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(2014) and Popov and van Horen (2014). By reducing the number of bank funded
entrepreneurs, the fraction of active producers that would benefit from improved loan
conditions in these countries has been shrinking. Those who ’survived’ this episode of
the crisis are likely to defend the regulatory status quo in the political process. They
promote inactivity by design.
In the light of the ongoing debate about changing the regulatory environment for
banks, we argue that an efficient policy of portfolio regulation may benefit from an
insulation of political rent-seeking and from clear rules of accountability for the re-
sponsible regulator. To address the problems of redistributional conflicts, the regula-
tion of a bank’s investment policy should be delegated to a transparent independent
authority or constrained by supranational law. If there is a limit on the bank’s con-
centration of sovereign debt (like it is the case for any other asset in a bank’s balance
sheet), the spillover effect that constitutes rent-creation and the electoral support of
agents for the status quo is alleviated. Thus, with respect to the international harmo-
nization of banking regulation, we strongly recommend a harmonization of maximum
government debt holdings by banks.
Second, a capital market union in the eurozone might offer credit substitution for
bank-dependent small andmedium sized enterprises (SMEs). This can improve credit
availability of entrepreneurs such that the identified bank-lending channel of impru-
dent bank regulation is weakened. As a consequence, the impact of politics on the
(mis)allocation of credits is likely to be constrained.
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This thesis has considered regulatory interventions into the banking sector. In the first
two chapters, a particular focus has been put on international aspects of banking reg-
ulation. Thereby, I have studied the outcome of non-cooperative national regulation
policies when national banks compete on international markets to serve national con-
sumers (first chapter) and when national entrepreneurs depend on mobile bank capi-
tal (second chapter). In the third chapter I have analyzed the regulation of sovereign
bonds in a political economy framework. In all chapters, I have derived results that
are somewhat unexpected at first glance.
The first chapter showed that regulation authorities have an incentive to impose cap-
ital standards on their national banking sector that are above the global cooperative
level. Initially, onemight be surprised why national regulation authorities would want
to impose additional costs on their national banking system and why this would be
opposed by other jurisdictions. However, once one takes into account that capital
standards can alter the structure of a heterogeneous national banking sector, an im-
portant point is added. Then, driving out the worst banks through higher capital
standards can become an attractive policy, while at the same time taxpayers and con-
sumers abroad might suffer from the repercussions of this policy on the quality of the
foreign banking sector.
Likewise, centralized resolution regimes might sound like a promising idea when this
can limit externalities that are imposed by unilateral national activities. However, in
a strict sense, this can only be unanimously approved when remaining instruments
within the regulatory framework are already globally fixed. Otherwise, as shown in
the second chapter, different regulatory measures might interact in a way that each
externality mutually mitigates each other as long as all instruments remain nationally
fixed.
Finally, this thesis questioned the common narrative that the present zero capital
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requirement for sovereign bonds only serve self interested politicians. Rather, as
analyzed in the third chapter, the distortive effects on the portfolio choice of banks can
lead to redistributive effects within the private sector. Thus, inadequate regulatory
standards can create beneficiaries thatmight help to stabilize an inefficient status quo.
All chapters thus show that taking a theoretical microeconomic perspective on topics
within the range of banking regulation can add to both, the economic literature and the
discussion in policy debates. Using this framework, one can identify new effects and
channels that, based on the assumptions, can be vividly discussed and, based on the
results, can be rigorously checked. Given the state of the finance literature previous
to the financial crisis, more might be needed.
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A Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Equations 1.17 – 1.20
To analyze the effects of an increase in ki on aggregate output and the cutoff qualities
qˆi in the two countries, we totally differentiate the equation system (1.10)-(1.12) to get
[A− y − 1 + ki − 2c˜] dqˆi = qˆidy + (ρ− qˆi)dki, (A.1)
[A− y − 1 + kj − 2c˜] dqˆj = qˆjdy, (A.2)
dy =
3(1− qˆ3)c
[3b+ 2(1− qˆ3)](2 + qˆ)2
(dqˆi + dqˆj)−
[3ρ(1− qˆ2)− 2(1− qˆ3)]
6b+ 4(1− qˆ3)
(dki + dkj),
(A.3)
where we have used the short-hand notation (1.3) and (1.23) from the main text,
eq. (1.5) has been used to simplify terms, and (A.3) has used symmetry after the
differentiation. This equation system can be simplified by substituting (A.3) into each
of (A.1) and (A.2). This yields the two-equation system
{
(qˆc˜+ φ)[6b+ 4(1− qˆ3)]− 2qˆ(1− qˆ3)c˜
}
dqi = 2qˆc˜(1− qˆ
3)dqj
+
{
(ρ− qˆ)[6b+ 4(1− qˆ3)]− [3ρqˆ(1− qˆ2)− 2qˆ(1− qˆ3)]
}
dki (A.4)
{
(qˆc˜+ φ)[6b+ 4(1− qˆ3)]− 2qˆ(1− qˆ3)c˜
}
dqj
= 2qˆc˜(1− qˆ3)dqi − qˆ[3ρqˆ(1− qˆ
2)− 2qˆ(1− qˆ3)]dki (A.5)
Solving the system (A.4) and (A.5) gives equations (1.17) and (1.18) in the main text.
Substituting these results back into (A.3) yields
∂y
∂ki
=
(1− qˆ)κ
2φΩ
, (A.6)
where κ and Ω are given in (1.22) and (1.21). Finally, differentiating (1.7) gives
dyi =
1
6b
{
−2(1− qˆ3i )dy + 2(1− qˆ
3
i )c˜dqˆi − [3ρ(1− qˆ
2
i )− 2(1− qˆ
3
i )]dki
}
(A.7)
Substituting (1.17) and (1.18) along with (A.6) into (A.7) gives (1.19) and (1.20) in
the main text.
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A.2 Conditions 1.27 – 1.28
From (1.24) and (1.26) and using (1.19), a positive effect of capital standards on bank
profits and consumer surplus, evaluated at k = 0 initially, requires thatκ > 0 in (1.22).
Evaluating κ at k = 0 and noting that qˆ = 0 for k = 0 from (1.5), this condition is
κ|k=0 =
3ρc
2
− (Ri − 1)(3ρ− 2) > 0 (A.8)
The endogenous variable (R − 1) can be substituted using (1.9) together with (1.6)
and (1.7). This yields
Ri − 1|k=0 =
3b
2(3b+ 2)
(2A− 3c− 2) . (A.9)
Substituting (A.9) in (A.8), a sufficient condition for κ|k=0 > 0 is
3
2
ρc− (3ρ− 2)
[
A−
3c
2
− 1
]
> 0.
Collecting the terms for c gives condition (1.27) in the main text.
A positive effect on taxpayers will result when the positive first two effects in (1.25)
dominate the third effect, which is negative for κ > 0. Substituting in from (1.17)
and (1.19), evaluating at k = qˆ = 0 and using y|k=0 = (R− 1)/3b from (1.6) and (1.7)
gives, as a sufficient condition
∂Ti
∂ki
∣∣∣∣
k=0
> 0 ⇔ 3ρ(R− 1)− κ > 0. (A.10)
Using (A.8) and (A.9) yields
∂Ti
∂ki
∣∣∣∣
k=0
> 0 ⇔
12b(2A− 3c− 2)(3ρ− 1)
(3b+ 2)
>
3ρc
2
. (A.11)
Collecting the terms involving candnoting that (3ρ−1) ≥ 2ρgives (1.28) as a sufficient
condition.
A.3 Equations 1.30 – 1.33
To derive (1.30), we first use (1.6) and (1.7) to rewrite:
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dyi
dki
=
1
6b
[
−3(1 + qˆ)φ
dqˆi
dki
+ (1− qˆ)2(2 + qˆ)
dφi
dki
]
. (A.12)
In a second step, we totally differentiate (1.5) to get:
dqˆi
dki
=
1
φ
(
ρ− qˆ
dφi
dki
)
, (A.13)
Then, we substitute (A.13) in (A.12) to get:
dyi
dki
=
1
6b
[
−3(1 + qˆ)ρ+ 2(1 + qˆ + qˆ2)
dφi
dki
]
. (A.14)
Similarly, we arrive at
dyj
dki
, whereby the only difference is that
dqˆj
dki
= − qˆ
ρ
dφj
dki
so that:
dyj
dki
=
2(1 + qˆ + qˆ2)
6b
dφj
dki
. (A.15)
Finally, we substitute (A.14) and (A.15) in (1.24)–(1.26), rearrange terms using (1.6)
and (1.7) and sum over all terms in (1.24)–(1.26) to arrive at (1.30).
Equation (1.31) follows directly from substituting (1.19) in (A.14) and rearranging
terms.
Equation (1.32) follows directly from substituting (1.20) in (A.15) and rearranging
terms.
To arrive at (1.33) we first derive the condition for dpii/dki = 0 which is equal to:
dφi
dki
=
3ρ
2 + qˆ
(A.16)
Substituting (A.16) in dTi/dki + dSi/dki then yields:
dTi
dki
∣∣∣∣
dpii
dki
=0
+
dSi
dki
∣∣∣∣
dpii
dki
=0
= β
(1− qˆ)3φ
6b
+ γ
(1− qˆ)3(2 + qˆ)φ
2(6b)2
dφj
dki
+
(1− qˆ)33ρ
6b(2 + qˆ)
[
β(1− k)− γ
(1− qˆ)(2 + qˆ)φqˆ
12b
]
,(A.17)
where the first and third term are always positive and the second term is positive for
κ < 0. Therefore, for the overall term to be positive it is sufficient that the negative
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last term is overcompensated by the positive first term, which is the case whenever
condition (1.33) holds.
A.4 Equation 1.35
Using (1.14)–(1.16) we can write welfare in country j as
Wj =
6αby2j
(1− qˆj)(2 + qˆj)2
−
β(1− kj)(1− qˆj)yj
(2 + qˆj)
+
γ(yi + yj)
2
4
i 6= j.
Differentiating with respect to ki gives in a first step
∂Wj
∂ki
=
12αbyj
(1− qˆ)(2 + qˆ)2
∂yi
∂ki
+
18αby2j qˆ
(1− qˆ)2(2 + qˆ)3
∂qˆj
∂ki
−
β(1− kj)(1− qˆ)
(2 + qˆ)
∂yj
∂ki
+
3β(1− kj)yj
(2 + qˆ)2
∂qˆj
∂ki
+
γ(yi + yj)
2
∂y
∂ki
. (A.18)
Substituting in from (1.18)–(1.20) and collecting terms gives eq. (1.35) in the main
text.
A.5 Equations 1.41 – 1.43
To start, first note that the total output is now equal to the following expression
y =
1
b
(
1− q˜3i
3
φhi −
1− q˜2i
2
khi ρ+
1− q˜3j
3
φhj −
1− q˜2i
2
khj ρ
+
q˜3i − qˆ
3
i
3
φhi −
q˜2i − qˆ
2
i
2
khi ρ+
q˜3j − qˆ
3
j
3
φhj −
q˜2j − qˆ
2
j
2
khj ρ
)
, (A.19)
where the first row in eq. (A.19) measures the output of banks in the high quality pool
of both countries, whereas the second row in (A.19) captures the output of banks in
the low quality pool.
We start by totally differentiating eq. (1.39) for each quality pool in both countries,
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which yields
dφli =
c
(qel)2
dqeli − dy + dki (A.20)
dφhi =
c
(qeh)2
dqehi − dy (A.21)
dφlj =
c
(qel)2
dqelj − dy (A.22)
dφhj =
c
(qeh)2
dqehj − dy . (A.23)
We then substitute (A.20) - (A.23) into the total differential of eq. (A.19). Rearranging
terms and using the symmetry between both countries gives us
dy =
q˜3 − qˆ3
3b
[
c
(qel)2
(
dqeli + dq
el
j
)
− 2dy + dki
]
−
q˜2 − qˆ2
2b
dki
+
1− q˜3
3b
[
c
(qeh)2
(
dqehi + dq
eh
j
)
− 2dy
]
. (A.24)
We now want to substitute dqel and dqeh in eq. (A.24). As lqˆ = 0, it follows directly
from (1.40) that qel = 2q˜+qˆ
3
and thus
dqeli =
2
3
dq˜i +
1
3
dqˆi (A.25)
dqelj =
2
3
dq˜j +
1
3
dqˆj . (A.26)
To get dqeh , we take the total derivative of (1.40) and substitute dlq˜ =
1
b
(q˜dφh+φhdq˜)
and dl1 =
1
b
dφh to get
dqehi =
[
2lq˜(2l1 + lq˜)
3(l1 + lq˜)2
]
dq˜i −
[
(1− q˜)2khρ
3(l1 + lq˜)2b
]
dφhi (A.27)
dqehj =
[
2lq˜(2l1 + lq˜)
3(l1 + lq˜)2
]
dq˜j −
[
(1− q˜)2khρ
3(l1 + lq˜)2b
]
dφhj . (A.28)
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We then substitute (A.21) in (A.27) and (A.23) in (A.28) and rearrange terms to get
dqehi =
[
2lq˜(2l1 + lq˜)b
3(l1 + lq˜)2b+
c
(qeh )2
(1− q˜)2khρ
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡Γ
dq˜i +
[
(1− q˜)2khρ
3(l1 + lq˜)2b+
c
(qeh )2
(1− q˜)2khρ
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡χ1
dy
(A.29)
dqehj =
[
2lq˜(2l1 + lq˜)b
3(l1 + lq˜)2b+
c
(qeh )2
(1− q˜)2khρ
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡Γ
dq˜j +
[
(1− q˜)2khρ
3(l1 + lq˜)2b+
c
(qeh )2
(1− q˜)2khρ
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡χ1
dy .
(A.30)
Now, substituting (A.25), (A.26), (A.29) and (A.30) into (A.24) and rearranging terms
gives us
dy


1 + 2
(
q˜3 − qˆ3
3b
)
+ 2
(
1− q˜3
3b
)[
3(l1 + lq˜)
2b
3(l1 + lq˜)2b+
c
(qeh )2
(1− q˜)2khρ
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡χ2


=
−
(
q˜2 − qˆ2
2b
−
q˜3 − qˆ3
3b
)
dki +
[
q˜3 − qˆ3
3b
2
3
c
(qel)2
+
1− q˜3
3b
Γ
c
(qeh)2
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡χ3
(dq˜i + dq˜j)
+
[
q˜3 − qˆ3
3b
1
3
c
(qel)2
]
(dqˆi + dqˆj) (A.31)
Now, to get dq˜i, we first substitute (A.25) in (A.20) and (A.29) in (A.21). We then
substitute these terms in the total derivative of (1.38) and slightly rearrange terms.
To arrive at dq˜j we follow the same steps. We then have
dq˜i

(φ
h − φl)− q˜
[
2
3
c
(qel)2
− Γ
c
(qeh)2
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡Λ

 =q˜
[
1
3
c
(qel)2
dqˆi − χ1
c
(qeh)2
dy
]
− (ρ− q˜) dki
(A.32)
dq˜j

(φ
h − φl)− q˜
[
2
3
c
(qel)2
− Γ
c
(qeh)2
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡Λ

 =q˜
[
1
3
c
(qel)2
dqˆj − χ1
c
(qeh)2
dy
]
, (A.33)
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where Λ > 0 has to hold, as otherwise we would arrive at q˜ = 1. Then, substituting
eqs. (A.32) and (A.33) in (A.31) and rearranging terms gives us
dy
[
1 + 2
(
q˜3 − qˆ3
3b
)
+ 2
(
1− q˜3
3b
)
χ2 + 2χ3
q˜χ1
c
(qeh )2
Λ
]
=
[
q˜3 − qˆ3
3b
1
3
c
(qel)2
+ χ3
q˜ 1
3
c
(qel )2
Λ
]
(dqˆi + dqˆj)−
[
q˜2 − qˆ2
2b
−
q˜3 − qˆ3
3b
+ χ3
ρ− q˜
Λ
]
dki
(A.34)
Now, to get dqˆi, we first substitute (A.25) in (A.20) and then substitute this term in
the total derivative of (1.5). Slightly rearranging terms and following the same steps
for dqˆj, we get
dqˆi
[
φl + qˆ
1
3
c
(qel)2
]
= (ρ− qˆ) dki −
[
qˆ
2
3
c
(qel)2
]
dq˜i + qˆdy (A.35)
dqˆj
[
φl + qˆ
1
3
c
(qel)2
]
= −
[
qˆ
2
3
c
(qel)2
]
dq˜j + qˆdy (A.36)
We can now substitute (A.32) in (A.35) and rearrange terms. Analogously, for dqˆj, we
substitute (A.33) in (A.36) and rearrange terms. This yields
dqˆi
[
φl + qˆ
1
3
c
(qel)2
+ qˆ
2
3
c
(qel)2
q˜ 1
3
c
(qel )2
Λ
]
=
[
(ρ− qˆ) + qˆ
2
3
c
(qel)2
ρ− q˜
Λ
]
dki
+
[
qˆ + qˆ
2
3
c
(qel)2
q˜χ1
c
(qeh )2
Λ
]
dy (A.37)
dqˆj
[
φl + qˆ
1
3
c
(qel)2
+ qˆ
2
3
c
(qel)2
q˜ 1
3
c
(qel )2
Λ
]
=
[
qˆ + qˆ
2
3
c
(qel)2
q˜χ1
c
(qeh )2
Λ
]
dy . (A.38)
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Next, we substitute (A.37) and (A.38) in (A.34) and rearrange terms to get
dy
dki
{
1 + 2
(
q˜3 − qˆ3
3b
)
+ 2
(
1− q˜3
3b
)
χ2 + 2χ3
q˜χ1
c
(qeh )2
Λ
−
[
q˜3 − qˆ3
3b
1
3
c
(qel)2
+ q˜
1
3
c
(qel)2
χ3
Λ
] qˆ + qˆ 23 c(qel )2
q˜χ1
c
(qeh )2
Λ
φl + qˆ 1
3
c
(qel )2
+ qˆ 2
3
c
(qel )2
q˜ 1
3
c
(qel )2
Λ



 =
−
[
q˜3 − qˆ3
3b
−
q˜2 − qˆ2
2b
+ (ρ− q˜)
χ3
Λ
]
+
[
q˜3 − qˆ3
3b
1
3
c
(qel)2
+ q˜
1
3
c
(qel)2
χ3
Λ
] (ρ− qˆ) + qˆ 23 c(qel )2 ρ−q˜Λ
φl + qˆ 1
3
c
(qel )2
+ qˆ 2
3
c
(qel )2
q˜ 1
3
c
(qel )2
Λ

 . (A.39)
Then, multiplying all terms in (A.39) with 6b
[
1 + qˆ 1
3φl
c
(qel )2
+ qˆ 2
3φl
c
(qel )2
q˜ 1
3
c
(qel )2
Λ
]
and
rearranging the third and fourth row of (A.39), we arrive at (1.44). Rearranging the
first and second row of (A.39) gives us
Ωs =6b+
qˆ
φl
1
3
c
(qel)2
[
6b+
4bq˜ c
(qel )2
+ 2(1− q˜3)(φh − φl)χ2
Λ
]
+
{
2 +
qˆ
φl
1
3
c
(qel)2
[
1 +
q˜ 2
3
c
(qel )2
Λ
]}[
2(q˜3 − qˆ3) + 2(1− q˜3)χ2 +
6bq˜ c
(qeh )2
χ1χ3
Λ
]
> 0
(A.40)
Finally, substituting (A.39) in (A.37) and (A.38) gives us (1.41) and (1.42), where we
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have introduced the short-hand notations
Υi =
q˜ − qˆ
φl
[
2q˜(q˜ + qˆ)(ρ− 1) + 2ρq˜2 − q˜qˆ − qˆ2
] [
1 +
c
(qel )2
2
3
c
(qeh )2
χ1(ρ− q˜)
Λ
]
+
2(1− q˜3) c
(qeh )2
Γρ(q˜ − qˆ)
Λ
+
ρ− qˆ
φl
[
6b+ 2
(
q˜3 − qˆ3
)
+ 2
(
1− q˜3
)
χ2
]
+
ρ− qˆ
φl

6b q˜
φh − φl
c
(qeh)2
χ1 +
q˜2
[
c
(qeh )2
]2
χ1(q˜
2 − qˆ2)
Λ


+
(ρ− q˜) qˆ
ρ
c
(qel )2
2
3
Λ
[
4(q˜3 − qˆ3) + 4
(
1− q˜3
)
χ2 +
6bq˜ c
(qeh )2
χ1χ3
Λ
]
> 0 (A.41)
Υ2 =6bqˆ
[
1 +
2
3
c
(qel)2
q˜χ1
c
(qeh )2
Λ
]
> 0 (A.42)
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B Appendix to Chapter 2
B.1 Equation 2.15
Maximizing Eq. (2.12) with respect to α yields
∂pi
∂α
=
{
1− λ˜2A
2
[
A− a
2α
kA
− 1−
(1− λ˜B)
2
2
cpA
]
−
(1− λ˜A)
2
2
kA
}
1
kA
−
{
1− λ˜2B
2
[
A− a
2(1− α)
kA
− 1−
(1− λ˜A)
2
2
cpB
]
−
(1− λ˜B)
2
2
kB
}
1
kB
= 0 ,
(B.1)
We can then factor out α and get
αa
(
1− λ˜2A
k2A
+
1− λ˜2B
k2B
)
=
1− λ˜2A
2kA
[
A− 1−
(1− λ˜B)
2
2
cpA
]
−
(1− λ˜A)
2
2
−
1− λ˜2B
2kB
[
A−
2a
kB
− 1−
(1− λ˜A)
2
2
cpB
]
−
(1− λ˜B)
2
2
.
(B.2)
Then, multiplying all terms with k2Ak
2
B and solving for α gives us
α =
(1− λ˜2A)kAk
2
B
[
A− 1− (1−λ˜B)
2
2
cpA
]
− (1− λ˜A)
2k2Ak
2
B
2a[(1− λ˜A)2k2B + (1− λ˜B)
2k2A]
−
(1− λ˜2B)kBk
2
A
[
A− 2a
kB
− 1− (1−λ˜A)
2
2
cpB
]
− (1− λ˜B)
2k2Ak
2
B
2a[(1− λ˜A)2k2B + (1− λ˜B)
2k2A]
. (B.3)
Finally, slightly rearranging terms we arrive at Eq. (2.15).
B.2 Equations 2.18 – 2.19
Substituting Eqs. (2.1) and (2.4) into (2.12), we can derive the marginal return of
investment for the subsidiary in country A:
MRA = A− a
2α
kA
− 1−
(1− λ˜)2
2
clA . (B.4)
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Now, for kA to be binding independent of the allocation of equity by the multinational
bank it must be true that MRA > 0 even for α = 1. Then, looking at Eq. (2.18),
it becomes clear that in this case the numerator of (2.18) will be negative and thus
∂α
∂kA
< 0. Looking at Eq. (2.19), we can see that a sufficient condition for ∂α
∂λ˜A
< 0 is
that
γ1 ≡ −λ˜
[
A−
a
k
− 1−
(1− λ˜)2
2
cpL
]
+ (1− λ˜)k < 0 . (B.5)
Now, substituting γ1 into the intervention threshold that is chosen by the supervisory
regime in Eq. (2.10) and rearranging terms we get that
γ1 = −λ˜
[
(1− λ˜)2
2
(cl − cp)− a
α
2k
]
−(1−λ˜)
[
1− k + cd
(
1−
1− λ˜2
2
pr
)]
. (B.6)
This shows that γ1 < 0 and thus
∂α
∂kA
< 0 whenever it holds that
(1− λ˜)
[
1− k + cd
(
1−
1− λ˜2
2
pr +
λ˜(1− λ˜)
2
pc
)]
+ λ˜
(1− λ˜)2
2
(cl − cp) > λ˜a
α
2k
,
(B.7)
where the left hand side of (B.7) is the sum of the failure cost (first term) and the
liquidation cost (second term) that is not internalized by the bank. The right hand
side measures the consumer surplus that is due to the investment of the subsidiary.
B.3 Equations 2.25 – 2.29
The welfare effect for country A of a marginal increase in γ is given by:
∂WFA
∂γ
=
(
∂WFA
∂λ˜A
+
∂WFA
∂λ˜B
∂λ˜B
∂λ˜A
+
∂WFA
∂kA
∂kA
∂λ˜A
+
∂WFA
∂kB
∂kB
∂λ˜A
)
∂λ˜A
∂γ
(B.8)
+
(
∂WFA
∂λ˜B
+
∂WFA
∂λ˜A
∂λ˜A
∂λ˜B
+
∂WFA
∂kA
∂kA
∂λ˜A
+
∂WFA
∂kB
∂kB
∂λ˜B
)
∂λ˜B
∂γ
, (B.9)
which simplifies to Eq. (2.25) when we use that ∂WFA
∂λ˜A
= ∂WFA
∂kA
= 0 for γ = 0 and that,
due to the symmetrybetweenbothcountries, it holds that δλ˜A/δγ = δλ˜B/δγ = δλ˜/δγ.
ToarriveatEq. (2.26),wefirst substituteEq. (2.10) inEq. (2.11) toderive the condition
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for λ˜ as a function of γ. This gives us
∂WFγ
∂λ˜A
=1− λ˜A
[
vA −
(1− λ˜B)
2
2
clA
]
+ (1− λ˜A)c
d
A
[
1−
1− λ˜2B
2
prA
]
+ γ
[
(1− λ˜A)
1− λ˜2B
2
clB − λ˜A
(1− λ˜B)
2
2
prBc
d
B
]
= 0 . (B.10)
Then, using the implicit function theoremon (B.10)we arrive atEq. (2.26). Eqs. (2.27)
and (2.28) follow directly from taking the first derivative of the expected welfare func-
tion in Eq. (2.9) with respect to λ˜B and kB, respectively. To arrive at Eq. (2.29), we
take Eq. (2.20) and use the implicit function theorem.
B.4 Condition 2.30
As we are only interested in a sufficient condition for ∂WFA
∂γ
< 0, we can use that
∂λ˜
∂γ︸︷︷︸
(+)
h(lr)cd
1
2k
(1− λ˜)2
2
1− λ˜2
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
(
∂kB
∂λ˜B
+
∂kB
∂λ˜A
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(−)
< 0 , (B.11)
∂λ˜
∂γ︸︷︷︸
(+)
∂α
∂kB
1
k
ψ︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
1
2
(
∂σB
∂λ˜A
+
∂σB
∂λ˜B
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(−)
< 0 , (B.12)
∂λ˜
∂γ︸︷︷︸
(+)
∂WFA
∂λ˜B︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
∂λ˜B
∂λ˜A︸︷︷︸
(−)
< 0 , (B.13)
and therefore leave these terms out of Eq. (2.25). Further, we can use the fact that
∂WFA
∂λ˜B
= ∂φB
∂λ˜A
in a symmetric setting. Then, as ∂λ˜
∂γ
∂WFA
∂λ˜B
> 0 we can exclude this term
from Eq. (2.25) and state the following condition:
∂WFA
∂γ
< 0 ⇔ 1−
1
k
∂α
∂kB
ψ
(
∂α
∂kB
+ 1
2k
)
∂ψB
∂kB
(
∂α
∂kB
+ 1
2k
)
− 1
2
∂σB
∂kB
< 0 , (B.14)
where the second term in Eq. (B.14) measures the indirect welfare effect that is due
to the decrease in capital standards. Rearranging Eq. (B.14) then yields the following
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condition for ∂WFA
∂γ
< 0:
(
∂α
∂kB
+
1
2k
)(
ψ
k
∂α
∂kB
−
∂ψB
∂kB
)
+
∂σB
∂kB
1
2
> 0 , (B.15)
where
∂ψB
∂kB
=
1
2k2
− c


1− λ˜2
2
(1− λ˜)2
2
pc +
(1− λ˜)2
2
(
1−
1− λ˜2
2
pr
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤2

 > 0 , (B.16)
∂σB
∂kB
= c
(1− λ˜)2
2
(
1− λ˜2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤1
[h(lr) + h(lc)] < 0 , (B.17)
∂α
∂kB
=
A− a 2
k
− 1−
≤1︷ ︸︸ ︷
(1− λ˜)2
2
cp
4a
. (B.18)
Then, we apply themaximumvalues that are shown in Eqs. (B.16)-(B.18) for all terms
that enter negatively in condition (B.15) . Finally, multiplying all terms in (B.15) with
16k4(1 − λ˜2)2, taking the maximum value of (1 − λ˜2)2 ≤ 1 for all terms that enter
negatively in (B.15) and slightly rearranging terms, we arrive at condition (2.30).
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C Appendix to Chapter 3
C.1 Proposition 1
Taking the implicit function theorem on eq. (3.10) we get
∂L
∂D
=
−(1− θG)
[
rL +
∂rL
∂L
L− r (1− kL)
]
2∂rL
∂L
+ ∂
2rL
∂L2
L
, (C.1)
where
∂rL
∂L
=
(e+ rL − r)
∂wL
∂L
1− wL
=
−(e+ rL − r)
(1− wL)2
(C.2)
∂2rL
∂L2
=
−∂rL
∂L
(1− wL)2
−
e+ rL − r
(1− wL)3
∂wL
∂L
=
2(e+ rL − r)
(1− wL)4
. (C.3)
To arrive at eq. (C.2) we first use the implicit function theorem on (3.9). In the second
step of (C.2), we derive ∂wL
∂L
using the the implicit function theorem on (3.8) and
substitute this into eq. (C.2).
To get eq. (C.3), we start from (C.2) and then, again, derive ∂wL
∂L
using the the implicit
function theorem on (3.8) and substitute this into eq. (C.3).
Finally, substituting eqs. (C.2) and (C.3) in eq. (C.1) and rearranging terms, we get
∂L
∂D
=
(1− θG)(1− wL)
4
[
rL +
∂rL
∂L
L− r (1− kL)
]
2(e+ rL − r) [(1− wL)2 − L]
, (C.4)
The numerator in eq. (C.4) will be positive whenever kL > 0 [see eq. (3.10)]. The
denominator is always positive, as L can take the maximum value of (1−wL)
2
2
[see
eq. (3.8)].
C.2 Proposition 2
The entrepreneur that is endowed with wˆ is characterized by the following condition
p0 − p1 − (r0L − r
1
L)(1− wˆ) (C.5)
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Now, substituting (3.1) in (C.5) and using n = e(1− wL) we get
e(w0L − w
1
L)− (r
0
L − r
1
L)(1− wˆ) = 0 (C.6)
Finally, substituting (3.9) in (C.6) and rearranging terms, we arrive at (3.14).
111
Bibliography
Acharya, S., Dreyfus, J.F. (1988). Optimal bank reorganization policies and the
pricing of federal deposit insurance. Journal of Finance 44, 1313-1334.
Acharya, V. (2003). Is the international convergence of capital adequacy regulation
desirable? Journal of Finance 58, 2745-2781.
Acharya, V., Yorulmazer, T. (2007). Too many to fail - An analysis of time-
inconsistency in bank closure policies. Journal of Financial Intermediation 16,
1-31.
Acharya, V., Drechsler, I., Schnabl, P. (2014a). A pyrrhic victory? Bank bailouts
and sovereign credit risk. Journal of Finance 69, 2689-2739.
Acharya, V., Eisert, T., Eufinger, C., Hirsch, C. (2014b). Real effects of the sovereign
debt crisis in Europe: Evidence from syndicated loans. CEPRDiscussion Paper
No. 10108.
Acharya, V., Steffen, S. (2015). The greatest carry trade ever? Understanding
eurozone bank risks. Journal of Financial Economics 115, 215-236.
Admati, A., DeMarzo, P., Hellwig, M., Pfleiderer, P. (2010). Fallacies, irrelevant
facts, and myths in the discussion of capital regulation: Why bank equity is not
expensive. Stanford GSB Research Paper No. 2063 and Preprint of the Max
Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn 2010/42.
Admati, A., Hellwig, M. (2013). The bankers’ new clothes: What’s wrong with
banking and what to do about it. Princeton University Press.
Aghion, P, Bolton, P. (1990). Government domestic debt and the risk of default: A
political-economic model of the strategic role of debt. MIT Press, Cambridge
MA.
Aghion, P., Bolton, P., Fries, S. (1999). Optimal design of bank bailouts: The case of
transition economies. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 155,
51-70.
Aghion, P., Fally, T., Scarpetta, S. (2007). Credit constraints as a barrier to the entry
and post-entry growth of firms. Economic Policy 22, 731-779.
Aghion, P., Hemous, D., Kharroubi, E. (2014). Cyclical fiscal policy, credit con-
straints, and industry growth. Journal of Monetary Economics 62, 41-58.
112
Bibliography
Akerlof, G.A. (1970). The market for lemons: quality, uncertainty, and the market
mechanism. Quarterly Journal of Economics 84, 488-500.
Alesina, A., Tabellini, G. (1990). A positive theory of fiscal deficits and government
debt. Review of Economic Studies 57, 401-414.
Allen, F., Gale, D. (2000). Financial contagion. Journal of Political Economy 108,
1-33.
Allen, F., Beck, T., Carletti, E., Lane, P., Schoenmaker, D., Wagner, W. (2011).
Cross-Border Banking in Europe: Implications for Financial Stability and
Macroeconomic Policies. CEPR Report. Center for Economic Policy Research.
Allen, F.,Carletti, E. (2013). What is systemic risk? Journal of Financial Stability 9,
242-249.
Anginer, D., Cerutti, E. and Mart¨ı¿➼nez Per¨ı¿➼a, M.S. (2014). Foreign bank sub-
sidiaries’ default risk during the global crisis. What factors help insulate affili-
ates from their parents? World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, 7053.
Auerbach, A.J., Devereux, M.P., Simpson, H. (2010). Taxing corporate income. In:
J. Mirrlees, S. Adam, T. Besley, R. Blundell, S. Bond, R. Chote, M. Gammie, P.
Johnson, G.Myles and J. Poterba (eds), Dimensions of TaxDesign: theMirrlees
Review, Oxford University Press, 837-893.
Barro, R. (1979). On the determination of public debt. Journal of Political Econ-
omy 87, 940-971.
Barth, J., Caprio Jr., G., Levine, R. (2006). Rethinking bank reguation: till angels
govern. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, (2014). Regulatory Consistency As-
sessment Programme (RCAP)- Assessment of Basel III regulations - European
Union. Bank for International Settlements.
Battistini, N., Pagano, M., Simonelli, S. (2013). Systemic risk, sovereign yields and
bank exposures in the euro crisis. Economic Policy 78, 203-251.
Beck, T., Demirgu¨c-Kunt, A., Levine, R. (2007). Finance, inequality and the poor.
Journal of Economic Growth 12, 27-49.
113
Bibliography
Beck, T., Demirgu¨c-Kunt, A., Laeven, L., Levine, R. (2008). Finance, firm size, and
growth. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 40, 1379-1405.
Beck, T., Wagner, W. (2013). Supranational supervision - Howmuch and for whom.
CEPR Discussion Paper No. 9546.
Beck, T., Radomir, T., Wagner, W. (2013). Supervising cross-border banks: theory,
evidence and policy. Economic Policy 73, 5-44.
Beck, T., Degryse, H., De Haas, R., van Horen, N. (2014). When arm’s length is too
far. Relationship banking over the business cycle. CESifo Working Paper No.
4877.
Becker, G. (1983). A theory of competition among pressure groups for political
influence. Quarterly Journal of Economics 98, 371-400.
Becker, B., Ivashina, V. (2014). Cyclicality of credit supply: Firm level evidence.
Journal of Monetary Economics 62, 76-93.
Benediktsdottir, S., Danielsson, J., Zoega, G. (2011). Lessons from a collapse of a
financial system. Economic Policy 66, 183-235.
Berger, A., Klapper, L., Udell, G. (2001). The ability of banks to lend to information-
ally opaque small business. Journal of Banking and Finance 25, 2127-2167.
Berger, A., Miller, N. H., Petersen, M., Rajan, R., Stein, J. (2005). Does function
follow organizational form? Evidence from the lending practices of large and
small banks. Journal of Financial Economics 76, 237-269.
Bolton, P., Freixas, X., Gambacorta, L., Mistrulli, P.E. (2013). Relationship and
transaction lending in a crisis. NBERWorking Paper No. 19467.
Boot, A., Greenbaum, S., Thakor, A. (1993). Reputation and discretion in financial
contracting. American Economic Review 83, 1165-1183.
Boot, A., Thakor, A. (2000). Can relationship banking survive competition? Journal
of Finance 55, 679-713.
Brutti, F. and P. Saure (2013). Repatriation of Debt in the Euro Crisis. Evidence
for the Secondary Market Theory. Center for Institutions, Policy and Culture
in the Development Process Working Paper 109.
114
Bibliography
Bryant, J. (1980). A model of reserves, bank runs, and deposit insurance. Journal
of Banking and Finance 4, 335-344.
Buch, C., Koch, C.T., Koetter, M. (2011). Size, productivity, and international
banking. Journal of International Economics 85, 329-334.
Buck, F. (2015). The rents of banking - A public choice approach to bank regulation.
ifo Beitra¨ge zur Wirtschaftsforschung 59, ifo Institut.
Cabral, L. M. B., Mata, J. (2003). On the evolution of the firm size distribution:
Facts and theory. American Economic Review 93, 1075-90.
Calomiris, C., Haber, S. (2014). Fragile by design: banking crises, scarce credit, and
political bargains. Princeton University Press.
Calzolari, G., Loranth, G. (2011). Regulation of multinational banks: A theoretical
inquiry. Journal of Financial Intermediation 20, 178-198.
Carbo-Valverde, S., Kane, E.J., Rodriguez-Fernandez, F. (2012). Regulatory arbi-
trage in cross-border banking mergers within the EU. Journal of Money, Credit
and Banking 44, 1609-1629.
Cetorelli, N., Goldberg, L.S. (2012). Banking globalization and monetary transmis-
sion. Journal of Finance 67, 1811-1843.
Chan, Y.S., Greenbaum, S.I., Thakor, A.V. (1992). Is fairly priced deposit insurance
possible? Journal of Finance 47, 227-245.
Chetty, R., Looney, A., Kroft, K. (2009). Salience and Taxation: Theory and Evi-
dence. American Economic Review 99, 1145-77.
Chodorow-Reich, G. (2014). The employment effects of credit market disruptions:
Firm level evidence from the 2008-09 financial crisis. Quarterly Journal of
Economics 129, 1-59.
Chor, D. (2009). Subsidies for FDI. Implications from a model with heterogeneous
firms. Journal of International Economics 78, 113-125.
Chor, D., Manova, K. (2012). Off the cliff and back? Credit conditions and in-
ternational trade during the global financial crisis. Journal of International
Economics 87, 117-133.
115
Bibliography
Claessens, S. (2010). Thefinancial crisis andfinancialnationalism, inS.Evenett,B.M.
Hoekman, Cattaneo (eds.), Effective crisis response and openess: Implications
for the trading system. Joint Wold Bank-CEPR Publication, London.
Claessens, S., Herring, D., Schoenmaker, D. (2010). A safer world financial system:
Improving the resolution of systemic institutions. 12th Geneva Report on the
World Economy. International Center for Monetary and Banking Studies, Lon-
don.
Clementi, G. L., Hopenhayn, H. A. (2006). A theory of financing constraints and
firm dynamics. Quarterly Journal of Economics 121, 229-265.
Collins, M. (2012). Money and banking in the UK: A history. Croom Helm, Rout-
ledge.
Cordella, T., Yeyati, E. (2002). Financial opening, deposit insurance, and risk in a
model of banking competition. European Economic Review 46, 471-485.
Crosignani, M. (2015). Why are banks not recapitalized during crises? A political
economy explanation. Working paper, NYU Stern School of Business.
De Haas, R., Van Horen, N. (2012). International shock transmission after the
Lehman Brothers collapse: Evidence from syndicated lending. American Eco-
nomic Review: Papers & Proceedings 112, 231-237.
De Marco, F. (2015). Bank lending and the sovereign debt crisis. Working Paper,
Boston College.
Dell’Ariccia, G., Marquez, R. (2006). Competition among regulators and credit
market integration. Journal of Financial Economics 79, 401-430.
Dell’Ariccia, G., Detragiache, E., Rajan, R. (2008). The real effect of banking crises.
Journal of Financial Intermediation 17, 89-112.
Dell’Ariccia, G., Marquez, R. (2010). Risk and the corporate structure of banks.
Journal of Finance 65, 1075-1096.
Demirgu¨c-Kunt, A., Kane, E., Laeven, L. (2014). Deposit insurance database.
NBERWorking Paper No. 20278.
116
Bibliography
Devereux, M., Johannesen, N., Vella, J. (2013). Can taxes tame the banks? Capital
structure responses to the post-crisis bank levies. Paper presented at the CESifo
Area Conference on Public Sector Economics, April 2013.
Dewatripont, M., Tirole, J. (1993). The prudential regulation of banks. MIT Press,
MIT.
Dewatripont, M., Freixas, X. (2011). Bank resolution: a framework for the assess-
ment of regulatory intervention. Oxford Review of Economic Policy 27, 411-
436.
Diamond, D.W., Dybvig, P. (1983). Banks runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity.
Journal of Political Economy 91, 401-419.
Diamond, D.W. (1984). Financial intermediation anddelegatedmonitoring. Review
of Economic Studies 51, 393-414.
Diamond, D.W., Rajan, R. (2005). Liquidity shortages and banking crises. Journal
of Finance 60, 615-647.
European Systemic Risk Board (2014). Is Europe overbanked? Reports of the Advi-
sory Scientific Committee No.4.
Evans, D. S., Jovanovic, B. (1989). An estimated model of entrepreneurial choice
under liquidity constraints. Journal of Political Economy 97, 808-27.
Farhi, E., Tirole, J. (2012). Collective moral hazard, maturity mismatch, and sys-
temic bailouts. American Economic Review 102, 60-93.
Farhi, E., Tirole, J. (2014). Deadly embrace: Sovereign and financial balance sheets
doom loops. Harvard University Working Paper, Nr.164191.
Finkelstein, A. (2009). E-ztax: Tax salience and tax rates. Quarterly Journal of
Economics 124, 969-1010.
Ferrando, A., Mulier, K. (2013). Firms financing constraints: Do perceptions match
the actual situation. European Central Bank, Working Paper No. 1577.
Freixas, X. (2010). Post-crisis challenges to bank regulation. Economic Policy 25,
375-399.
117
Bibliography
Fuest, C., Huber, B., Mintz, J. (2005). Capital mobility and tax competition. Foun-
dations and Trends in Microeconomics 1:1 (NowPublishers, Boston andDelft),
1-62.
Gennaioli, N., Martin, A., Rossi, S. (2014). Sovereign default, domestic banks, and
financial institutions. Journal of Finance 69, 819-866.
Gertler, G., Gilchrist, M. (1994). Monetary policy, business cycles, and the behavior
of small manufacturing firms. Quarterly Journal of Economics 109, 309-340.
Gianetti,M., Laeven, L. (2012). Theflighthomeeffect: Evidence fromthe syndicated
loanmarket during financial crises. Journal of Financial Economics 104, 23-43.
Goodhart, C., Schoenmaker, D. (1995). Should the functions of monetary policy and
banking supervision be separated? Oxford Economic Papers 47, 539-560.
Goodhart, C., Schoenmaker, D. (2009). Fiscal burden sharing in cross-border bank-
ing crises. International Journal of Central Banking 5, 141-165.
Gros, D. (2013). Banking union with a sovereign virus. Intereconomics 48, 93-97.
Grossman, G., Helpman, E. (1994). Protection for sale. American Economic Re-
view 84, 833-50.
Guiso, L., Sapienza, P., Zingales, L. (2004). Does local financial developmentmatter?
Quarterly Journal of Economics 119, 929-969.
Haber, S., Perotti, E. (2008). The political economy of financial systems. Tinbergen
Institute Discussion Papers Nr. 10-022/2.
Hagan, S., Vinals, J. (2010). Resolution of cross-border banks - A proposed frame-
work for enhanced coordination. IMF Legal andMonetary and Capital Markets
Departments.
Hillman, A. (1989). Political economy of protection. HarwoodAcademic Publishers,
Chur.
Hellman, T., Murdock, K., Stiglitz, J. (2000). Liberalization, moral hazard in bank-
ing, and prudential regulation: Are capital requirements enough? American
Economic Review 90, 147-165.
Holmstro¨m, B., Tirole, J. (1993). Market liquidity and performance monitoring.
Journal of Political Economy 101, 678-709.
118
Bibliography
Holmstro¨m, B., Tirole, J. (1997). Financial intermediation, loanable funds, and the
real sector. Quarterly Journal of Economics 112, 663-691.
Holmstro¨m, B., Tirole, J. (1998). Private and public supply of liquidity. Journal of
Political Economy 106, 1-40.
Houston, J.F., Lin, C., Ma, Y. (2012). Regulatory arbitrage and international bank
flows. Journal of Finance 67, 1845-1895.
Inderst, R. (2013). Prudence as a competitive advantage: On the effects of competi-
tion on banks’ risk-taking incentives. European Economic Review 60, 127-143.
Ivashina, V., Scharfstein, D. (2010). Bank lending during the financial crisis of 2008.
Journal of Financial Economics 97, 319-338.
Jensen, M., Meckling W. (1976). Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency
costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3, 305-60.
Kahn, C., Santos, J. (2005). Allocating bank regulatory powers: lender of last resort,
deposit insurance and supervision. European Economic Review 49, 2107-2136.
Kaya, O. (2014). SME financing in the euro area. New solutions to and old problem.
EU Monitor, Global finance markets, Deutsche Bank Research, Oktober 14.
Keen. M. (2011). Rethinking the taxation of the financial sector. CESifo Economic
Studies 57, 1-24.
King, R., Levine, R. (1993). Finance and growth: Schumpeter might be right. Quar-
terly Journal of Economics 108, 717-737.
Kopecky, K., VanHoose, D. (2006). Capital regulation, heterogeneous monitoring
costs, and aggregate loan quality. Journal of Banking and Finance 30, 2235-
2255.
Laeven, L., Valencia, F. (2012). Systemic banking crises database: An update. IMF
Working Paper 12163.
Lall, R. (2012). From failure to failure: The politics of international banking regula-
tion. Review of International Political Economy 19, 609-638.
Levine, R. (2005). Finance and growth: Theory and evidence. in: Philippe Aghion
and Steven Durlauf (ed.), Handbook of Economic Growth, 865-934.
119
Bibliography
Lipsey, R.G., Lancaster, K. (1956). The general theory of second best. Review of
Economic Studies 24, 11-32.
Lloyd-Ellis, H., Bernhardt, D. (2000). Enterprise, inequality, and economic develop-
ment. Review of Economic Studies 67, 147-68.
McKinnon, R. (1973). Money and capital in economic development. Brookings
Institution Press, Washington D.C.
Midrigan,V., Xu,D.Y. (2014). Finance andmisallocation: Evidence formplant-level
data. American Economic Review 104, 422-458.
Mitchell, J. (2000). Bad debts and the cleaning, transferring of banks’ balance
sheets: An application to transition economies. Journal of Financial Inter-
mediation 10, 1-27.
Morrison, A., White, L. (2005). Crises and capital requirements in banking. Ameri-
can Economic Review 95, 1548-1572.
Morrison, A., White, L. (2009). Level playing fields in international financial regula-
tion. Journal of Finance 64, 1099-1142.
Navaretti,G.B.,Calzolari,G., Pozzolo,A.F., Levi,M. (2010). Multinationalbanking
in Europe - financial stability and regulatory implications: lessons from the
financial crisis. Economic Policy 64, 703-753.
Niepmann, F. (2013). Banking across borders. CESifo Working Paper No. 4120.
Munich.
Niepmann, F., Schmidt-Eisenlohr, T. (2013). Bank bailouts, international linkages,
and cooperation. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 5, 270-305.
Niskanen, W. (1971). Bureaucracy and representative government. Aldine-
Atherton, Chicago.
OECD (2014). Financing SMEs and entrepreneurs 2014: An OECD scoreboard.
OECD Publishing, Paris.
Ongena, S., Popov, A., Udell, G. (2013). ”When the cat’s away the mice will play”:
Does regulation at home affect bank risk-taking abroad?. Journal of Financial
Economics 108, 727-750.
120
Bibliography
Peek, J., Rosengren, E.S. (1997). The international transmission of financial shocks:
The case of Japan. American Economic Review 87, 495-505.
Philippon, T. (2015). Has the US finance industry become less efficient? On the
theory and measurement of financial intermediation. American Economic Re-
view 105, 1408-1438.
Popov, A., Udell, G.F. (2012). Cross-border banking, credit access, and the financial
crisis. Journal of International Economics 87, 147-161.
Popov, A., van Horen, N. (2014). Exporting sovereign stress: Evidence from syn-
dicated bank lending during the euro area sovereign debt crisis. Review of Fi-
nance 19, 1-42.
Rajan, R., Zingales, L. (1998). Financial dependence and growth. American Eco-
nomic Review 88, 559-86.
Rajan, R., Zingales, L. (2003). The great reversals: The politics of financial devel-
opment in the 20th century. Journal of Financial Economics 69, 5-50.
Reinhart, C., Sbrancia, B. (2015). The liquidation of government debt. Economic
Policy 82, 291-333.
Repullo,R. (2000). Whoshouldactasa lenderof last resort? An incomplete contracts
model. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 32, 580-605.
Repullo, R. (2004). Capital requirements, market power, and risk taking in banking.
Journal of Financial Intermediation 13, 156-182.
Rochet, J.-Ch. (1992). Capital requirements and thebehaviour of commercial banks.
European Economic Review 36, 1137-1178.
Roubini, N., Sala-i Martin, X. (1992). Financial repression and economic growth.
Journal of Development Economics 39, 5-30.
Samuelson, P. (1954). The theory of public expenditure. Review of Economics and
Statistics 37, 350-356.
Sengupta, R. (2007). Foreign entry and bank competition. Journal of Financial
Economics 84, 502-528.
Shaw, E. (1973). Financial deepening in economic development. Oxford University
Press, New York.
121
Bibliography
Shleifer, A., Vishny, R. (1998). The grabbing hand. Harvard University Press.
Sinn, H.W. (1980). O¨konomische Entscheidungen bei Ungewissheit. Mohr Siebeck,
T¨ı¿➼bingen.
Sinn,H.W. (1997). The selectionprinciple andmarket failure in systemscompetition.
Journal of Public Economics 66, 247-274.
Sinn, H.W. (2003). Risktaking, limited liability, and the competition of bank regu-
lators. Finanzarchiv 59, 305-329.
Stigler, J (1971). The theory of economic regulation. The Bell Journal of Economics
and Management Science 2, 3-21.
Stiglitz, J.,Weiss A. (1981). Credit rationing inmarkets with imperfect information.
American Economic Review 71, 393-410.
Tirole, J. (2012). The euro crisis: some reflections on institutional reform. Banque
de France, Financial Stability Review, 225-42.
van Riet, A. (2013). Financial repression to ease fiscal stress: turning back the clock
in the eurozone? in Banco Central do Brasil, Financial Stability and Banking,
Sao Paolo.
Weidmann, J. (2013). Stop encouraging banks to buy government bonds. in The
Financial Times, September 30, 2013.
Weinberg, J. (2002). Competition among bank regulators. Economic Quartlerly,
19-36.
122
Eidesstattliche Versicherung
Ich versichere hiermit eidesstattlich, dass ich die vorliegende Arbeit selbsta¨ndig und
ohne fremde Hilfe verfasst habe. Die aus fremden Quellen direkt oder indirekt
u¨bernommenen Gedanken sowie mir gegebenen Anregungen sind als solche kenntlich
gemacht. Die Arbeit wurde bisher keiner anderen Pru¨fungsbeho¨rde vorgelegt und
auch noch nicht vero¨ffentlicht. Sofern ein Teil der Arbeit aus bereits vero¨ffentlichten
Papers besteht, habe ich dies ausdru¨cklich angegeben.
Mu¨nchen, 25. Juni 2015
Ulf Maier
